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U\'  ''Wl  \  lI'iXAL     PORTRAITS HOMER     LEA 

General  Lea's  uniform  in  the  above  picture  is  that  of  a  lieutenant-general.  The  gold 
buttons  have  the  coiled  dragon  surmounted  bv  three  stars.  The  medal  on  the  side 
is  that  of  the  Pong  Wong  Whin.  The  gold  star  suspended  by  a  crimson  ribbon 
from  the  neck  bears  the  medallion  of  the  Emperor  Kwang  Hsu,  and  these  words  : 
"To  Homer  Lea  from  Kang  Yu  Wei."  His  Excellency  Kang  Yu  Wei  was  the 
Emperor's  chier  adviser  at  the  time  of  his  deposition  in  iSoS. 


THE  DAY  OF 

THE   SAXON 


BY 

HOMER     LEA 

AUTHOR  OF 
"THE  VALOR  OF  IGNORANCE" 


General  Homer  Lea 
Author  of  The  Day  of  the  Saxon 


NEW    YORK     AND     LONDON 

HARPER     a^'     BROTHERS     PUBLISHERS 

M  C  M  X  I  I 


COPYRIGHT.    1912.    BY    HARPER   a    BROTHERS 

PRINTED   IN    THE    UNITED   STATES   OF   AMERICA 

PUBLISHED   JUNE.    1912 


FIELD-MARSHAL    LORD     ROBERTS 

V.  C,  K.  G. 


CONTENTS 


CHAP.  PAGE 

Preface ix 


BOOK  I 

I.  The  Saxon  and  His  Empire i 

II.  The  British  Empire  and  War 6 

III.  The  Saxon  and  America 25 

IV.  The  Saxon  and  India 44 

V.  The  Saxon  and  India  (continued) 54 

VI.  The  Saxon  and  the  Pacific 66 

VII.  The  Saxon  and  Eastern  Asia 82 

VIII.  The  Saxon  and  the  Russian 100 

IX.  The  Saxon  and  Europe 119 

X.  The  Saxon  and  the  Germans 129 

BOOK  II 

I.  The  British  Empire  and  the  World 149 

II.  Limitations  of  Naval  Warfare 164 

III.  Limitations  of  Naval  Warfare  (continued)      .    .  173 

IV.  Saxon  Struggle  for  Survival — Russia 186 

V.  Saxon  Struggle  for  Survival — Germany  ....  202 

VI.  Preparation  and  Conflict 216 

VII.  Unity  of  Forces 230 

Index 243 


LIST  OF  CHARTS 

Chart  I ^'^'"«  ^-  ^4 

Chart  II "        78 

Chart  III "      "^ 

Chart  IV "       ^^ 


PREFACE 

THIS  is  the  second  volume  of  that  work  dealing 
with  new  phases  of  military  science  as  they 
affect  national  existence  which  has  occupied  my  time 
for  several  years  past.  The  first  volume  was  The 
Valor  of  Ignorance;  the  third  is  not  yet  completed. 

I  have  many  persons  to  thank  for  the  interest 
they  have  shown  in  the  progress  of  this  volume,  and 
I  wish  particularly  to  thank  Sir  John  George  Tolle- 
mache  Sinclair,  Bart,  of  Thurso  Castle,  who  has  been 
most  kind  in  securing  various  data,  etc.,  for  me. 

This    book    has    been    written    under    numerous 

difficulties.     Begun  in  America,  parts  were  written 

upon  every  continent  and  every  sea,  being  finally 

completed  in  Asia.     Begun  in  profound  peace,  the 

concluding   chapters  were  finished   upon   a   recent 

field  of  battle. 

H.  L. 

Nanking,  China. 


BOOK    I 

It  is  a  law  of  nature  common  to  all  mankind,  which  no 
time  shall  annul  or  destroy,  that  those  who  have  more 
strength  and  excellence  shall  bear  rule  over  those  who 
have  less. — Dionysius. 


THE    DAY    OF    THE 
SAXON 


THE    SAXON    A-VD    EI5    EilPIRE 

Origin  of  Xacionai  D-v-t-rra:::- —  De-rre-  :c  TT^.— Old  and  New 
Patriotism. 

WPEEX  we  consider  ir.tere5:5  vital  to  national 
existence  we  can  ciinrrrr.::i:e  b-t  slightly  be- 
tween them  and  the  personal  ~j^r-:5  that  control 
individual  efforts.  Both  are  r:::vri  by  the  same 
impulses,  and  over  both  the  sane  wide  vanities  and 
fears  hold  dominion.  Nations  are  not  introspective 
any  more  than  are  indi^'iduals.  and  the  degree  that 
crises  affect  them  is  determined  inversely  by  the 
remoteness  in  time  and  space  of  their  occurrence. 
What  has  happened  in  the  past  or  what  may  take 
place  in  the  future,  what  goes  on  without  the  thresh- 
old or  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  state,  has  Httle 
^ect  upon  mankind  as  compared  with  the  influence 
of  internal  affairs  and  the  domestic  concerns  of  the 
present. 

I 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

In  the  circumscription  of  man's  fealty  to  his  imme- 
diate time  and  environment  is  to  be  foimd  the  origin 
of  all  national  and  racial  disintegration.  When  men 
abandon  with  reluctance  their  own  dunghills  for 
the  glories  of  their  God,  the  fretful  moments  of  their 
existence  for  the  calm  of  eternal  time,  how  fragile 
are  their  racial  bonds  and  how  futile  are  the  hopes 
based  upon  them ! 

By  the  efforts  men  make  to  preserve  their  families 
from  want,  from  servitude  or  destruction  do  we 
judge  their  domestic  virtues.  In  such  a  manner, 
only  to  a  larger  degree,  should  judgment  be  rendered 
upon  these  same  men  according  to  the  efforts  they 
make  toward  a  like  preser\^ation  of  their  race.  If  a 
man  who  gives  over  his  family  to  the  vicissitudes  of 
his  neglect  is  deserving  of  scorn,  how  great  should  be 
the  contempt  felt  for  him  who  evades  the  obligations 
he  owes  his  race  and  gives  over,  not  alone  his  family, 
but  all  his  people  to  conquest  or  destruction, 
r  Public  fealty  is  only  a  nobler  conception  of  the 
duty  a  man  owes  his  family.  A  nation  is  a  union  of 
families;  patriotism  the  synthesis  of  their  domestic 
virtues.  The  ruin  of  states,  like  the  ruin  of  famiHes, 
comes  from  one  cause — neglect.  To  neglect  one's 
family  is  to  lose  it;  to  neglect  one's  country  is  to 
perish  with  it.  Individuals  are  a  part  of  the  world 
'  only  in  the  duration  or  memory  of  their  race. 

The  British  Empire  stands  in  the  same  relation  to 
this  neglect,  its  causes  and  results,  as  all  other  nations 
that  have  gone  down  because  of  it.     Wars  have 


THE    SAXON    AND    HIS    EMPIRE 

brought  about  the  formation  of  this  Empire ;  and  wars 
will  prolong  or  shorten  its  existence  according  as  to 
whether  or  not  the  British  people  prepare  for  those 
inevitable  struggles  that  are  now  approaching  and 
which  belong  in  no  way  to  the  ephemeral  ordinances 
or  the  passions  of  men  but  are  a  part  of  those  ele- 
mental forces  that  take  no  cognizance  of  mankind 
nor  of  his  institutions. 

Factors  that  determine  the  length  or  brevity  of 
wars  are  invariable  in  their  application,  and  the  con- 
ditions circimiscribing  the  military  relationship  of 
the  Empire  to  the  world  are  reducible  to  three 
principles : 

1.  When  the  military  preparedness  of  the  British 
Empire  is  developed  proportionately  to  that  of  its 
strongest  enemy  and  continues  in  constant  progres- 
sion during  peace,  the  number  of  its  wars,  their 
duration  and  destruction  of  life,  is  reduced  to  a 
minimum. 

2.  Whenever  its  state  of  mil[ta.ry  preparedness  is 
only  equal  to  the  least  militant  power,  then  it  is 
capable  of  waging  war  only  '^'ith  such  a  nation. 
These  wars  are  the  longest  in  duration  and  are  the 
greatest  in  the  destruction  of  life  and  property. 

3.  When  a  state  of  militar^^  preparedness  is  highl}'' 
developed  in  the  enemy  and  lacking  in  the  British 
Empire,  the  destruction  of  the  Empire  "^^11  ensue 
if  that  attack  is  developed  in  Europe  against  the 
United  Kingdom  or  is  directed  against  the  Indian 
frontiers. 

3 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

The  British  Empire  will  be  destroyed  only  through 
those  avertable  causes  which  the  Saxon  now  dreads 
to  contemplate.  Yet  it  is  because  of  this  evasion 
that  the  defense  of  the  Empire  falls  away  and  the 
time  of  its  dissolution  draws  near. 

To  understand  the  true  significance  of  an  empire 
as  vast  and  fragile  as  that  of  the  Saxon  one  must 
have  no  fixed  opinions  concerning  its  military  pro- 
gression, but  must,  on  the  other  hand,  make  the 
acquisition  of  such  knowledge  the  basic  principle 
of  his  patriotism. 

The  Saxon  has  marked  around  this  earth,  as  has 
no  other  race  before  him,  the  scarlet  circle  of  his 
power.  This  thin,  red  Saxon  line,  so  thin  with  his 
numbers,  so  red  with  his  blood,  was  made  possible 
only  by  his  heroism  and  racial  fealty.  Where  this 
line  has  not  gone  man  has  not  found.  It  has  crossed 
every  sea;  it  has  traversed  every  desert ;  it  has  sought 
every  solitude;  it  has  passed  through  swamps  where 
only  the  sacred  ibis  fishes ;  over  sands  that  have  never 
been  moistened ;  over  snows  that  have  never  melted. 
There  has  been  no  storm  it  has  not  encoimtered,  no 
pain  it  has  not  endured;  no  race  it  has  not  fought, 
and  no  disease  it  has  not  contended  with.  This 
Saxon  line  has  been  to  the  earth  a  girdle  tragic  and 
heroic,  binding  within  itself  all  the  old  and  great 
places  of  the  world.  It  has  been  silent  in  its  duty, 
ignored  in  its  achievement,  and  scorned  in  its  devo- 
tion; yet  it  has  given  down  to  this  now  neglectful 
race  a  world  such  as  mankind  has  never  known  be- 

4 


THE    SAXON    AND    HIS    EMPIRE 

fore;  an  empire  over  which  the  sun  and  stars  shine 
together;  where  night  never  falls  nor  dawn  begins. 
At  this  late  hour  or  never  must  the  Saxon  people 
arouse  themselves  to  the  somber  consequences  of 
their  neglect  and  break  away  from  the  pleasant 
security  of  their  delusions.  To  them  has  now  come 
that  gloomy  dawn  so  familiar  to  man  throughout 
all  the  nights  and  dawns  he  has  bedded  and  risen 
together,  falling  asleep  upon  a  peaceful  earth  and 
getting  up  to  find  it  a  place  of  strife;  going  to  bed 
under  the  serene  and  happy  heavens  and  awakening 
to  find  them  filled  with  demons;  laying  his  head 
upon  the  pillow  of  his  gods  and  rising  to  find  him- 
self abandoned.  This  has  ever  been  the  fate  of 
nations  as  they  have  laid  themselves  down  to  sleep 
throughout  the  ages  much  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
Saxon  race,  in  all  their  glory  and  hope  and  vanity, 
only  to  awake  at  a  predetermined  hour  to  find  them- 
selves upon  a  savage  dawn,  stripped  and  desolate. 


II 

THE    BRITISH    EMPIRE    AND   WAR 

War  Basic  Principle  in  National  Progression. — Preparation  Constant 
in  Change. — Determination  of  Source  and  Approximate  Time  of 
Simple. — Law  of  Survival  Immutable. — British  Empire  Made 
from  Fragments  of  Four  Powers. — Now  Confronted  by  Four. — 
Laws  Governing  Future  Decisive  Hostilities. — Militancy  Divis- 
ible into  Three  Phases. — Duration  of  Peace. — Application  to 
British  Empire. 

THE  scorn  of  war,  like  the  denial  of  death,  be- 
longs to  the  same  category  of  self-deception.  It 
is  the  derision  of  the  non-apparent.  It  is  the  hate 
of  hateful  realities.  So  mankind  hides  it  away  from 
himself  in  those  deeper  cellars  of  his  consciousness 
where,  all  heaped  together,  are  secreted  his  hidden 
fears.  National  valor  based  on  concealment  is  no 
more  than  the  spontaneous  expression  of  national 
fears,  the  mad  struggle  of  them  under  the  propulsion 
of  necessity  .  To  evade  the  contemplation  of  in- 
dividual extinction  is  identical,  in  a  general  sense, 
with  that  subterfuge  practised  by  unmartial  nations 
toward  war.  The  inevitability  of  both  is  recognized, 
but  the  application  of  this  knowledge  is  relegated, 
not  to  themselves,  but  to  all  other  men  and  all 
j  other  nations. 
''  6 


THE    BRITISH    EMPIRE    AND    WAR 

War  is  a  part  of  life,  and  its  place  in  national ' 
existence  is  fixed  and  predetermined.  Human  equiv- 
ocation cannot  affect  its  status;  nor  the  laws  of 
mankind  its  application.  To  the  degree  that  war 
is  a  basic  principle  in  national  progression  must 
preparation  for  its  conduct  be  specific.  There  can 
be  no  scorn  of  it,  nor  denial,  nor  fear,  nor  the  sub- 
stitution of  human  ordinances  for  those  that  are  ; 
cognizant  of  man  only  in  the  aggregate. 

While  the  policy  of  statesmen  in  one  generation 
may  affect,  for  good  or  for  evil,  the  affairs  of  the 
nation  in  a  distant  period  of  time,  there  still  exists, 
nevertheless,  that  effective  coimterpoise  of  constant 
readjustment  of  international  relationship  that  is 
determined,  not  by  the  statesmen  themselves,  but 
by  external  conditions  over  which  they  have  no 
control  and  from  which  they  have  no  defense  except  J 
to  readjust  their  policies  and  systems. 

In  this  manner,  and  no  other,  must  the  conduct  of 
a  nation's  military  poHcy  be  carried  on.  The  same 
external  control  remains  paramount  and  constant; 
and,  as  the  probabihties  of  war  shift  from  one  na- 
tion to  another,  preparations  must  shift  accordingly; 
a  state  of  preparedness  must  always  exist  that  is 
variable  yet  specific. 

This  fundamental  principle  is  denied  by  the 
British  Empire  in  its  miHtary  development,  as  it  is 
by  America  and  China.  The  latter  is  now  paving 
the  price  of  its  scorn ;  and,  though  the  penalty  has 
not  as  yet  been   exacted  from  America  and   the 

7 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

British  Empire,  the  time  is  near  at  hand  when  the 
old  Shylock  of  their  disdain  shall  bare  the  breasts 
of  both. 

To  the  multitude  of  a  nation  engrossed  in  their 
own  affairs  it  seems  impossible  to  foretell  the  ap- 
proach of  war,  the  place  from  which  it  shall  come  and 
the  manner  of  its  conflict.  Hence  it  is  that  in  na- 
tions governed  by  popular  will  the  preparation  for 
war  is,  according  to  the  degree  that  the  populace 
controls  such  legislation,  general  in  character  and 
useless  in  application. 

In  the  formative  processes  of  national  life  and  in 
their  eventual  dissolution  there  is  nothing  uncertain 
nor  mysterious  in  the  determination  of  the  quarter 
from  whence  wars  shall  come  nor  the  approximate 
time  of  their  approach.  But  whenever  legislation 
affecting  war  is  determined  by  popular  will,  such 
legislation  becomes  incoherent;  when  controlled  by 
constitutional  limitations,  it  becomes  inflexible  and 
passes  into  a  state  of  dry  rot.  Like  the  puff-ball, 
it  retains  its  outward  semblance,  yet  the  heart  of  it 
is  no  more  than  dust. 

"  When  we  consider  that  characteristic  now  so  pre- 
dominant in  the  nations  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race, 
of  allowing  individual  wants  to  take  precedence  over 
the  vital  interests  of  national  existence,  we  find  in  it 

Levery  source  of  militant  immobility  and  decay. 
The  Sim  never  sets  on  the  same  political  and 
military  conditions  that  its  first  rays  illumine.     The 
rapidity  of  this  diurnal  change  is  not  apparent  to 

8 


THE    BRITISH    EMPIRE    AND    WAR 

nan,  sunk  in  his  own  affairs,  for  he  views  the  pro- 
gression of  national  and  worldly  events — if  he  views 
them  at  all — in  the  same  manner  as  he  regards, 
unconcernedly  and  concretely,  the  drift  of  the  stream. 
He  is  cognizant  of  it  only  as  a  whole.  Yet  it  is  the 
unnumbered  minute  particles  that  constitute  its 
volume  and  their  ceaseless  surging  that  determines 
its  movement.  As  a  river  viewed  from  a  distance 
appears  an  immovable  mass,  so  in  like  manner  does 
the  individual  of  Anglo-Saxon  nations  regard  the 
flow  and  volume  of  national  events.  It  is  because 
of  this  that  their  military  systems  have  become 
fixed ;  whereas,  if  state  and  race  are  to  survive,  their 
flexibility  should  be  in  constant  ratio  to  the  causes 
that  determine  their  institution. 

The  British  Empire  stands  in  no  different  rela- 
tion to  these  elemental  characteristics  of  warfare 
than  any  other  nation  that  has  ever  existed,  though 
the  utilization  of  its  military  power,  governed  by  dif- 
ferent conditions,  may  bear  but  little  resemblance 
to  the  military  activities  of  other  nations.  We  are 
not  at  present  concerned  with  the  expression  of 
British  militancy,  but  only  with  its  constitution 
and  the  fundamental  principles  that  govern  its 
relationship  to  the  continuance  and  preservation 
of  the  Empire. 

Bitter  as  the  realization  of  it  may  be,  bitter  as  is 
the  contemplation  of  national  fragility  and  the  futile 
struggle  of  man  to  find  refuge  in  the  delusion  of  uni- 
versal peace,  the  natural  law  of  survival  remains 

9 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON    • 

immutable.  The  Saxon  Empire  can  endure  only 
so  long  as  her  miHtary  development  remains  constant 
to  her  poHtical  expansion  and  the  economic  develop- 
ment of  her  territories.  This  military-  development 
moreover  must  be  proportionate  to  the  mihtary, 
political,  and  commercial  expansion  of  all  other  na- 
tions, singly  and  in  coaUtion.  Never,  so  long  as 
their  expansion,  whether  militant,  poHtical,  or  econ- 
omic, is  convergent  with  the  Empire's  established 
interests,  can  British  mihtancy  remain  dormant  or 
evade  its  responsibilities. 

{""    The  same  causes  and  the  identical  means  that 

j  brought  about  the  estabhshment  of  all  other  na- 
tions produced  in  Hke  manner  the  British  Empire. 
By  wars  and  conquests,  by  theft  and  intrigue,  by 

'  the  same  brutal  use  of  physical  power,  was  it  put  to- 
gether piece  by  piece. 

The  brutaHty  of  all  national  development  is  ap- 
parent, and  we  make  no  excuse  for  it.  To  conceal 
it  would  be  a  denial  of  fact ;  to  glamour  it  over,  an 
apology  to  truth.  There  is  Uttle  in  Hfe  that  is  not 
brutal  except  our  ideal.  As  we  increase  the  aggre- 
gate of  individuals  and  their  collective  activities,  we 
increase  proportionately  their  brutality. 

"  Nations  cannot  be  created,  nor  can  they  become 
great,  by  any  purely  ethical  or  spiritual  expansion. 
The  estabhshment,  in  great  or  small  entities,  of 
tribes  and  states  is  the  resultant  only  of  their  phy- 
sical power;  and  whenever  there  is  a  reversal,  or  an 
attempted  reversal  to  this,  the  result  is  either  in- 

lO 


THE    BRITISH    EMPIRE    AND    WAR 

temal  dissolution  or  sudden  destruction,  their  dis- 
membered territories  going  to  make  up  the  dominions 
of  their  conquerors. 

In  just  such  a  manner  has  the  British  Empire 
been  made  up  from  the  fragments  of  four  great  mari- 
time powers ;  the  satrapies  of  petty  potentates  and  the 
wilderness  of  nameless  savages. 

When  the  commercial  power  of  Venice  and  Genoa 
passed  over  to  Portugal  and  Spain,  these  two  powers 
had,  by  their  discoveries  and  conquest,  divided,  in 
a  practical  sense,  the  world  between  them.  Yet 
the  militant  decay  began  early  to  manifest  itself 
in  Portugal,  and  by  the  end  of  the  melancholy  reign 
of  John  III.  it  had  made  its  final  exit  from  the  camps 
of  dominant  kingdoms.  In  like  manner  Spain  began 
to  go  down  after  the  revolt  of  the  Netherlands. 

Holland,  France,  and  England  then  assumed  the 
power  of  these  two  decadent  states  in  the  same  man- 
ner as  they  had  taken  over  the  abandoned  possessions 
of  other  states  and  tribes. 

It  was  not  until  after  the  Peace  of  Bredo  that  the 
decline  of  Holland  began,  discordant,  desperate,  in- 
evitable. It  suffered  from  the  old  disease  of  na- 
tions, that  universal  paresis,  the  delusion  that  trade 
and  its  gold  constitutes  a  national  asset  capable  of 
indefinite  progression,  and  is  freed  from  concomitant 
miHtary  expansion.  So  it  descended  from  the  dais 
of  its  greatness  and  now  sits  in  the  shadow  of  other 
kingdoms'  footstools  —  a  jester  in  the  motley  of 
universal  peace. 

2  II 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

The  going  down  of  Holland  was  followed  by  that 
of  France,  beginning  subsequent  to  the  Seven 
Years'  War  and  ending  in  the  days  of  the  Revolution. 
With  the  decline  of  France  as  a  maritime  power, 
continental  supremacy  upon  the  sea  was  at  an  end. 
By  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century  England  had 
gathered  together  the  wreckage  of  these  nations — 
the  wreckage  for  which  she  was  not  alone  responsible. 
By  their  vanity  and  ignorance,  by  her  valor  and 
brutality — as  is  the  way  of  nations — she  seized,  one 
by  one,  their  seas  and  dominions. 

Now,  after  a  century  of  rule,  of  such  supremacy 
as  mankind  has  never  heretofore  known,  the  British 
Empire  is  confronted,  not  by  one,  but  by  four  powers 
in  the  eventual  struggle  for  the  suzerainty  of  one- 
third  the  world.  Each  of  these  nations  is  propor- 
tionately better  qualified  to  wrest  it  from  the  Saxons 
than  were  they,  from  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  to 
the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  capable  of  tak- 
ing it  by  force  of  arms  from  Portugal,  Spain,  Hol- 
land, and  France. 

It  is  not,  however.  In  the  military  potentiality  of 
these  Powers  that  the  dread  of  the  Briton  should  be 
found,  but  rather  in  the  fundamental  difference  that 
exists  between  the  conquests  of  the  sixteenth  and 
the  twentieth  centuries.  In  those  earlier  centuries 
the  hunt  and  bagging  of  states  was  rather  the  result 
of  individual  lust  for  individual  loot  and  was,  in 
consequence,  restricted.  Now  all  is  changed;  the 
individual  has  given  way  to  his  composite  self,  the 

12 


THE    BRITISH    EMPIRE    AND   WAR 

nation,  and  the  loot  of  town  and  tavern  has  given 
way  to  the  universal  thievery  of  natural  resources 
that  modern  civilization  has  made  necessary  for  the 
progression  of  man  and  the  supremacy  of  his  politi- 
cal institutions.  In  those  old  days  it' was  the  order- 
less  strife  of  individuals ;  now  it  is  the  predetermined 
struggle  of  nations.  In  those  times  when  the  world 
was  opulent  and  the  greed  of  man  was  the  small 
greed  of  his  single  self,  mankind  marauded  rather 
than  warred.  Now  it  is  the  struggle  of  nations  in 
the  last  looting  of  Nature;  increasing  each  year  in 
intensity,  not  alone  by  the  added  increment  of  popu- 
lation, but  by  the  development  of  material  science 
and  the  growing  hungers  of  our  insatiable  civilization. 
The  two  laws  that  govern  in  the  future  the  out- 
break of  decisive  hostilities,  we  state  as  follows: 

1.  When  the  resources  of  one  nation  stand  in 
inverse  ratio  to  its  military  power,  and  the  military 
capacity  of  its  competitor  is  proportionate  to  the 
needs  of  its  race,  then  war  will  ensue  when  the 
military  decadence  of  one  and  the  economic  ne- 
cessities of  the  other  reach  a  known  point. 

2.  When  the  exploitation  of  the  natural  resources 
of  a  nation  militarily  weak  is  prohibitive  to  nations 
militarily  strong,  war  will  ensue  when  the  economic 
needs  of  the  militant  powers  exceed  their  own  nat- 
ural resources. 

It  is  in  these  two  principles  that  is  found  the  true 
source  and  terribleness  of  those  wars  that  must  in 
due  time  fall  upon  the  British  Empire. 

13 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

5       The  inevitability  of  wars  cannot  be  determined 
upon    by   the    extraneous    manifestations    of   their 
•^  precipitating   causes.     These   causes   have   nothing 

^  ff  to  do  with  the  source  of  war  and,  strange  as  it  may 

seem,  have  only  the  slightest  effect  upon  the  combat 
itself.  The  sources  of  war  are  constant  and  im- 
mutable, differing  only  in  the  viewpoint  of  the  ob- 
server, while  the  apparent  and  precipitating  causes 
are  no  more  than  ephemeral,  coming  and  going  from 
time  to  time,  as  the  fluttering  of  smoke  over  some 
crater-top.  Yet  it  is  upon  this  coming  and  going 
of  the  immaterial  that  the  false  doctrine  of  arbi- 
tration is  based. 

As  the  complexity  of  civilization  increases,  with  a 
corresponding  augmentation  of  popular  control  in 
governmental  affairs,  the  personal  element  in  war- 
fare vanishes.  In  future  wars  the  rages  of  kings  and 
the  schemes  of  their  ministers  will  play  no  part; 
their  origin  now  rests  in  the  contact  of  nations  and 
races,  in  the  convergence  of  their  expansion.  Due 
to  this  fact,  that  uncertain  element,  the  hates  of 
monarchs  and  the  ambitions  of  their  ministers,  is 
eliminated,  and  the  determination  of  the  approach 
of  war  becomes  more  exact.  We  have  already 
enunciated  the  law  governing  the  convergence  of 
nations.^ 

The  basic  principle  of  war  has  been  the  same  for 
all  time  and  will  continue  so  until  the  end  of  human 
contention.     Only  the  immediate  causes  and  manner 
^  The  Valor  of  Ignorance. 
14 


^^ 


THE    BRITISH    EMPIRE    AND   WAR 

of  war,  those  last  straws  that  break  down  the  peace 
of  nations,  alter  from  age  to  age.  In  the  past  it  was 
the  individual  who  was  the  predominant  factor; 
to-day,  nations;  to-morrow,  races. 

It  is  in  the  political  and  geographical  situation  of 
the  British  Empire  that  we  must  look  to  its  freedom 
from  war  or  its  position  as  the  storm-center  of  those 
terrible  struggles  that  must  fall  upon  the  world 
sometime  on  the  morrow. 

In  exact  proportion  as  the  Empire  is  removed  from 
the  expanding  spheres  of  other  nations  will  it  be 
freed  from  the  environment  of  combat;  but  to  the 
degree  that  the  reverse  is  true  the  Empire  is  placed 
within  the  sphere  of  war. 

The  character  of  the  British  Dominion  is  different 
from  any  of  the  great  empires  that  have  preceded 
it.  It  not  only  consists  of  one-fourth  the  land  sur- 
face, but  the  suzerainty  of  the  Five  Seas.  It  is  over 
this  seventeen- twentieths  of  the  world  that  broods  the 
jealous  yet  anxious  scowl  of  the  Saxon  race.  That 
British  rule  should,  in  various  degrees  of  sovereignty, 
exercise  its  dominion  over  seventeen-twentieths  of 
the  world's  surface  is  significant  of  just  that  degree 
of  repression  toward  all  other  nations,  their  rights 
and  expansion  by  land  or  by  sea. 

It  is  not  so  much  in  the  vastness  of  British  pos- 
sessions that  are  found  conditions  provocative  of 
war  as  it  is  in  its  geographical  distribution.  It  is 
not  a  segregated  sovereignty  occupying,  as  the  Rus- 
sian Empire,  a  comer  or  contiguous  portion  of  the 

15 


THE    DAY   OF    THE    SAXON 

earth,  but  forms,  on  the  other  hand,  a  circle  around 
the  entire  globe,  within  which  is  placed  all  the  other 
powers  of  the  world;  and  not  one  of  them  can  follow 
their  lines  of  natural  expansion  without,  sooner  or 
later,  being  brought  into  direct  contact  with  the 
"British  Dominion. 

It  is  not  for  us  to  comment  on  this  portentous 
circle,  this  stupendous  yet  shadowy  girdle,  that  holds 
for  the  human  race  so  much  of  terror  and  of  gratitude, 
so  much  of  freedom  and  of  war.  It  is  enough  to 
make  evident  its  presence  and  its  potentialities. 

At  the  present  time  no  great  nation  in  Europe  or 
Asia  can  move  on  those  radii  of  expansion,  as  de- 
termined by  natural  law,  radii  upon  which  they  must 
move  or  fall  into  decadence,  without  the  prior  de- 
struction of  Saxon  sovereignty.  It  is  because  of 
this  that  we  find  in  Europe  more  than  sixteen  million 
soldiers  and  in  Asia  more  than  three  millions  to 
break  forth  at  some  predetermined  time,  singly  or 
in  coalition,  and  shatter  the  vast  yet  fragile  circle 
of  British  power. 

As  we  contemplate  the  Saxon  armies  of  less  than 
half  a  million  men,  scattered  around  the  world  on 
this  never-ending  circle  under  the  pretense  of  guard- 
ing against  twice  ten  million  men,  there  is  recalled  to 
us  a  similar  scene  that  one  may  look  upon  from  the 
northern  slopes  of  the  Wu  Tai  Mountains,  where 
the  old  wall  of  China  stretches  like  the  British  wall 
over  dominions  it  can  no  longer  defend.  Over 
mountain   chains,    through    deserts,    across   rivers, 

i6 


THE    BRITISH    EMPIRE    AND   WAR 

around  principalities  and  states  it  goes  on  and  on 
until  one  would  almost  imagine  that  there  was 
neither  end  nor  beginning  to  it.  But  alas,  the  end 
of  the  wall  is  there ;  there  at  every  point  upon  which 
the  eye  rests.  It  is  no  longer  a  wall:  it  is  a  monu- 
ment. 

So  now  as  we  meditate  upon  the  Hving  wall  of 
Britain,  extending  not  across  a  northern  frontier,  but 
around  and  around  the  world,  we  see  only  the  pres- 
ent in  its  counterpart  of  antiquity.  Like  the  old 
wall  of  Hoangti,  its  watch  towers  have  crumbled, 
but  man  rather  than  time  has  thrown  them  down. 
The  Saxon  himself,  and  not  the  enemy,  has  put  out 
its  watch-fires,  torn  down  its  merlons,  and  made  the 
wide  breaches  between  its  bastions.  It  is  no  longer 
a  barrier,  but,  not  unlike  the  old  wall  of  China,  it  is 
a  monument,  a  monument  to  the  dead  that  built 
it  and  to  the  spirit  that  has  all  butdeparted. 

We  have,  heretofore,  found  that  the  militancy  of  a  I 
race  is  primarily  dependent  upon  necessity;  and,  as 
this  condition  passes,  the  militancy  dependent  upon  it 
deteriorates;  and,  while  the  necessity  of  militancy    9^ 
must  return  to  a  race  at  some  subsequent  period,  the       ^  v 
militant  spirit  does  not  return  simultaneously  with      '-  ^ 
it.     Because  of  this  single  tragic  fact,  do  nations, 
whenever  they  reach  such  pre-eminence  among  other 
states  as  to  appear  to  themselves  impregnable,  sanc- 
tion the  degeneration  of  the  military  spirit.     When 
this  decadence  reaches  a  certain  point,  the  nation,  re- 
gardless of  its  wealth,  area,  or  population  is  destroyed^ 

17 


'(^3^ 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

Militancy  is  divisible  into  three  distinct  phases: 

1.  The  militancy  of  the  struggle  to  survive. 

2.  The  militancy  of  conquest. 

3.  The  militancy  of  supremacy  or  preservation  of 
ownership. 

It  is  in  the  first  that  the  mihtary  genius  of  a  people 
reaches  its  height.  It  is  in  the  last  that  the  nation 
takes  its  final  departure  from  the  affairs  of  mankind. 

The  Saxon  race  has  apparently  entered  upon  this 
last  stage  of  militancy.  The  old  ideals  that  made 
possible  the  Empire  have  been  put  aside.  The 
militant  spirit  has  become  of  secondary  considera- 
tion: it  is  now  hardly  more  than  that  spirit  of  the 
trade  rat,  redolent  and  satisfied  in  the  accumulation 
of  that  which  is  useless  to  national  and  racial  pro- 
gression. 

It  is,  therefore,  the  purpose  of  this  work  to  examine 
into,  not  alone  the  probabilities  of  war  that  must 
eventually  result  in  the  destruction  of  the  Empire, 
but  into  the  possibilities  of  bringing  about  a  militant 
renascence  of  the  Saxon  race  before  their  day  is 
finally  done. 

We  have  considered  in  a  general  sense  the  main 
factors  that  determine  the  militant  decadence  of  a 
race  or  state,  but  we  have  omitted  one  salient  factor 
— the  control  by  statesmen  over  the  direction  of 
national  progression,  national  ideals  and  institutions. 
This  control,  paradoxical  as  it  may  seem,  diminishes 
as  is  increased  the  power  of  the  populace  over  govern- 
mental aft'airs.     No  people  are  more  easily  deceived 

18 


THE    BRITISH    EMPIRE    AND    WAR 

than  when  permitted  to  deceive  themselves.  Self- 
deception  is  the  rule  of  the  human  race.  Hence  in 
any  government  dependent  upon  the  will  of  the 
populace  statesmen  give  w^ay  to  politicians,  and  these, 
so  notorious  for  their  cowardly  nature,  go  with  the 
populace  along  the  line  of  least  resistance.  In  na- 
tional affairs  this  line  leads  to  the  most  debased  of 
ideals — the  supremacy  of  individual  greed  over  na- 
tional unity  and  perpetuation. 

Had  British  statesmen  at  the  close  of  the  militant 
era  of  conquest  taken  the  precaution  to  preserve 
Saxon  militancy  in  its  purity,  and  held  it  aloof  from 
the  sweat  and  hypocrisy  of  commercial  supremacy, 
there  would  not  now  exist  those  dangers  we  are  to 
consider  in  this  work. 

It  is  true  that  even  the  wisest  statesmen,  being  but 
transient  in  their  tenure  of  office,  resort  to  expedients. 
But  the  mediocre  statesman  gives  no  thought  to  the 
true  relation  the  state  and  its  functions  bear  to  the 
individual.  Whenever  they  differentiate  between 
them  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties,  the  future  gives 
way  to  the  present  and  the  nation  to  the  individual. 

As  the  power  of  the  populace  increases,  the  wisdom 
of  the  statesmen,  who  concern  themselves  with  ex- 
ternal affairs,  decreases  proportionately.  Because 
of  this  it  is  no  uncommon  thing  to  find  that  their 
judgment  relative  to  war  is  not  superior  to  the  com- 
mon opinion  of  their  constituents.  Instead  of  be- 
ing cognizant  of  the  one  primitive  principle  that 
the  expansion  of  nations  and  their  concomitant  wars 

19 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

are  governed  by  natural  laws,  they  construe  these 
laws  and  wars  to  be  of  their  own  making,  since  the 
forces  productive  of  them  operate  through  their 
agency. 

So  now  in  this  crucial  period  of  the  Saxon  race 
we  find  it  given  over  to  self-deception,  to  the  fat 
somnolence  of  satisfaction,  viewing  all  the  world 
that  lies  beyond  their  shadow  with  complaisance  and 
obese  disdain.  )  Party  politics,  obscuring  the  nation 
^in  its  yellow  mist,  endeavors  to  form  within  this 
fleeting  nebulosity  a  world  of  its  own,  filling  it  with 
all  that  is  temporizing  and  false,  all  that  is  transient 
and  corrodent,  until  that  eventual  day  when  the 
storm  of  war  shall  scatter  this  nebula  of  fraud 
and  the  world  shall  find  it  a  worm-eaten  pile  in  the 
^  cleared  wash  of  its  sea. 

Wars  against  the  British  Empire  are  not  governed 
by  conditions  mysterious  nor  unknown,  but  are,  on 
the  other  hand,  determinable  with  more  or  less 
exactitude;  and  our  purpose  in  this  work  is  to  ex- 
amine into  the  occurrence  of  those  conflicts  that  must 
ensue  so  long  as  the  Saxon  Empire  encircles  the 
world. 

The  determination  of  future  wars  directed  against 
the  Saxon  race  is  governed  by  four  definite  prin- 
ciples. 

I.  There  can  be  no  salient  political  or  territorial 
expansion  of  any  of  the  great  powers  without  a 
corresponding  subtraction  from  British  Dominion. 
The  degree  of  this  subtraction  or  destruction,  as  the 

20 


THE    BRITISH   EMPIRE   AND    WAR 

case  may  be,  is  determined  by  the  relative  dispro- 
portion between  the  miHtary  capacity  of  the  ex- 
panding powers  and  that  of  the  Empire. 

2.  War  by  a  single  power  against  the  Empire, 
in  ascertaining  its  probability  and  time,  is  determined 
by  the  rate  of  the  expansion  along  one  or  more  radii 
converging  upon  the  British  Dominion,  plus  the 
momentum  of  national  necessity  and  the  kinetic 
energy  of  its  military  establishment. 

3.  War  by  a  coalition  against  the  Empire  is  de- 
termined by  the  approximation  of  their  equality 
in  rates  of  expansion  along  their  respective  radii 
convergent  on  specific  arcs  of  the  British  circle,  plus 
their  approximate  equality  in  national  momentiim 
and  military  energy. 

4.  The  number  of  allies  is  determined  by  three 
factors : 

(a)  The  time  of  mutual  adjustment. 
(6)  The  degree  of  weakness  in  two  or  more 
arcs  of  the  British  circle. 

(c)  The  degree  of  militant  expansion  of  two 
or  more  nations  whose  respective  radii  are  con- 
vergent upon  the  two  or  more  weakened  arcs 
in  the  British  circle. 
Preparation  for  the  continuance  of  the  Empire 
and  the  preservation  of  its  integrity  must  be  specific. 
It  must  be  as  ceaseless  and  expanding  as  is  the  pro- 
gression of  the  race  itself.     The  Imperial  circle  with 
which  the  Saxon  has  girdled  the  world — and  man- 
kind— is  not  fixed,  but  is,  on  the  other  hand,  in  a 

21 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

state  of  constant  agitation.  This  alternating  shrink- 
age and  expansion  is  the  Law  of  Nations.  Frontiers 
are  never,  but  for  the  briefest  period  of  time,  quies- 
cent. Hence  it  is  that,  in  seeking  the  approximately 
constant  variation  in  national  boundaries  in  order 
to  ascertain  whether  their  tendency  is  to  contract  or 
extend,  we  do  not  look  to  their  geographical  borders, 
but  to  the  spirit  of  their  people. 

Each  nation  builds  its  own  monuments — and 
writes  its  own  epitaphs. 

If,  however,  we  regard  only  the  geographical  and 
political  situation  of  the  Empire  we  find  that  it 
stands  in  relation  to  the  powers  of  the  world,  not 
only  productive  of  the  possibility  and  probability 
of  war,  but  the  absolute  certainty  of  it.  Yet  this 
is  not  the  end;  for,  when  the  spirit  of  the  nation 
breaks  forth  at  the  same  time  in  the  denial  of  war, 
then  we  have  not  war,  but  destruction.  This  denial 
means  nothing  more  nor  less  than  a  belief  on  their 
part  that  the  world  acquiesces  in  Saxon  sovereignty; 
the  spontaneous  shrinkage  of  their  own  countries 
and  the  unopposed  expansion  of  the  British  Empire 
until  it  assumes  the  undisputed  sovereignty  of  the 
world. 

For  a  Saxon  to  deny  war  is  to  epitomize  human 
vanity. 
[~     Peace  and  its  duration,  like  war,  is  determined  by 
natural  laws  that  in  their  fundamental  principles 
do  not  vary  nor  are  found  wanting. 

In  conformity  to  these  laws  we  find  that  the  future 

22 


THE    BRITISH    EMPIRE   AND   WAR 

peace  of  the  Empire  stands  in  decreasing  ratio  and 
must  so  continue  until  it  is  either  destroyed  or  reaches 
a  point  of  world  dominance. 

There  can  be  no  further  extension  of  British 
sovereignty  without  encroachment  upon  the  polit- 
ical rights  and  territorial  possessions  of  other  na- 
tions— a  condition  of  warfare  the  continuity  of  which 
is  determined  by  the  relative  equality  in  military 
power  that  exists  between  the  Empire  and  the  na- 
tions that  stand  across  its  lines  of  expansion. 

There  can  be  no  retention  of  present  British 
sovereignty  without  the  repression  of  the  territorial 
and  political  expansion  of  other  nations — a  condition 
that  must  culminate  in  war,  one  war  if  the  Empire 
is  destroyed ;  a  series  if  it  is  victorious. 

The  intensity  of  these  conditions  increases  with 
each  year  of  added  population;  each  year  of  aug- 
mented arts  and  sciences  that  open  up  to  mankind 
new  wants,  while  at  the  same  time  diminishing  the 
source  of  their  supply;  each  year  of  new  invention 
that  shatters  time  and  space  and  crowds  the  greater 
nations,  by  irresistible  and  uncontrollable  expan- 
sion, against  the  circle  of  the  British  Empire. 

It  is  in  this  last  principle  that  we  come  upon  the 
inevitability  of  war,  upon  the  full  consciousness  of 
it,  so  that  no  amount  of  hope  nor  evasion  nor  denial 
can  conceal  it  from  us.  It  is  very  simple,  this  ir- 
revocable law  of  war.     It  is  terrible  in  its  simplicity. 

The  circle  of  the  Saxon  Dominion  must  be  broken 
or   the   greatness   of   other   nations   be   restricted. 

23 


r 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

Their  growth,  their  ideals,  and  aspirations  must,  on 
reaching  it,  stop;  and  in  that  stoppage,  decHne;  in 
that  going  down,  perish.  But  this  condition  can 
only  result  after  long  and  terrible  struggles,  after 
they  have  been  hurled  back  from  the  Saxon  circle 
into  their  own  small  comer  of  the  world.  Should, 
however,  these  nations  not  be  hurled  back,  then  the 
circle  is  shattered,  and  other  nations  assume  suprem- 
acy, each  in  its  respective  arc,  over  those  domin- 
ions of  the  Saxon  race. 

In  this  epoch  of  war  upon  which  the  Empire  is 
about  to  enter,  hopes  of  peace  are  futile ;  constitutions 
and  kings  and  gods  are  without  avail,  for  these  are 
the  old,  old  struggles  that  govern  the  growth  and 
dissolution  of  national  life. 


Ill 


THE    SAXON   AND   AMERICA 

^Principles  Governing  Political  Relationship  of  Nations. — Inter- 
relationship between  British  Empire  and  the  Worid.— Principles 
Governing  Break-up  of  a  Scattered  Empire. — Future  Relation  to 
America. — Sources  of  Future  Canadian  Population. — Its  Effect. — 
United  States  No  Longer  a  Saxon  Nation.— Degrees  of  Expan- 
sion.— England  has  Maintained  Doctrine  of  American  Immunity. — 
Military  Superiority  Necessary. 

CONDITIONS  that  determine  and  factors  that 
govern  political  relationship  between  nations 
appear,  in  the  multiplicity  of  transient  stipulation, 
to  be  both  intricate  and  subtle.  This  is  a  delusion 
built  up  by  the  vanity  of  man,  as  in  former  times  he 
believed  himself  to  be  the  center  of  the  universe; 
the  earth  his  barnyard,  the  sun  his  bonfire,  the  moon 
and  stars  his  big  and  little  candles,  all  of  which  had 
been  arranged  for  him  by  the  same  Creator  who 
stalked  patiently  in  his  foot-steps  to  note  down  his 
meritorious  deeds  and  to  wink  at  his  shortcomings. 
The  poHtical  relationship  that  exists  among  na- 
tions, far  from  being  complex,  is  reducible  to  two 
general  principles.  But  man,  through  whom  these 
principles  must  find  expression,  instead  of  acknowl- 
edging his  true  relationship  as  the  agency  through 

25 


\ 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

whom  they  must  act,  endeavors  to  attribute  to  him- 
self a  creative  faculty  and  would  have  himself  be- 
lieve that  in  him  and  his  momentary  tenure  upon 
earth  rests  the  origin  of  all  the  immutable  laws  that 
regtdate  nations  in  their  wars  and  in  peace. 

The  added  years  of  human  life  upon  earth  and  the 
vast  increasing  sums  of  empirical  knowledge  never 
bring  mankind  to  realize  that  he  cannot  circumvent 
those  irrevocable  decrees  of  human  association, 
either  individually  or  collectively.  These  belong 
not  to  him,  but  to  Nature. 

Man  should  be  as  old  as  recorded  time,  yet  he 
remains,  whenever  his  vanity  intervenes,  as  young  as 
his  own  years. 

The  wisdom  of  the  human  race  only  finds  expres- 
sion in  the  ignorance  of  the  individual. 

The  cumulative  wisdom  of  the  world  has,  in  prac- 
tical workings,  little  effect  in  guiding  the  destiny  of 
nations  even  in  this  age  of  superior  intelligence. 
It  can  be  truly  said  that,  while  we  are  two  thou- 
sand years  older  than  Caesar,  we  have  statesmen 
whose  political  intelligence  antedates  that  historical 
period  by  an  almost  equal  number  of  years. 

A  nation  retrogrades  in  universal  poHtical  intel- 
ligence in  proportion  as  its  international  affairs  are 
controlled  by  popular  prejudice.  The  understand- 
ing of  the  populace  concerning  matters  remote  from 
their  immediate  environment  is  the  comprehension, 
not  of  their  maximum  individual  intelHgence,  but 
of   their   maximum   collective   ignorance.     Foreign 

26 


THE    SAXON    AND    AMERICA 

policies,  like  the  hopes  and  terrors  of  the  unknown, 
are  without  the  realm  of  popular  reason.  This  is 
due  not  alone  to  ignorance,  but  to  the  supervention 
of  the  present  over  both  the  past  and  the  future, 
to  the  domination  of  an  immediate  environment  over 
the  possibilities  or  dangers  of  an  horizon  concerning 
which  little  or  nothing  is  known.  The  limitations 
of  the  individual  are  very  great. 

The  common  man  loves  his  own  dunghill  better 
than  heaven. 

All  activity,  human  or  otherwise,  that  is  constant 
in  its  recurrence,  identical  in  its  causes  and  effects, 
indifferent  to  time  or  geographical  segregation,  is 
governed  by  universal  law.     But  when  concerned  \ 

with  mankind  and  the  diverse  interests  that  affect 
him,  the  invariability  of  these  principles  is  over- 
looked ;  or  rather,  as  the  proverbial  grains  of  wheat, 
they  are  hid  under  shifting  clouds  of  human  chaff. 

The  two  principles,  one  positive  and  the  other 
negative,  that  govern  concretely  the  political  re- 
lationship of  nations  may  be  stated:  ^^5 

1.  The   duration   of   national   existence   depends 
upon  a  nation's  physical  power  to  remain  or  become         v' 
supreme  over  other  political  entities  whose  interests        ^   '-- 
are  convergent. 

2.  A  nation's  physical  power  must  remain  con- 
stant in  its  capacity  to  prevent  dictation,  conquest, 
or  supremacy  by  other  states  whose  interests  are 
convergent.  --^ 

These   two   laws   constitute   and   exemplify   the 
3  27 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

fundamental  principles  that  govern  the  political  re- 
lationship of  nations.  All  other  conditions  of  na- 
tional existence  and  innumerable  phases  of  their 
application  are  subordinate.  So  long  as  these  two 
principles  are  conserved  and  applied  in  their  entirety 
to  national  progression,  statesmen  need  not  concern 
themselves  with  secondary  factors,  for  they  will 
fall  naturally  into  their  allotted  and  circumscribed 
spheres. 

These  are  the  principles  that  must  guide  us  in  the 
examination  of  the  poHtical  relationship  the  British 
Empire  bears  to  the  rest  of  the  world. 

The  ascertainment  of  the  poHtical  interrelation- 
ship existent  between  the  British  Empire  and  the 
balance  of  the  world  is  first  determinable  by  the  re- 
lationship of  their  lines  of  expansion  and  shrinkage; 
the  acuteness  of  their  angles  of  convergence  and  the 
kinetic  energy  by  which  they  move  along  these 
lines.  While  we  cannot,  in  the  brevity  of  this  work, 
take  up  each  nation  and  consider  the  conditions  that 
govern  its  expansion  or  shrinkage  and  affect,  in  a 
correlative  degree,  the  British  Empire,  we  will  do  so, 
in  a  broader  sense,  considering  first  America,  then 
Asia  and  Europe,  in  order  that  the  true  political 
contact  of  the  Saxon  race  with  those  nations  may  be 
understood  in  its  gloomy  and  portentous  phases. 

The  early  British  struggles  in  the  Western  Hemis- 
phere show  decisively  those  changeless  elements  that 
determine  national  expansion  and  retrogression. 
In  that  contact  and  in  the  strife  that  accompanied 

28 


THE    SAXON    AND    AMERICA 

it  are  portrayed  not  only  the  three  degrees  of  mili- 
tancy already  considered,  but  resultant  conditions 
that  are  in  themselves  prognostications  of  an  in- 
evitable end. 

The  loss  of  the  American  Colonies,  due,  not  so 
much  to  the  American  Revolution,  as  to  the  ignorance 
of  British  statesmen  and  the  concurrence  of  European 
wars,  is  illustrative  of  two  quite  opposite  principles 
in  the  break-up  of  an  empire  whose  territories  are 
not  contiguous.  The  same  principles  hold  true  at 
the  present  time,  and  the  dangers  inherent  in  them 
are  always  existent. 

1.  The  convergence  of  one  or  more  nations  upon 
a  single  frontier  may  cause  the  loss  of  dominions  in 
quite  the  opposite  part  of  the  empire.  This  re- 
sults when  the  military  equilibrium  of  all  frontiers 
is  not  properly  maintained. 

2.  The  segregated  portions  of  an  empire  whose 
dominions  are  separated  by  seas,  acquire,  in  propor- 
tion to  the  time  they  have  become  an  established 
community,  interests  that  are  distinct  from  those 
of  the  empire  as  a  whole.  When  these  conditions 
become  as  decisive  as  those  that  resulted  in  the  sep- 
aration of  the  American  Colonies,  then  that  por- 
tion of  the  empire  affected  invariably  makes  com- 
mon cause  with  those  nations  whose  convergence 
of  interests  has  reached,  concurrently,  an  identical 
acuteness. 

While  we  will  not  make  conclusive  application  of 
these  principles  until  toward  the  close  of  this  work, 

29 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

we  have,  nevertheless,  given  this  early  expression  to 
them  that  they  may  always  be  kept  in  mind,  for 
they  form  two  links  in  the  great  chain  that  must 
bind  the  empire  together. 

The  political  relationship  of  the  British  Empire 
toward  America  in  the  future,  increasing  in  decisive- 
ness with  each  decade,  must  be  considered  from  three 
salient  points: 

1.  Convergence  of  Canadian  interests. 

2.  Convergence  of  American  interests. 

3.  Convergence  of  European  interests. 

The  convergence  of  Canadian  interests  must  be 
considered  without  relation  to  the  present  or  to 
those  strange  political  fantasies  that  appertain  to 
this  generation.  It  can  only  be  regarded  in  the 
light  of  historical  precedents  and  those  laws  that 
determine  its  development  as  a  component  part 
of  the  Empire  or  its  transition  to  a  independent 
state. 

Canada  is  in  an  embryonic  sense  an  United  States 
without  its  revolution  or  republicanism.  To  bring 
about  in  Canada,  what  occurred  a  century  and  a  half 
ago  in  the  United  States  only  necessitates  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  same  means  and  the  portrayal  of  the 
same  ignorance  to  the  general  principles  upon  which 
depends  the  perpetuity  of  the  Empire. 

The  development  of  Canadian  nationalism  and 
the  expansion  of  Canadian  interests  cannot  be 
stopped  nor  retarded  nor  circumvented,  but  must 
continue  along  one  of  two  lines: 

30 


THE    SAXON    AND    AMERICA 

1.  The  continuity  of  the  Empire  and  the  con- 
tinuance of  Saxon  supremacy. 

2.  The  independance  of  the  Dominion  and  de- 
struction of  Saxon  supremacy. 

The  differentiation  between  these  two  ways  we 
have  reserved  for  the  latter  part  of  this  work,  where 
will  be  made  evident  the  principles  upon  which  rest 
the  preservation  of  Saxon  Canada,  not  alone  to  the 
Empire,  but  to  herself. 

The  Canadian  Dominion  consists  of  one-sixteenth 
of  the  land  surface  of  the  globe,  and  it  is  in  all  this 
vastness  that  broods  the  day  and  deeds  of  the  day 
we  dread  to  contemplate. 

The  tendency  of  Canadian  political  progression 
through  the  character  of  its  people  is  only  determin- 
able by  the  course  of  its  future  population  : 

(a)   Birth-rate  of  the  Saxon  population. 

(6)  Birth-rate  of  the  French  population. 

(c)  British  immigration. 

(d)  American  immigration. 

(e)  European  immigration. 

As  each  year  increases  the  facilities  of  transporta- 
tion and  intercommunication  the  peoples  of  the 
world  become  more  and  more  mobile.  To  such  a 
degree  has  this  mobility  of  races  advanced,  even  at 
the  present  time,  that  in  all  countries  rich  in  natural 
resources  but  deficient  in  inhabitants  the  future  pop- 
ulation consists,  not  of  the  descendants  of  the  first 
inhabitants,  but  of  those  nationalities  whose  source  of 
supply  is  most  abundant  and  whose  mobilityis  greatest. 

31 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

With  this  migration  of  mankind  there  goes  on  in 
the  new  land  a  transmutation  of  racial  ideals.  This 
change,  so  affecting  the  ultimate  sovereignty  of  the 
land,  is  generally  denied,  owing  to  the  impercep- 
tibility  of  its  effects — the  transient  character  of  the 
observer  and  the  prejudices  that  govern  his  deduc- 
tions. 

When,  however,  we  consider  the  sources  of  future 
population — those  nationalities  that  will  eventually 
people  Canada — from  the  standpoint  of  British 
tenure  and  Saxon  domination,  we  realize  its  present 
political  relationship  and  racial  supremacy  must  in 
due  time  pass  away  unless  maintained  by  institu- 
tions and  power  that  are  removed  from  without 
the  sphere  of  the  populace,  that  emanate  from  and 
reside  in  the  Saxon  race,  or,  in  other  words,  in  the 
Empire  as  a  whole. 

The  birth-rate  of  the  present  inhabitants  of  Canada, 
no  matter  how  great  it  may  be,  cannot  have  any  de- 
terrent effect  upon  those  floods  that  must  sooner  or 
later  inundate  the  whole  of  the  Canadian  Dominion. 
The  population  of  unexploited  territories  has  noth- 
ing to  do,  now  nor  in  the  future,  with  localized  pro- 
creation of  mankind.  It  belongs  to  his  treks,  to 
those  new  crusades  of  races  wherein  the  passion  that 
drives  them  onward  is  their  hungers.  Their  goal 
is  no  longer  spiritual;  it  is  the  unlooted  cupboard  of 
Nature. 

The  sources  of  immigration  into  Canada  are  the 
British  Isles,  Europe,  and  the  United  States.     In  the 

32 


THE    SAXON    AND   AMERICA 

United  Kingdom  alone  is  to  be  found  a  source  of  im- 
migration that  would  least  affect  the  continuance  of 
Saxon  domination  and  Imperial  unity.  The  effect 
of  immigration  from  the  United  States,  on  the  other 
hand,  reduces  Saxon  supremacy  in  proportion  as  the 
immigration  is  non-Saxon.  If  this  is  proportionate 
to  the  non-Saxon  population  of  the  United  States, 
it  is  between  five  and  seven-twelfths.  From  a 
political  standpoint  American  immigration  bears 
in  its  train  the  foci  of  sectional  legislation  and  the 
precedence  of  circumscribed  environment  over  na- 
tional or  Imperial  considerations.  It  is  the  charac- 
teristic feature  of  the  American  Republic  and  will 
change  the  progression  and  continuance  of  Imperial 
unity  to  that  point  of  retrocession  and  deterioration. 
While  the  sources  of  emigration  from  the  United 
States  is  more  than  twofold,  that  of  the  British  Isles, 
that  of  Europe,  is  tenfold.  In  the  predominant  na- 
tionalities now  invading  Canada  there  is  not  to  be 
found  a  single  element  that  tends  to  the  perpetuation 
of  the  Saxon  race  or  that  would  not  destroy  its  foun- 
dations and  bring  about  the  final  passage  of  Canadian 
fealty  for  the  principle  of  British  unity  to  the  con- 
trol of  the  non-Saxon  elements.  The  beginning  of 
this  is  even  now  apparent  in  Canadian  affairs 
through  the  growth  of  Canadian  control  over  condi- 
tions that  appertain  alone  to  the  Empire.  This  is 
due  to  the  development  of  local  politics  and  conse- 
quent subversion  of  imperialism  to  sectionalism  and 
the  false  ideal  of  equality  between  the  Dominion 

33 


THE    DAY    OF   THE    SAXON 

and  the  Empire.  Equality  between  the  whole  and 
one  of  its  component  parts  is  an  impossibility. 
Canadian  interests  can  possess  no  such  precedence 
if  the  Empire  is  to  endure. 

What  the  United  States  are  to-day  Canada  may 
be  to-morrow.  The  determination  of  this  transi- 
tion does  not  belong  primarily  to  the  people  of 
Canada,  but  to  the  statesmen  of  the  Empire.  As 
through  ignorance  of  their  predecessors  the  American 
Colonies  were  lost  to  the  British  nation,  in  just  such 
a  manner  may  Canada  take  its  departure. 

In  the  loss  of  the  American  Colonies  the  possi- 
bility of  a  Saxon  Empire,  embracing  the  entire  world, 
was  put  aside  perhaps  forever.  There  are  those  who 
still  hold  out  the  delusive  hope  that,  being  allies 
by  blood,  these  two  nations  may  become  so  polit- 
ically.    This  cannot  be  for  two  reasons: 

1.  Whenever  one  nation  is  created  out  of  the  sub- 
stance of  another  by  rebellion,  there  can  never  exist 
between  the  peoples  of  these  two  nations  mutual 
confidence  and  interdependence,  for  one  remains 
jealous  of  its  old  prerogatives  and  the  other  of  its 
new. 

2.  Whenever  one  nation  is  created  out  of  the  sub- 
stance of  another  by  rebelHon  and  is  subsequently 
populated  by  alien  races,  the  alienation  becomes  two- 
fold,''and  to  the  jealousy  of  political  equality  or  pre- 
cedence is  added  racial  antipathy. 

That  the  British  Empire  and  the  United  States 
should  adhere  together  in  political  unity  and  should 

34 


THE    SAXON    AND    AMERICA 

establish  throughout  the  world  not  alone  Saxon 
dominion,  but  Saxon  liberties  and  principles,  is 
self-evident.  But  this  ideal  does  not  blind  us  to 
the  improbabiHty  of  its  accomplishment;  this  is 
determined  by  the  principles  just  expressed. 

The  United  States  are  no  longer  an  Anglo-Saxon 
nation.  With  each  decade  they  are  drawing  farther 
and  farther  away  from  the  race  of  their  origin.  During 
the  ninety  years  of  immigration  only  one-fourth  of 
the  immigrants  have  been  British.  The  other  three- 
fourths  come  from  all  other  quarters  of  the  globe. 
One-sixth  were  German,  one- twelfth  Russian,  one- 
tenth  Italian,  one-tenth  from  Austria-Hungary, 
while  the  balance  has  been  made  up  from  various 
other  non-Saxon  races. 

That  there  should  be  a  declination  in  British  emi- 
gration and  an  increase  in  that  from  Europe  was  in- 
evitable, not  only  from  the  disproportion  of  supply, 
but  from  the  fact  that  the  British  Islands  have 
not  only  Canada  but  Australasia  and  South  Af- 
rica into  which  certain  of  their  emigration  must 
flow. 

In  the  last  fiscal  year  the  immigration  into  the 
United  States,  exceeding  a  million  of  persons,  was 
made  up  almost  entirely  of  races  other  than  Anglo- 
Saxon.  Eighty-three  per  cent,  of  the  immio;ration 
came  from  the  Mediterranean  countries,  while  the 
other  seventeen  per  cent,  were  from  various  other 
nations  of  Europe  and  Asia.  Should  this  degree  of 
immigration  continue  for  two  or  three  generations, 

35 


THE    DAY    OF   THE    SAXON 

the  Anglo-Saxon  in  America  will  vanish,  racially  as 
_  well  as  poHtically. 
/^  j         Racial  supremacy  and  political  intelligence  in  a 

^<5  ^    \    nation  are  diminished  as  is  lengthened  the  catalogue 
"^         i    of  its  races. 

So  long  as  the  present  sociological  conditions  con- 
tinue unchanged  in  the  RepubUc  and  its  political 
constitution  remains  unaltered  the  nation  must, 
in  due  time,  be  given  over  to  those  races  who  can 
turn  up  to  heaven  the  greatest  number  of  befouled 
and  stubby  noses.  The  final  passage  of  the  Ameri- 
can Republic  into  the  control  of  other  races  ap- 
proaches, and  with  it  the  Day  of  the  Saxon  draws 
to  an  end,  when  the  dismalest  of  twilights  shall  fall 
upon  it — a  twilight  that  knows  no  other  day. 

The  political  relationship  between  the  United 
States  and  the  British  Empire  must  be  regarded  in 
the  same  light  as  that  of  other  alien  races.  What- 
ever are  their  strong  wants,  these  will  determine 
their  friendship,  no  stronger  nor  weaker  than  that 
of  other  nations.  Whenever  the  angles  of  their 
interests  become  acutely  convergent  there  will  be 
rumors  of  strife;  and  when  they  meet,  war  will 
ensue. 

In  considering  the  political  relationship  existent 
between  the  British  Empire  and  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere as  a  whole  and  relative  to  the  probabilities 
of  war,  we  come  upon  two  salient  characteristics: 

I.  That  the  probabilities  of  war  will  increase  pro- 
portionately as  is  augmented  the  political  impor- 

36 


THE    SAXON    AND    AMERICA 

tance  of  the  hemisphere,  its  closer  contact  and  inter- 
relationship with  the  balance  of  the  world. 

2.  In  the  Western  Hemisphere  the  British  Empire 
has  to  do  solely  with  republics,  so  that  in  disputes 
it  has  to  deal,  not  with  the  governments  of  these 
nations,  but  with  the  multitudes  controlling  them; 
not  with  negotiations  that  are  unmoved  by  preju- 
dice or  self-interest,  but  with  that  Cyclopean  ne- 
gotiant itself,  whose  single  flaming  eye  sees  no  more 
than  its  own  wants  and  into  whose  dim  consciousness 
only  the  glow  of  its  own  passions  penetrates. 

Because  of  these  conditions  the  precipitating 
causes  of  war  are  far  in  excess  of  its  sources.  This 
condition  increases  the  frequency  of  war,  when,  in 
the  natural  convergence  of  international  interests, 
one  or  both  nations  are  controlled  by  the  populace. 
It  is  then  difficult  to  differentiate  between  the  causes 
and  sources  of  international  struggle.  In  such  cases, 
the  lines  of  national  progression  rest  upon  the  pivot 
of  a  people's  passion  and  ignorance,  so  that  in  a 
single  night  its  natural  line  of  political  progress  may 
be  altered  by  those  strange  trivialities  that  affect 
the  mob-mind  of  nations.  Its  convergence  may 
then  become  acute,  and  its  movement  along  a  new 
line  of  political  expansion  so  rapid  that  war  breaks 
forth  from  what  mankind  is  accustomed  to  call  un- 
clouded skies. 

These  conditions,  in  themselves  so  provocative  of 
war,  are  traceable  to  one  or  the  other  of  two  distinct 
causes  that  concern  the  British  Empire  in  the  wars 

37 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

of  the  Western  Hemisphere — the  racial  convergence 
of  European  interests  on  this  hemisphere. 
■^  A  nation  possesses  four  degrees  of  expansion — 

rJi^XX  territorial,    economic,   political,   and   racial.     These 

degrees  of  expansion  are  in  turn  dependent  not  alone 
upon  the  potentiality  of  the  expanding  state,  but 

d  also  upon  the  receptive  condition  of  that  country 

'^  toward  which  its  energies  are  turned.     To  expand 

territorially,  it  must  have  physical  power  superior 
to  that  of  the  state  whose  territories  are  subject 
to  its  expansion.  To  expand  economically  it  must 
have  a  productivity  in  excess  of  its  own  needs  and  a 
capacity  for  the  consumption  of  the  resources  of  other 
parts  of  the  world.  To  expand  politically,  it  must 
possess  strong  centralization  of  government  and  mili- 
tary power  greater  than  the  state  toward  which  it 
is  directed  plus  the  military  or  political  protection 
of  its  other  frontiers.  To  expand  racially  is  the 
exodus  of  the  people,  due  in  emigration  to  the  excess 
of  population  over  the  natural  resources  of  the  na- 
tion; and  in  immigration  due  to  a  reversal  of  these 
conditions  plus  a  similarity  of  climatic  conditions  and 
I  resources  to  which  the  expanding  race  is  accustomed. 
These  four  conditions  determine  the  relationship  of 
Europe  and  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

In  the  period  just  subsequent  to  the  discovery  of 
America,  where  the  relative  military  power  of  the 
European  nations  and  the  aborigines  in  the  New 
World  was  so  disproportionate,  there  followed  in  its 
natural  course  the  conquest   of   these   undefended 

38 


THE    SAXON    AND    AMERICA 

continents  and  the  political  expansion  of  European 
powers.  But  with  the  militant  decadence  of  these 
nations  their  tenure  passed  from  them,  so  that,  with 
the  exception  of  the  British  Empire,  only  the 
remnants  remain. 

The  failure  of  these  states  to  preserve  their  con- 
quests in  the  Western  Hemisphere  was  due  to  five 
causes : 

1.  Their  militant  decline. 

2.  Their  defeat  in  European  wars  in  which  their 
possessions  in  the  New  World  were  considered  as 
spoils  for  the  victor. 

3.  The  primitive  economic  condition  of  that  age 
and  the  excess  of  natural  resources  over  the  demand. 

4.  The  limited  population  of  Europe,  which  pre- 
vented adequate  racial  expansion  of  any  or  all  of 
these  nations. 

5.  The  distance  intervening  between  the  Eastern 
and  Western  hemispheres  as  determined  by  the 
capacity  of  transport  and  the  time  of  communica- 
tion. 

At  the  present  period  we  find  the  reverse  of  these 
conditions.  While  the  first  conquest  of  the  Amer- 
icas bore  only  the  tentative  character  of  a  military 
expedition  and  the  thievery  of  kings,  it  has  now 
changed  to  the  most  enduring  phase  of  human  con- 
quest— racial  expansion.  The  factors  that  govern 
these  altered  conditions  we  have  already  enumerated : 
the  excess  of  population  in  Europe  over  its  natural 
resources,  and  the  reversal  of  these  conditions  in  the 

39 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

Western  Hemisphere;  the  similarity  of  cUmate  and 
natural  products;  the  ehmination  of  the  intervening 
spaces  of  sea. 

As  neither  the  United  States  nor  Canada  has  been 
nor  will  be  solely  populated  by  the  reproduction  of 
its  original  inhabitants,  but  by  immigration,  so  th( 
settlement  of  the  entire  hemisphere  must,  in  du< 
time,  be  brought  about  by  these  same  means.  And 
as  the  character  of  this  future  population  is  deter- 
minable by  the  quantative  supply  of  its  soiirce,  the 
final  colonization  of  the  Americans  and  the  deter- 
minate factors  controlling  it  are  not  Saxon,  but 
European  or  Asiatic. 

It  is  this  transfer  of  European  power  to  the 
Western  Hemisphere  in  its  most  durable  form,  the 
people  themselves,  together  with  their  prejudices 
and  institutions,  their  old  hates  and  hereditary 
attachments,  that  must  lessen  from  decade  to  decade 
the  power  of  the  Saxon  over  this  half  of  the  world. 

Heretofore  England  has  established,  almost  un- 
known to  herself  or  to  the  world,  a  doctrine  of 
American  immunity,  more  real  than  that  enunciated 
by  Monroe,  by  her  control  of  the  Atlantic — a  suprem- 
acy that  was  determined  not  so  much  by  her  naval 
superiority  as  by  maintaining  military  and  political 
equilibrium  among  European  nations.  But  now,  as 
the  expansion  of  Europe  toward  the  Western 
Hemisphere  is  racial,  a  new  danger  is  apparent  in 
the  domination  of  the  Americas  by  one  or  a  coali- 
tion of  European  peoples.     This  will  result  in  the 

40 


THE    SAXON    AND    AMERICA 

circumscription  of  the  Saxon  race  and  its  political 
elimination  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

As  the  security  of  the  Empire  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  is  determined  by  the  continuance  of 
miHtary  and  poHtical  equilibrium  in  Europe,  security 
to  the  Saxon  race  in  their  dominion  over  the  Western 
Hemisphere  is,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  determinable 
rby  the  same  principles. 

When  a  race  assumes  or  attempts  to  assume 
dominion  over  territories  greater  than  the  excess  of 
its  population  can  people,  or  dominates  or  seeks  to 
dominate  races  whose  population  and  rate  of  in- 
crease in  numbers  are  greater  than  its  own,  it  must 
substitute  for  its  numerical  inferiority  a  degree  of 
miUtary  superiority  that  will  increase  propor- 
tionately with  each  increment  to  its  dominions 
and  to  the  numerical  increase  of  the  subordinate 
race. 

The  invariability  of  this  principle  in  its  applica- 
tion is  apparent  throughout  the  history  of  mankind 
from  the  time  of  his  first  conquest  up  to  the  present, 
and  must  continue  so  long  as  man  is  divided  into 
states  and  races.  In  ancient  times  we  have  the 
examples  of  the  Macedonian,  the  Roman,  the  Mos- 
lem, the  Mongol;  in  modem  times  the  Manchu, 
Spaniard,  Frenchman,  and  Saxon;  in  the  immediate 
future  the  Saxon,  Teuton,  Slav,  and  Japanese.  In 
ancient  times  the  Roman  and  the  Mongol  empires 
illustrated  by  the  period  of  their  duration  the  primi- 
tive element  of  the  principle  that: 

41 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

1.  Inferior  numbers  plus  military  capacity  re- 
sults in  a  sum  of  actual  power. 

2.  Superior  numbers  minus  military  capacity 
results  only  in  potential  power. 

The  potential  power  of  nations  is,  contrary  to 
general  opinion,  of  no  consequence  if  the  capacity 
to  make  use  of  it  for  the  specific  purpose  of  war  is 
wanting.  This  potentiality  of  a  nation  is  inclusive 
of  its  people  to  the  same  degree  as  it  is  of  the  iron 
ore  in  its  mountains  and  other  resources  of  which  no 
use  is  made  for  the  preparation  or  conduct  of  war. 
Because  of  this  the  vastest  empires  did  not  disturb 
the  calculations  of  Alexander  nor  Mohammed  nor 
Genghis  Khan  nor  Napoleon.  The  wealth  and 
population  of  the  United  States  excite  no  fear  in 
Japan,  nor  does  the  vastness  of  the  British  Empire 
cast  any  foreboding  shadow  across  those  routes  of 
march  over  which  Germanic  armies  expect,  in  due 
time,  to  make  their  way. 

The  reverse  of  these  conditions  shows  the  causes 
that  are  attendant  upon  the  decline  of  a  military 
power  whenever  the  numerical  inferiority  of  the  con- 
quered nations  is  very  great.  After  the  militant 
period  of  conquest  is  over  the  declination  of  militancy 
in  the  ruling  race  proceeds  through  three  channels: 
racial  assimilation,  racial  deterioration,  and  miUtant 
decadence.  This  is  slow  or  fast  in  proportion  to  the 
numerical  strength  of  the  conquerors  and  the  safe- 
guards they  throw  around  their  own  race.  If  the 
vanquished  race  possesses  a  disproportionate  excess 

42 


THE    SAXON    AND    AMERICA 

of  population  over  that  of  the  victors,  the  conquerors 
will  vanish  as  soon  as  did  the  tribe  of  Genghis  Khan. 
The  declination  of  militancy  in  the  victor  goes  on 
arithmetically  while  the  population  of  the  conquered 
race  increases  in  geometrical  ratio.  Though  at  the 
time  of  the  conquest  each  soldier  of  the  victor  was 
equal  to  fifty  or  a  hundred  of  the  vanquished  nation, 
we  soon  find  that  the  conquered  race  is  in  the  ascen- 
dant by  the  natural  increase  of  population  and  there 
are  two  hundred  instead  of  a  hundred  to  one  that 
originally  determined  their  military  equality. 
4 


IV 


THE    SAXON    AND    INDIA 


Law  of  National  Environment. — Application. — Political  Relation- 
ship of  Empire  to  Asia. — Loss  of  India, — Environment  of  Nature. 
— Its  Effect. — Military  Establishment  of  Nations  Over  De- 
pendencies. 

\  "1  X  7HILE  the  assumption  of  mankind  decreases  as 
V  V  his  knowledge  is  added  to,  the  beneficence  re- 
sulting from  this  slow  erosion  of  his  ignorance  is 
offset  by  an  increase  of  credulous  vanity  which 
often  exceeds  the  increments  time  makes  to  his 
wisdom.  That  which  he  formerly  assumed  as  be- 
longing to  the  gods  he  now  unconcernedly  appro- 
priates to  himself;  he  harnesses  their  powers  as 
.^olus  once  chained  within  his  cavern  the  storms 
of  Heaven;  he  whittles  down  their  thrones  into  his 
,'  children's  footstools  and  in  their  broken  temples 
stalls  his  reveries  and  derision. 

Yet  the  mocking  truth  remains  that  mankind, 
even  in  his  aggregates  of  tribes  and  nations,  has  been 
(^  ,  so  circumscribed  by  his  environment  that  the  great- 
\  ness  of  his  race's  destiny  has  been  determined  rather 
by  the  relative  position  of  its  earthy  habitat  than  by 
the  genius  of  its  people  or  the  gods  they  chose  to 
watch  over  them. 

44 


THE    SAXON    AND    INDIA 

The  Law  of  National  Environment  is  determin- 
able by  three  principles: 

1.  Whenever  a  physically  inferior  state  is  placed 
between  two  greater  powers  so  that  it  is  included 
within  their  sphere  of  political  and  military  progres- 
sion, its  independence  is  never  more  than  tentative 
and  its  political  survival  brief, 

2.  Whenever  a  state  is  surrounded  by  frontiers 
that  are  impregnable  through  physical  conformation, 
such  a  state  expands  no  farther  than  these  frontiers 
and  remains  externally  impregnable,  though  in- 
ternally decadent,  until  the  offensive  capacity  of  other 
nations  exceeds  its  natural  def ensibility ;  then  it 
collapses. 

3.  A  state  whose  political  and  geographical  fron- 
tiers are  not  circumscribed,  and  whose  strategic 
sphere  is  alone  determinable  by  the  military  and 
political  flexibility  of  its  government,  continues  to 
progress  in  power  until  through  military  decadence 
a  contraction  of  its  frontiers  begins;  then  it  retro- 
grades. 

In  the  first  principle  are  to  be  found  the  factors 
that  determine  the  extinction  of  unnumbered  na- 
tions through  all  periods  of  time.  The  entire  his- 
tory of  national  life  is  dimly  illumined  by  the  fiar- 
ing-up  of  these  kingdoms  in  the  wrong  and  draughty 
places  of  the  world;  their  heroic  sputterings  and 
goings-out.  In  these  God  is  of  no  avail,  for  Pales- 
tine was  a  state  of  this  description.  Valor  has  noth- 
ing to  do  with  their  duration,  for  Poland  was  such 

45 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

a  kingdom.  Age  adds  to  them  neither  sanctity 
nor  protection,  for  Korea  was  another  country  of  this 
misplacement.  They  belong  not  alone  to  the  past, 
but  also  to  the  future;  and  in  this  tragic  category  is 
found  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  Denmark,  the 
Balkans,  Persia,  and  Afghanistan. 

Controlled  by  the  conditions  of  the  second  prin- 
ciple are  to  be  found  fewer  states,  and  they  belong 
entirely  to  the  past,  for  mankind  now  recognizes  no 
impregnability  in  the  ramparts,  glacis,  or  moats  of 
nature.  Egypt,  Peru,  Mexico,  America,  Central 
Asia,  India,  China,  and  Tibet,  one  after  another  have 
they  fallen.  That  impregnability  with  which  na- 
ture had  shielded  them  for  so  many  ages  and  made 
possible  their  civilizations  also  made  possible  their 
inevitable  collapse  when  once  the  persistent  in- 
genuity of  mankind  broke  through  the  solitudes  that 
surrounded  them. 

In  the  third  principle  alone  are  to  be  found  the 
possibilities  of  supreme  racial  and  world  greatness. 
Operative  under  it  has  come  up  the  Saxon  race,  and 
concomitant  with  its  rise  has  taken  place  that  ex- 
ploration of  the  world  and  that  development  of 
mechanical  means  by  which  it  has  been  accomplished. 
That  the  British  Empire  now  encircles  the  world  has 
been  due  not  so  much  to  the  old  valor  or  the  old 
spirit  of  the  race  as  to  the  fortuitous  circumstance 
that  for  the  last  several  centuries  the  British  Islands 
have  been  the  strategic  center  of  the  world.  It  is 
now  the  shifting  of  this  center,  or  rather  the  break- 

46 


THE    SAXON   AND    INDIA 

ing-up  of  it  into  several  non-Saxon  centers,  that  con- 
stitutes the  source  of  British  poHtical  disintegration. 
If  it  is  lost,  the  supremacy  of  the  Saxon  is  at  an  end. 

The  political  relationship  of  the  British  Empire 
to  Asia  has  been  in  its  most  salient  aspects  similar 
to  its  relation  with  America  in  that  it  has  interposed 
itself  between  Europe  and  Asia  in  the  same  manner 
that  it  has  prevented  the  political  and  military  ex- 
pansion of  Europe  across  the  Atlantic.  This  re- 
pression of  the  natural  impulse  of  European  political 
and  military  expansion  in  the  East  as  well  as  in  the 
West  is  productive  of  the  same  sources  of  war.  Only 
in  the  precipitating  causes  that  usher  in  the  conflicts 
is  to  be  found  a  difference.  A 

Europe  can  be  compared  to  a  vast  reservoir  filled 
with  constantly  expanding  matter,  and  the  British 
Islands  the  great  sluice-gates  that  regulate  the 
manner  of  its  escapement.  There  can  be  no  complete 
repression  of  Europe  within  Europe.  Whether 
pacific  or  violent,  this  continent  must  overflow — by 
emigration  so  long  as  the  British  Empire  remains 
militarily  intact,  by  conquest  when  the  Empire's 
militancy  has  fallen  away. 

England,  and  not  the  United  States,  guarantees  the 
independence  of  American  nations;  and  in  the  pres- 
ervation of  the  British  Empire  rather  than  in  the 
doctrine  of  Monroe  is  to  be  found  the  basis  of  their 
security. 

The  intervention  of  the  Saxon  race  between 
Europe  and  Asia  is  also  twofold;  and,  while  it  has 

47 


r\ 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

nothing  to  do  with  the  insidious  conquest  of  immi- 
gration, it  has  to  do,  on  the  one  hand,  with  European 
poHtical  and  military  expansion,  and,  on  the  other, 
with  the  reversion  of  Oriental  states  into  the  power 
of  their  inhabitants. 

The  political  and  military  relationship  of  the 
British  Empire  to  the  Far  East  is  reducible  to  two 
conditions : 

1.  The  loss  or  retention  of  India. 

2.  The  loss  or  maintenance  of  the  political  equilib- 
riimi  of  the  Pacific. 

Next  to  a  direct  attack  and  seizure  of  the  British 
Islands  the  loss  of  India  is  the  most  vital  blow  that 
can  be  given  to  the  Saxon  Empire.  So  closely  as- 
sociated is  India  with  the  continuance  of  the  Empire 
that  it  is  by  no  means  certain — as  will  be  seen  later 
on — that  an  invasion  of  England  would  not  be  pref- 
erable to  the  conquest  of  India. 

In  this  consideration  the  wealth  of  India  plays  no 
part,  and  though  its  imports  and  exports  exceed  those 
of  the  Russian  Empire,  its  population  and  area  are  six 
times  greater  than  those  of  Germany.  Its  significance 
is  more  portentous  than  the  curtailment  of  material 
gains.  Its  loss  means  primarily  that  there  has  been 
made  in  the  circle  of  British  dominion  a  gap  so  vast 
that  all  the  blood  and  fire  and  iron  of  the  Saxon  race 
cannot  again  bring  together  its  broken  ends. 

In  the  wreck  of  India  is  to  be  found  the  Golgotha 
of  the  Saxon. 

While  the  loss  of  India  may  result  from  two  causes 

48 


THE    SAXON   AND    INDIA 

— European  conquest  or  Indian  reversion — the  reten- 
tion of  India  depends  upon  a  single  factor — the  mili- 
tary supremacy  of  the  Empire,  not  alone  in  India,  but 
upon  all  its  frontiers.  Hence,  while  the  attack  may 
come  from  two  very  different  directions,  the  defense 
and  the  preparation  for  defense  are  one  and  the  same. 
To  submit  to  one  is  to  be  laid  open  to  both:  to  be 
strong  against  one  is  to  guard  against  both. 

In  this  chapter  will  be  considered  these  two  causes. 
Subsequently  we  will  examine  in  detail  their  deter- 
minate factors  and  those  principles  upon  which  the 
loss  or  retention  of  India  depends. 

In  the  relationship  that  must  necessarily  exist  be- 
tween a  sovereign  and  a  dependent  state,  two  ethical 
systems  are  in  constant  struggle:  the  ethics  of  con- 
quest, though  the  conquest  is  over;  and  the  ethics  of 
revulsion,  though  the  revolt  is  not  begun.  Both  are 
primitive;  both  are  inevitable;  both  are  brutal. 

In  the  development  of  India  under  British  rule  the 
renascence  of  Indian  nationalism  must  be  the  result. 
Its  progress,  as  in  all  other  subject  states  governed 
under  similar  conditions,  is  determined  by  three 
principles : 

1.  A  primary  and  slow  growth  through  education 
and  assimilation  of  the  salient  characteristics  of  the 
sovereign  race. 

2.  A  secondary  and  more  rapid  progress  through 
the  agency  of  national  renascence. 

3.  Tertiary  and  sudden  florescence  through  the 
defeat  of  the  sovereign  race  upon  some  other  frontier. 

49 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

With  the  growth  of  nationahsm  in  a  subject 
state  governed  by  such  laws  as  are  operative  in 
India  a  renascence  of  miUtancy  is  eventually 
evolved.  This  is  not  due  to  the  fact  that  a  portion 
of  the  population  are  employed  as  soldiers,  by  which 
one  might  be  led  to. believe  that  there  is  infused  into 
them  the  basic  principles  of  modem  mihtary  science, 
but  belongs  to  conditions  beyond  and  outside  of  this. 
Ordinarily  it  might  be  said  that  it  is  the  transference 
to  the  subject  race  of  those  militant  qualities  that 
constitutes  the  dominant  character  of  the  conqueror. 
In  the  greater  part  of  India,  miHtancy  is  not  the  ac- 
ceptance of  something  new;  it  is  more :  it  is  the  trans- 
figuration of  ideals  that  are  as  old  as  the  race  itself. 
It  may  be  a  retaliation. 

The  environment  of  nature  is  responsible  for  this 
peculiarity  in  Indian  races,  as  it  is  for  all  those  funda- 
mental characteristics  that  differentiate  the  races  of 
mankind.     In  Europe,  nature  and  its  phenomena, 
such  as  would  affect  primitive  man,  are  relatively  in- 
significant; in  India  they  are  appalling.     In  Europe 
man  has  constantly  approached  the  finite;  in  India  he 
has  progressed  toward  the  infinite.     In  one  there  has 
been  an  increasing  indifference  to  natural  forces ;  in  the 
other  a  growing  consciousness  of  their  illimitability. 
In  one  the  gods  are  portrayed  with  human  charac- 
teristics;  in  the  other  they  represent  a  Himalayan 
awfulness.     In  Europe  are  found  Jove  with  his  de- 
baucheries  and   Jehovah   with   his   prejudices.      In 
India  are  Siva  and  KaH,  the  metamorphosis  through 

50 


THE    SAXON    AND    INDIA 

the  Indian  mind  of  the  terrors  of  his  environment, 
the  black  abyss  of  his  mountains,  his  forests  and 
monsters,  his  seas  and  storms,  his  wastes  and  horrors, 
and  all  that  is  inimical,  coercive,  and  dreadful  to 
man.  Out  of  this  came  the  worship  of  the  terrible 
and  the  ethics  of  fear. 

What  has  this  almost  primitive  condition  to  do 
with  the  British  tenure  of  India?  It  is  the  basis 
of  its  power.  After  the  Saxon  conquered  India  he 
destroyed  the  conditions  that  made  possible  the 
continuance  of  his  tenure  without  great  military 
power. 

Those  influences  which  heretofore  controlled  and 
directed  the  Indian  mind  were  derived  from  the  most 
sublime  and  terrible  forces  in  nature.  They  were 
remote  from  man  and  in  comparison  only  emphasized 
his  feebleness.  For  man  to  have  assumed  a  godship 
in  India  would  have  been  destructive  to  the  entire 
system,  since  no  man  could  inspire  that  Great  Fear 
which  rests  alone  upon  unassailable  nature  and  its 
phenomena. 

The  British  Empire  in  its  lordship  over  India  must 
govern  by  the  same  conditions.  Its  rule  must  be 
inspired  with  the  same  impartiahty  and  grandeur 
characteristic  of  nature.  The  violation  of  this 
principle  by  misgovemment  or  the  defeat  of  the 
Empire  on  another  frontier  constitutes  the  basis  of 
hostile  militant  renascence. 

Nothing  is  more  portentous  to  Saxon  power  than 
to  inspire  the  contempt  of  India. 

51 


THE    DAY   OF   THE    SAXON 

In  regard  to  the  military  establishment  of  nations 
over  dependencies  gained  by  conquest  we  formulate 
two  general  laws,  each  divisible  into  two  propositions : 

1.  The  military  establishment  of  a  nation  over  a 
dependency  secured  by  the  force  of  arms  can  be 
decreased : 

(a)  After  conquest  only  when  the  peoples 
conquered  are  low  in  the  stage  of  civiUzation 
or  few  in  numbers. 

(b)  When  the  territory  seized  is  insignificant 
and  possesses  no  strategic  or  commercial  value 
to  other  powers. 

2.  The  military  establishment  of  nations  over 
dependencies  gained  by  conquest  must  be  in- 
creased : 

(a)  Proportionately  to  the  increase  of  na- 
tionalism and  mihtancy  due  to  general  educa- 
tion and  the  assimilation  of  the  militant  charac- 
teristics of  the  conquerors.  This  may  be 
rapid  or  slow,  diffused  or  restricted,  and  in 
accordance  with  these  facts  must  the  increase 
be  governed. 

(b)  As  the  value  of  the  dependency  increases 
either  commercially  or  strategically  to  one  or 
more  nations.  This  increase  must  be  deter- 
mined by  the  acuteness  of  the  angles  of  their 
convergent  lines  of  expansion  and  the  rapidity 
of  their  movement  toward  their  objective. 
This  rapidity  is  not  measured  by  any  single 
movement,  but  by  the  sum  total  of  that  pro- 

52 


THE    SAXON    AND    INDIA 

gression  which  is  consecutive  and  constitutes 
both  natural  and  predetermined  expansion. 
The  application  of  these  laws  to  the  government 

of  India  and  the  continuance  of  Saxon  tenure  needs 

no  commentary. 


THE    SAXON    AND    INDIA. CONTINUED 

Relationship  of  Population  to  Landed  Area. — Expansion  of  Races. 
— National  Boundaries. — Disintegration  of  a  Nation  May  Begin 
on  Most  Remote  Frontier. — Boundaries  Militarily  Divisible 
into  Three  Classes. — True  Sphere  of  Indian  Defense  Against 
European  Advance. 

IN  national  life  certain  factors  affect  nations  which 
are  dependent  upon  the  relationship  their  popula- 
tion bears  to  the  landed  area  of  their  habitat  and  its 
productive  capacity.  These  factors  increase  in  their 
intensity  when  applied  to  such  a  nation  as  India, 
where  productive  expansibility  is  dependent  upon 
a  corresponding  increase  in  the  cultivable  land  area. 
If  this  addition  is  not  proportionate  to  the  incre- 
ment of  population,  then  there  must  result  a  corre- 
sponding change  in  the  productive  character  of  that 
increment  or  a  movement  of  population. 

It  IS  not  the  increase  of  population  in  India  nor 
the  character  of  its  employment  that  has  any  dif- 
ferent military  effect  there  than  in  other  dependent 
states  subject  to  the  same  general  conditions.  But 
it  is  the  movement  of  its  population,  a  movement 
that  will  be  accelerated  as  knowledge  is  diffused 
throughout  India  and  as  the  means  of  communica- 

54 


THE    SAXON    AND    INDIA 

tion  with  other  lands  are  multiplied,  that  has  a 
miHtary  significance  which  the  Empire  cannot 
ignore. 

A  modern  nation  sovereign  over  alien  states  has  a 
different  task  to  perform  and  one  that  is  antithetic 
to  the  obligation  of  former  empires.  Under  present 
and  future  conditions  governing  the  interrelation- 
ship of  sovereign  and  dependent  states,  the  difference 
that  exists  in  the  poHtical  status  and  civil  rights  of 
individuals  must  continue  to  grow  less  and  less  until 
they  are  imperceptibly  merged  into  one  common 
standard.  To  contend  bHndly  against  this  natural 
progression  is  impossible.  What  concerns  the  Saxon 
is,  in  granting  this  personal  equality,  to  maintain  the 
integrity  of  the  Empire  and  the  dominion  of  the  race. 

We  have  heretofore  stated  as  an  axiom  that  in  an 
empire  made  up  of  heterogeneous  racial  elements 
it  can  only  endure  so  long  as  the  military  power  and 
governmental  direction  remain  in  the  hands  of  a 
homogeneous  people.  But  to  this  principle  it  is 
necessary  to  add  the  corollary  that  the  ruling  race 
cannot,  without  disintegrating  effects,  fail  to  realize 
that  progression  is  not  confined  to  them  alone;  and 
preparation  for  the  territorial  expansion  of  such  de- 
pendencies as  India  must  be  proportionate  to  their 
development. 

It  is  necessary  to  consider  only  one  phase  of  this 
principle  as  applicable  to  the  movement  of  Indian 
population  and  the  increased  military  responsibility 
it    involves.     Notwithstanding    that    India    is    the 

55 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

second  greatest  nation  in  the  world  in  point  of 
population — fifth  as  regards  wealth — and  possesses  to 
a  corresponding  degree  all  the  elements  of  national 
and  racial  expansion,  no  provision  has  been  made  for 
this  overflow;  but,  on  the  contrary,  legislation  has 
attempted,  in  the  blindest  manner,  the  impossible 
task  of  its  curtailment.  While  India  is  as  much  a 
part  of  the  British  Empire  as  South  Africa,  Aus- 
tralia, or  Canada,  yet  British  Indian  subjects  are 
prohibited  from  domicile  in  these  dominions,  though 
part  of  a  common  Empire. 

Of  the  many  phases  in  military  progression  that 
such  legislation  gives  expression  to,  we  are  now  con- 
cerned with: 

1.  The  Empire's  duty  to  India  in  providing  for 
its  natural  expansion. 

2.  Its  duty  to  the  dominions  in  recognizing  the 
justice  of  their  contention  that  racial  amalgama- 
tion is  impossible. 

Without  this  amalgam,  unity  can  only  be  found  in 
segregation. 

The  expansion  of  races  is  more  or  less  controlled 
by  natural  laws  less  applicable  in  modem  times  than 
in  former  ages.  With  each  advance  of  civilization 
these  natural  factors  become  less  and  less  potent. 
But  we  find  that  the  great  and  little  movements  of 
people  still  follow  certain  inherent  laws,  one  of  which 
is  that  they  move  along  not  longitudinal  but  latitu- 
dinal lines,  and  the  habitat  they  eventually  estabHsh 
as  they  trek  these  old  unmarked  highways  of  the 

S6 


THE    SAXON    AND    INDIA 

world  is  determined  by  a  certain  similitude  of 
climatic  and  other  natural  conditions  to  which,  ra- 
cially, they  had  long  been  accustomed.  As  deter- 
mined by  these  conditions,  we  find  two  natural 
lines  of  Indian  racial  and  territorial  expansion  that 
are  far  removed  from  those  dominions  inhabited  by 
white  races: 

1.  The  Aryan  races  in  Northern  India  should  move 
westward  to  Asia  Minor. 

2.  The  non- Aryan  races  should  move  eastward  to 
the  East  Indies. 

This  territorial  expansion  of  India,  including  Persia 
and  Asia  Minor  on  the  west,  Burma,  the  Malay 
Peninsula,  and  the  Indies  on  the  east,  is  in  its  final 
analysis  politically  correct,  provided  that  it  does  not 
go  beyond  nor  stop  short  of  those  lands  that  con- 
stitute the  true  frontiers  of  India. 

It  is  in  the  study  of  these  strategic  lines  that  we 
discover  this  territorial  expansion  of  India  to  be, 
in  its  extreme,  not  only  confined  within  the  true 
strategic  frontiers,  but  until  this  territorial  expansion 
is  accomplished,  tentatively  or  otherwise,  it  can  be 
said  that  the  Indian  Empire,  contracted  within  a 
sphere  remote  from  its  real  frontiers,  is  deprived  of  its 
first  essentials  of  defense. 

Modem  life  has  produced  many  anomalies  in  the 
interrelationship  of  states.  We  see,  more  and  more, 
the  substitution  of  human  ordinances  for  natural 
laws  and  the  constant  increase  in  the  belief  that  they 
are  imperishable.     Yet  they  are  as  vain  and  futile 

57 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

as  those  fantasies  that  lay  out  the  architecture  of 
Heaven  toward  which  solemn  millions  move  in  con- 
fidence. To  these  delusions  we  find,  in  modern 
times,  a  counterpart  in  the  chimeras  of  statesmen — 
or,  more  correctly  speaking,  in  those  who  should  be 
statesmen,  but  who  nevertheless  lead  on  their  na- 
tions to  the  same  small  gateway  beyond  which  all 
illusions  vanish  and  all  hope  to  correct  the  errors  of 
humanity  is  put  aside. 

Of  the  present  delusions  that  are  now  leading 
mankind  upon  those  blind  trails  that  end  nowhere  the 
two  most  characteristic  are  those  of  Universal  Peace 
and  the  delimitation  of  national  boundaries. 

All  national  frontiers  are  subject  to  constant 
fluctuation  and  must  be  forever  shrinking  or  expand- 
ing. They  can  no  more  remain  delimited  than  can 
the  coast-line  of  oceans,  for  they  are  those  indefinable 
shores  where  break  the  restless,  turbulent  seas  of 
life. 

Of  the  several  principles  governing  the  movement 
of  national  boundaries  we  are  alone  concerned  with 
those  that  affect  India:  first,  as  regards  its  own 
integrity  and  progression:  secondly,  the  relation  its 
frontiers  bear  to  the  solidarity  and  continuance  of 
the  Empire.     These  are  reducible  to  three  principles : 

1.  The  frontiers  of  India  coincide  with  those  of 
the  United  Kingdom  in  exact  proportion  as  their 
violability  affects  the  integrity  of  the  Empire. 

2.  Permanency  of  the  present  Indian  frontiers  is 
only  possible  through: 

58 


THE    SAXON    AND    INDIA 

(a)  Stationary  or  lessening  population. 
(6)  Repression  of  Indian  political  and  eco- 
nomic development. 

(c)    Voluntary    retrocession    before    the    ex- 
pansion of  Germany,  Russia,  and  Japan. 
3.  The  expansion  of  the  present  Indian  frontiers 
is  made  inevitable  by : 

(a)  Increasing  population. 

(b)  Economic  and  political  development. 

(c)  Territorial  expansion  of  Germany,  Rus- 
sia, and  Japan,  convergent  upon  India  or  its 
interests. 

(d)  The  military  necessity  of  a  new  align- 
ment of  Indian  frontiers. 

That  the  first  principle  should  appear  anomalous 
is  to  be  expected,  though  the  paradox  is,  in  reality, 
the  failure  to  recognize  its  truth.  Mankind  is  too 
apt  to  forget  that,  as  the  character  of  national  life 
alters,  international  relationship  must  undergo  a 
change.  It  does  not  occur  to  him  that  the  frontiers 
of  maritime  empires  are,  in  their  military  and  polit- 
ical significance,  totally  different  from  those  fron- 
tiers belonging  to  states  whose  territories  are  homo- 
geneous and  integral.  Moreover,  we  seldom  find 
that  any  distinction  is  made  between  those  factors 
that  adjusted  the  frontiers  of  ancient  maritime  em- 
pires and  those  that  are  decisive  under  modern 
conditions. 

Interdependence  in  the  defense  of  frontiers  in- 
creases proportionately  as  is  increased  their  inter- 

5  59 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

communicability  with  the  miHtary  centers  of  both 
the  offense  and  the  defense. 

In  former  times  each  frontier  was  self-contained, 
and  its  defense  or  loss  was  by  no  means  dependent 
upon  the  security  of  remote  boundaries,  especially 
those  of  oversea  possessions.  But  in  modem  times 
these  conditions  have  all  been  changed,  and  the  dura- 
tion of  national  life  is  no  longer  dependent  upon  the 
security  of  a  capital.  The  disintegration  of  the 
greatest  nation  may  begin  upon  its  most  remote 
frontiers.  So  when  we  say  that  the  frontiers  of  India 
coincide  with  those  of  the  United  Kingdom,  we  mean 
that  their  violation  will  have,  in  due  time,  the  same 
effect  upon  the  continuance  and  solidarity  of  the 
Empire  as  an  attack  upon  the  British  Isles.  A  com- 
plete exemplification  of  this  principle  has  been  de- 
ferred to  a  subsequent  chapter  of  this  volume. 

The  propositions  contained  in  the  second  and  third 
principles  are  self-evident,  except  the  last  two,  which 
deal  with:  (i)  the  territorial  expansion  of  Germany, 
Russia,  and  Japan  in  their  convergence  upon  India 
and  its  interests;  (2)  the  consequent  realignment  of 
Indian  frontiers. 

The  territorial  expansion  of  Germany,  Russia, 
and  Japan,  the  basic  principles  upon  which  their 
expansion  is  founded,  the  degree  of  its  propulsion, 
and  the  effect  as  regards  not  alone  India  but  the 
entire  Empire  will  be  examined  into  in  a  future 
portion  of  this  work.  For  the  present  we  will  con- 
sider tentatively  how  this  has  brought  about  the 

60 


THE    SAXON    AND    INDIA 

necessity  of  a  new  adjustment  of  the  Indian  fron- 
tiers. 

It  is  believed  that  when  there  is  an  advance  against 
the  frontiers  of  a  nation  the  best  policy  is  either  the 
strengthening  of  the  existent  lines  or  a  contraction 
of  them.  The  reasons  for  such  a  beHef  are  evident. 
As  many  others,  they  are  founded  on  conditions  no 
longer  vital.  They  are  not  appHcable  to  the  fron- 
tiers of  India. 

The  boundaries  of  nations  in  a  military  sense  are 
divisible  in  three  classes  and  are  subject  to  a  like 
number  of  military  distinctions  in  their  defense: 

1.  When  the  frontiers  are  contiguous  with  those 
of  a  more  powerful  military  state. 

2.  When  the  frontiers  are  contiguous  with  those 
of  a  weaker  miUtary  state. 

3.  When  the  frontiers  are  contiguous  with  those 
of  a  decadent  state,  intervening  between  the  aggres- 
sive and  defensive  states. 

In  the  first  condition  we  are  confronted  with  a 
purely  military  defensive  which  may  only  be  served  by 
the  strengthening  of  existing  frontiers,  or,  if  strategic 
conditions  warrant  and  the  internal  weakness  of  the 
state  demand  it,  by  their  contraction. 

In  the  second  condition  we  find  a  purely  offensive 
movement,  with  the  expansion  of  national  boundaries 
which  will  be  temporary  or  permanent  as  the  con- 
clusion of  the  war  determines. 

India,  however,  is  only  concerned  with  the  third 
condition,  which  has  heretofore  received  little  or  no 

61 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

consideration  in  military  science.  We,  therefore, 
lay  down  this  axiom:  that  when  the  frontiers  of  a 
nation  are  contiguous  to  those  of  a  miHtarily  decadent 
state,  intervening  between  it  and  a  convergent  power, 
then  that  decadent  state,  or  such  portions  of  it  as 
determined  by  strategic  considerations,  must  be 
occupied,  tentatively  or  otherwise,  as  soon  as  the 
intention  of  the  aggressive  state  is  ascertained. 

We  have  shown  that  whenever  an  inferior  state  is 
placed  within  the  mihtary  sphere  of  two  great  powers 
at  war,  it  ceases  to  possess  those  international 
rights  that  are  supposed  to  go  with  neutraHty. 
When,  moreover,  such  a  state  directly  intervenes 
between  the  frontiers  of  two  warring  powers,  it 
becomes  in  the  beginning  of  hostilities  the  theater 
of  combat  and  is  subject  to  the  maximum  hardship 
of  war,  since,  belonging  to  neither  combatant,  it 
receives  the  protection  of  neither  and  is,  in  a  sense, 
the  enemy  of  both. 

When  such  a  condition  exists,  the  power  which  is 
able  to  seize,  prior  to  war,  the  extreme  frontier  of  the 
buffer  state  secvires  an  advantage.  It  is  because  of 
this  determinate  factor  that  whenever  it  is  apparent 
that  the  expansion  of  a  rival  power  is  convergent  upon 
one  or  more  of  the  Empire's  frontiers,  then  that 
frontier,  instead  of  contracting  or  retaining  its 
aHgnment,  should,  if  conditions  permit,  be  pushed 
forward  in  direction  of  the  territorial  advance  of  the 
hostile  power.  Those  spheres  of  influence  which  the 
great  powers  have  marked  out   for   themselves  in 

62 


THE     SAXON    AND    INDIA 

different  parts  of  the  world  are  valuable  or  are,  on 
the  other  hand,  a  source  of  weakness.  This  depends 
upon  their  location  and  utilization  in  accordance  with 
these  principles. 

There  are  in  the  world  only  three  countries  that 
possess  pre-eminent  strategic  positions:  the  British 
Islands,  the  Japanese  Islands,  and  India.  The  Indian 
Empire  is  in  the  strategic  center  of  the  third  most 
important  portion  of  the  globe.  Its  influence  has 
had  its  effect  upon  the  European  mind  from  the 
earliest  times;  and  in  the  future  the  power  of  its 
strategic  position  as  a  determinate  factor  in  world 
politics  will  increase  with  each  international  re- 
adjustment. 

It  is,  however,  the  corelationship  of  British  pos- 
sessions in  the  Indian  and  Pacific  oceans,  in  Africa 
and  Asia  Minor,  that  gives  to  India,  as  the  center  of 
this  vast  region,  its  unique  greatness  and  power. 
Radiating  from  it  as  a  center,  with  one  vortex  com- 
mon to  all,  are  thirteen  strategic  triangles  surround- 
ing the  entire  Indian  sphere.^  These  are  divisible 
into  two  classes:  those  confined  to  British  territory 
and  those  that  are  not.  Eleven  of  these  triangles 
belong  to  the  former  and  two  to  the  latter  class. 
The  first  are  the  result  of  acting  in  strict  accordance 
with  the  laws  of  political  and  military  strategy, 
and  give,  in  their  offensive  and  defensive  capacity, 
complete  security  to  those  regions  over  which  their 
spheres    extend.     Westward    they    include    Arabia 

'Chart  I. 
63 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

and  the  east  coast  of  Africa  from  Aden  to  Cape 
Town.  Southward  they  include  the  entire  Indian 
Ocean;  southeast,  Australia  and  New  Zealand; 
eastward  the  Malay  Peninsvda  and  the  Straits 
Settlements. 

These  eleven  strategic  triangles  have  outside  of 
India  three  subsidiary  centers :  Asia  Minor,  the  center 
of  the  western  sphere;  the  triangle  Seychelles,  Mau- 
ritius, Diego  Garcia,  the  center  of  the  southern  sphere ; 
and  Singapore,  the  center  of  the  eastern.  The  co- 
relation  and  interdependence  of  these  centers  on 
India  show  clearly  the  truth  of  the  statement  that 
India  constitutes  the  principal  strategic  center  of 
this  portion  of  the  world  and  that  with  its  loss  there 
must  fall  away  simultaneously  all  this  vast  region 
over  which  the  Saxon  now  rules. 

As  we  thus  contemplate  India  apparently  in- 
vulnerable, in  the  ven,*  center  of  her  strategic  en- 
virons, it  seems  impossible  to  conjecture  her  in- 
vasion or  conquest.  But  almost  in  the  same  manner 
as  the  heel  of  Achilles  was  always  with  him,  so  there 
exists  in  every  system  of  defense  and  in  every  em- 
pire some  point  of  vulnerability.  India  has  this 
point.  And,  anomalous  as  it  may  appear,  the  point 
of  greatest  danger,  unlike  the  god's  heel,  is  the  one 
most  exposed  and  toward  which  the  expansion  of 
the  two  greatest  military  powers  in  the  worid  are 
convergent — the  northwest  frontier  of  India. 

Two  strategic  triangles  constitute  the  true  sphere 
of  Indian  defense  against  European  advance: 

64 


THE    SAXON    AND    INDIA 

1.  The  triangle  India,  Kabul,  Teheran — against 
Russian  advance. 

2.  The  triangle  India,  Port  Said,  Teheran — against 
German  advance. 

Russia  should  not  be  permitted  to  pass  the  line 
Kabul-Teheran  nor  Germany  the  line  Port  Said- 
Teheran.  By  this  it  is  seen  that  Persia  is,  equally 
with  India,  common  to  both  triangles  and,  consti- 
tuting the  center  of  these  two  tentative  frontiers, 
is  the  key  to  the  defens^^  of  India  from  European 
aggression. 


VI 

THE    SAXON   AND   THE   PACIFIC 

Importance  of  India  in  Defense  of  Australasia. — Relation  of  Brown 
and  Yellow  Races  to. — Movement  of  Asian  Popiilation  toward. — 
Home  Defense  Impossible.  —  Australasia  Insular.  —  Australia 
Divided  into  Seven  Military  Spheres. — Seizure  Restricted  to 
Two. 

T""  HE  general  tendency  to  regard  the  various 
phenomena  of  existence  in  an  intrinsic  sense 
jy  is  productive  of  much  error,  since  in  life  nothing 
exists  alone.  As  an  individual  is  only  a  partial 
analysis  of  humanity,  so  a  nation  is  only  a  partial 
synthesis.  Because  of  this  the  source  of  greatness 
in  nations,  as  well  as  in  individuals,  is  always  rela- 
tive, and  sometimes  is  so  inherent  in  external  condi- 
tions as  to  be  entirely  removed  from  those  factors 
upon  which  we  ordinarily  base  our  ideas  of  power  and 
^^sovereignty. 

This  is  true  of  India. 

The  great  error  of  England  is  its  ignorance  of  India. 
By  this  is  not  meant  ignorance  in  internal  govern- 
ment or  economies,  but  in  a  just  recognition  of  its 
political  relationship  with  the  world  and  in  its  charac- 
ter as  the  basis  of  the  British  Empire. 

The  real  greatness  of  India  might  be  said  to  be 

66 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    PACIFIC 

without  itself,  yet  belonging  to  it  much  in  the  same 
manner  as  the  greatness  of  kings  is  in  the  totality  of 
their  monarchy. 

Had  India  not  been  where  it  is  there  would  have 
resulted  no  British  Empire. 

Only  because  India  is  British  are  the  Mediter- 
ranean and  Red  seas,  Malta,  Cyprus,  Egypt,  the 
Suez,  and  coasts  of  Asia  Minor  under  Saxon  sover- 
eignty. For  the  same  reason  Africa  is  principally 
British  as  well  as  Mauritius,  Seychelles,  and  other 
islands  of  the  Indian  Ocean  together  with  Burma, 
the  Straits  Settlements,  Hongkong,  New  Zealand, 
and  Australia. 

Were  it  not  for  India  the  British  nation  woiild 
have  been  confined  to  the  United  Kingdom  and 
America. 

It  was  India  that  brought  the  Saxon  eastward, 
and  it  was  the  strategic  position  of  India^  that  made 
possible  their  Empire. 

India,  in  a  military  sense,  is  the  Empire,  and  only 
so  long  as  Saxon  dominion  over  it  continues  un- 
broken and  its  frontiers  remain  inviolate  will  it  be 
possible  for  the  British  Empire  to  endure. 

The  second  factor  that  governs  the  interrela- 
tionship of  the  Empire  and  the  Orient  is  restricted 
to  the  loss  or  maintenance  of  the  political  and  mili- 
tary equilibrium  of  the  Pacific.  This  factor  is 
subordinate,  in  both  its  political  and  military 
character,  to  that  of  India,  since  such  equilibrium  in 

1  Chart  I. 

67 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

the  Pacific  is  primarily  dependent  upon  the  loss  or 
retention  of  that  country.  But  there  are  condi- 
tions toward  which  the  Empire  is  now  tending  that 
may  so  destroy  this  equihbrium  that  it  will  result 
in  the  eventual  loss  of  India  and  the  consequent 
disintegration  of  the  Empire. 

This  question  of  the  Pacific  is  restricted  to  two 
phases : 

1 ,  The  relation  of  British  Pacific  dominions  to  the 
Empire  and  Asian  nations. 

2.  The  relation  of  the  Empire  to  its  Pacific 
dominions  and  Asian  nations. 

Contrary  as  it  is  to  general  opinion,  mankind's 
cognition  of  his  progression  succeeds  rather  than 
precedes  his  development  and  those  successive 
changes  he  undergoes.  Mankind  belongs  to  the 
progeny  of  Epimetheus. 

In  modem  times  this  condition  is  apparent  in  the 
persistence  with  which  some  nations  remain  blind 
to  the  ever-changing  character  of  their  international 
association,  altering  to  a  greater  or  less  degree  each 
time  the  earth  completes  its  orbit.  Those  condi- 
tions most  vital  to  the  existence  and  greatness  of 
nations  are  first  affected.  This  rigidity  of  human 
ignorance  increases  in  direct  ratio  as  is  augmented 
the  control  of  the  populace  over  the  affairs  of  state. 

Because  of  these  swiftly  shifting  phases  of  modern 
life  the  military  relationship  of  the  United  States 
to  both  Europe  and  Asia  has  entirely  changed  within 
a  single  generation;  yet  public  opinion  has  not  al- 

68 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    PACIFIC 

tered,  and  that  nation  has  been  reduced  to  a  defense- 
less condition  proportionately  as  old  facts  have  be- 
come modern  delusions  and  those  old  truths  new 
lies. 

The  people  of  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  in 
consideration  of  their  control  of  public  affairs,  are 
no  exception  to  the  above  rule,  and  they  have  shown 
no  greater  prescience  than  the  people  of  the  United 
States  in  regard  to  the  new  military  interrelation- 
ship of  nations  and  its  inherent  dangers.  Australasia 
has  stopped  short  of  what  it  wishes  to  accomplish — 
the  preservation  of  their  possessions  to  the  Saxon 
race. 

The  security  of  Australasia  rests  entirely  upon  one 
condition  —  the  integrity  and  continuance  of  the 
British  Empire.  Concomitant  with  its  defeat  and 
disintegration  Saxon  dominion  in  the  south  Pacific 
comes  to  an  end.  As  we  have  seen  that  even  if 
Canada  should  become  independent  or  American, 
Africa  Dutch  or  independent,  the  Empire  might 
continue;  but  with  the  loss  of  India  through  revolt 
or  conquest  the  Empire  is  shattered  and  Saxon 
Australasia  will  at  that  time,  or  in  the  final  political 
and  military  readjustment  of  the  Pacific,  pass  under 
the  tenure  of  another  race. 

The  first  principle  of  Australasian  defense  is  the 
defense  of  India. 

While  it  is  impossible  to  look  ahead  and  determine 
with  exactitude  the  futurity  of  nations,  yet  it  is 
possible  to  approximate,   by  the  concurrence  and 

69 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

general  drift  of  international  activity,  the  events  of 
the  immediate  future;  and  upon  this  approximation 
consider,  under  different  sets  of  given  circimi- 
stances,  probabilities  more  distant.  The  future 
of  Australasia  is  illustrative  of  this  truth. 

It  can  be  regarded  in  modem  times  as  a  basic 
principle  that  whenever  a  rich  and  sparsely  inhabited 
region  lies  within  the  sphere  of  the  racial  expansion 
of  greater  and  more  populous  empires,  that  expan- 
sion will  result  unless  prohibited  by  potential  or 
actual  power  superior  to  that  of  the  expanding 
race.  Moreover,  we  find  that  the  power  made  use  of 
in  the  original  prohibition  cannot  remain  fixed,  but 
must  be  increased  proportionately  as  is  increased  the 
power  of  the  expanding  nations  plus  their  augment- 
ed proximity  as  determined  by  modern  transpor- 
tation. The  relation  of  Saxon  Australasia  to  the 
brown  and  yellow  races  of  Asia  is  productive  of  two 
portentous  factors: 

1.  Australasia  is  nearly  as  large  as  Europe,  while 
its  population  is  less  than  that  of  the  city  of  London. 

2.  Surrounding  Australasia  are  Asian  empires  with 
a  population  approximately  three  times  greater  than 
that  of  Europe. 

The  period  when  a  race's  natural  expansion 
becomes  migratory  is  determined  when  the  popula- 
tion exceeds  the  productive  capacity  of  their  native 
soil  plus  the  knowledge  and  ability  to  reach  those 
lands  that  give  to  their  labor  not  alone  sustenance 
but  increment. 

70 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    PACIFIC 

At  some  more  or  less  definite  time,  which  may  or 
may  not  be  the  present,  the  natural  movement 
toward  Australasia  by  Asia  will  begin.  There  are 
two  tentative  preventions,  one  peaceful,  the  other 
military.  The  first  by  populating  these  regions 
with  Saxons  or  white  races.  Second  by  military 
power  enforcing  the  prohibition  of  Asian  immigra- 
tion. The  impossibility  of  the  first  prohibitory 
measure  is  apparent,  since  the  increase  of  the  Saxon 
population  must  go  on  in  the  future,  as  in  the  past, 
by  propagation  and  voluntary  immigration.  Yet 
the  relative  disproportion  in  numerical  strength  now 
existing  between  the  white  races  of  Australasia 
and  the  colored  races  of  Asia  will  not  decrease,  but 
will,  on  the  other  hand,  be  augmented  in  a  con- 
stantly increasing  ratio,  for  there  is  in  this  dual 
propagation  another  strange  fatality. 

While  eighty  years  are  necessary  for  the  white  race, 
under  the  best  of  conditions,  to  double  its  numbers, 
the  brown  and  yellow  races  under  the  worst  con- 
ditions double  theirs  in  one-fourth  less  time.  To 
have  confidence,  therefore,  in  the  ability  of  the 
Saxons  to  preserve  to  themselves  through  immigra- 
tion or  propagation  Australasia  and  its  environs 
is  only  expressive  of  futility.  In  this  belief  is 
found  the  apocalypse  of  the  white  man's  igno- 
rance. 

We  are  now  reduced,  in  the  retention  of  Saxon 
sovereignty  over  Australasia,  to  the  single  principle 
of  military  defense,  but  a  defense  in  its  conception 

71 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

and  use  far  different  from  that  now  practised  through- 
out these  Pacific  dominions. 

The  vast  numerical  superiority  of  the  brown  and 
yellow  races  over  the  white  in  the  Pacific  and  In- 
dian oceans  has  its  corollary  in  the  modem  com- 
bative equality  of  all  races.  The  universality  of 
knowledge,  and  a  similar  universality  in  the  applica- 
tion of  science,  places  all  of  mankind  on  an  equal 
footing  as  regards  the  use  of  mechanical  appliances 
in  war  or  in  the  business  of  peace.  With  the  es- 
tablishment of  equality  in  the  means  of  conducting 
war  we  must  revert  for  its  decision  to  that  old 
factor,  the  inequality  of  population  and  the  numeri- 
cal disproportion  between  the  forces  engaged.  It 
is  in  this  realization  that  the  armaments  and  mili- 
tary knowledge  of  Asian  empires  are  now  equal  to 
those  of  Australasia  that  we  become  cognizant  of 
the  ominous  gulf  that  separates  the  six  millions  of 
Saxons  in  the  south  Pacific  from  the  thousand 
millions  that  surround  them. 

Upon  the  cognition  of  these  facts  alone  must  the 
defense  of  Australasia  be  based.  In  other  words, 
home  defense  for  Australasia  and  New  Zealand  is 
a  military  anomaly.  The  frontiers  of  Australasia 
are  remote  from  the  south  Pacific.  They  have  no 
fixity.  They  shift  from  one  quarter  of  the  empire 
to  another,  constantly  changing,  but  invariably 
coinciding  with  those  portions  of  the  empire  against 
which  an  attack  is  being  directed.  The  universality 
of  Australasian  frontiers  is  due  to  their  inherent 

72 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    PACIFIC 

necessity  of  being  imperial.  The  normal  position 
of  Australasia  in  the  defense  of  the  Empire  is  the 
defense  of  India. 

While  the  Pacific  colonies  and  dominions  can 
never  possess  alone  that  defensive  capacity  sufficient 
to  prevent  the  seizure  of  their  territories  by  any 
power  which  has  gained  control  of  their  seas,  yet 
they  constitute  a  source  of  war  and  become  more 
constantly  provocative  of  it  as  the  Pacific  becomes 
more  and  more  the  foci  of  human  struggle. 

The  time  has  passed  forever  when  a  relatively 
small  community  possessing  a  vast  area  of  unde- 
veloped wealth  can  secure  this  to  themselves  in 
that  illusive  freedom  mankind  calls  independence. 
When  now,  and  more  so  in  the  future,  a  colony  or 
dominion  passes  without  the  protective  sphere  of 
a  great  power,  either  through  imperial  disintegra- 
tion or  by  secession,  it  lingers  but  a  moment  in  the 
mirage  of  its  delusive  sovereignty,  then  passes  into 
the  keeping  of  another  empire  whose  internal  ex- 
pansion constitutes  the  motif  to  its  conquest. 

It  was  this  tentative  independence,  already 
noticed,  that  lost  to  the  Transvaal  and  Orange 
Free  State  their  character  as  distinct  political  en- 
tities. Coming  within  the  sphere  of  Imperial  pro- 
gression, their  absorption  was  predetermined  so 
long  as  they  were  not  a  portion  of  another  nation 
as  strong  or  stronger  than  the  British  Empire.  If 
Australia  and  New  Zealand  were  sovereign  nations, 
their  relations  to  Asian  empires  would  be  no  difiEer- 

73 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

ent  from  that  of  the  African  states  to  the  British 
nation,  except  in  the  degree  of  intensity  which 
controls  the  impulse  of  Asian  expansion.  Over  this 
expansion  Australasia  alone  could  have  no  control. 
It  could  neither  threaten  nor  circumvent. 
~  Each  day  the  world  grows  smaller;  each  day 
mankind  is  being  more  crowded  and  jostled  together. 
In  this  universal  pressure  all  is  in  a  state  of  flux — 
man  and  his  habitat.  Because  of  this,  decadent  and 
minor  states  must  gravitate  with  increasing  mo- 
mentum toward  the  larger  and  more  powerful 
nations.  Because  of  this  Australasia  is  dragging 
closer  and  closer  to  the  shores  of  Asia.  Yet  it  is 
not  war  that  is  doing  this;  it  is  peace:  not  the  con- 
quests of  kings,  but  the  hungers  of  their  subjects; 
not  man  in  his  elementary  character  of  marauder, 
but  man  in  his  highest  civilization,  in  his  ten  thousand 
new  necessities  —  his  speech  across  the  waters,  his 
flight  across  the  seas. 

Australasia  is  not  fixed,  in  the  sense  of  racial  or 
national  security,  upon  the  bed  of  its  ocean.  It  is 
fixed  only  so  long  as  it  is  anchored  to  the  British 
Empire.  Whenever  these  chains  are  broken  it  is 
adrift  like  a  derelict  upon  a  sea  of  storm. 

In  this  work  only  those  basic  principles  governing 
the  defense  of  Australasia  concern  us.  For  if  once 
these  principles  are  understood,  and  all  military 
preparations  based  upon  them,  the  errors  and  mis- 
conceptions that  must  creep  in  and  constitute  a 
definite  portion  of  their  detail  are  immaterial.     But 

74 


THE  SAXON  AND  THE  PACIFIC 

if  the  foundations  upon  which  are  erected  the  de- 
fense of  these  dominions  are  false,  then  there  can 
be  no  superstructure  regardless  of  the  labor  ex- 
pended but  will  prove  to  be  worthless.  It  is  be- 
cause of  this  fact  that  the  efforts  now  being  made 
for  Australasian  defense  are  so  delimited  that  they 
form  an  immaterial  factor  in  the  ultimate  struggle 
for  national  survival.  They  belong  to  world  con- 
ditions that  no  longer  exist. 

The  defense  of  a  country  and  the  manner  of  its 
execution  are  determined  by  two  principal  factors : 

1.  The   direction   from   which   the   attack  is   to 
come. 

2.  The    character   of    the    nation's    geographical 
environment. 

The  defense  of  Germany  against  Russia  is  en- 
tirely different  from  that  which  would  be  employed 
against  England.  So,  in  the  geographical  environ- 
ment, the  manner  of  defense  varies.  An  insular 
nation  is  subject  to  conditions  that  have  little  or 
nothing  to  do  with  those  wars  waged  between  two 
continental  states.  The  preparation  for  these  two 
distinct  classes  of  war  must  vary  accordingly,  al- 
though nations  cannot  be  confined  strictly  to  these 
two  distinctions.  Austria,  Turkey,  Russia,  and 
China  are  continental  nations.  England  and  Japan 
are  insular.  Still  we  find  that  there  are  other 
continental  states  that  also  possess,  in  one  form  or 
another,  certain  characteristics  of  insular  powers, 
as  Germany,  France,  and  the  United  States.  On 
6  75 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

the  other  hand,  the  British  Empire  in  India  and  else- 
where and  Japan  in  Korea  and  Manchuria  are  sub- 
ject to  the  same  responsibilities  as  continental 
countries.  In  most  modem  nations,  therefore,  we 
find  that,  in  so  far  as  their  military  preparation  is 
concerned,  there  must  always  be  maintained  a 
flexible  equilibrium  between  their  naval  and  mili- 
tary preparations,  governed  in  their  variability  by 
the  direction  from  which  the  attack  is  to  come  or 
by  the  necessities  attendant  upon  their  expansion. 

Had  Japan,  although  an  insular  state,  possessed 
her  naval  development  alone  and  neglected  her  land 
forces,  the  war  against  Russia  would  have  failed. 
But,  recognizing  the  true  principle  of  flexibility  in 
military  preparation,  Japan  adopted  against  a  con- 
tinental power  its  characteristics  of  continental 
warfare. 

Considering  Australasia  as  a  sovereign  nation, 
with  its  inherent  military  responsibilities,  what  con- 
stitutes the  error  of  its  defense?  It  is  in  the  adop- 
tion of  a  continental  system  to  the  protection  of 
insular  territory.  While  both  Japan  and  Great 
Britain  are  insular  kingdoms,  they  are  not  without 
continental  attributes;  but,  as  regards  Australasia, 
it  is,  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  term,  wholly  insular, 
and  does  not  possess  one  single  characteristic  of  a 
continental  power  that  would  justify  the  illusion 
of  home  defense  in  the  sense  now  understood. 

Australasia  lies  apart  from  the  balance  of  the 
world.     It  is  a  continent  of  its  own  in  its  own  vast 

76 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    PACIFIC 

hemisphere  of  water.  Its  plants  and  animals  are 
not  those  of  the  Old  or  the  New  World;  but  are 
peculiar  to  that  vast  isolation  nature  could  not 
overcome.  Only  within  the  last  two  generations 
man  has  succeeded  where  nature  failed. 

A  narrow  channel  alone  separates  the  United 
Kingdom  from  Europe;  between  Japan  and  Asia 
are  the  tragic  Straits  of  Tsu  Shima;  but  beyond  the 
shores  of  Australasia  are  two  oceans:  Cape  Town 
six  thousand  miles  away,  North  America  nearly 
seven,  and,  while  Asia  is  less  than  four  thousand, 
the  United  Kingdom  is  more  than  twelve.  It  is 
this  almost  inimitable  isolation  that  constitutes 
Australasia's  purely  insular  character. 

The  permanent  defense  of  Australasia  is  naval. 

Its  land  forces,  if  adequate,  can  assure  that  defense 
of  its  shores  only  if  the  control  of  the  sea  by  the 
enemy  is  temporary ;  but  if  the  maritime  supremacy 
is  undisturbed  or  permanent,  the  defense  can  only 
last  for  a  relatively  short  time. 

This  is  determined  by  three  conditions: 

I.  The  relative  disproportion  betv/een  the  at- 
tacking forces  and  the  defenders: 

(a)  Disparity  in  population  and  wealth  be- 
tween Australasia  and  the  power  capable  of 
attack. 

(b)  Australasia  is  divided  into  seven  distinct 
military  spheres  that  are  neither  corelative  nor 
co-operative. 

(c)  The  defense  of  the  whole  is  determined 

77 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

by  the  struggle  of  the  strongest  sphere,  the 
population  of  this  region  determining  the  de- 
fensive potentiality  of  the  whole. 

2.  Nine -tenths  of  the  population  live  adjacent 
to  the  sea. 

3.  Retreating  inland,  instead  of  moving  toward 
the  base  of  their  resources,  they  move  away  from 
them  with  the  first  retrograde  movement. 

The  seven  mihtary  spheres  ^  of  Australia  are : 
(i)  the  environs  of  Perth  on  the  west  coast;  (2)  the 
environs  of  Adelaide  and  (3)  Melbourne  on  the 
south  coast;  (4)  the  environs  of  Sydney  and  (5) 
Brisbane  on  the  east  coast,  together  with  the  two 
islands  of  New  Zealand.  It  is  seen  ^  that  Western 
AustraUa  has,  in  a  military  sense,  no  defensive 
interrelationship  with  the  other  six  spheres  because 
of  its  isolation.  All  its  efforts  will  be  restricted  to 
its  own  sphere. 

This  is  also  true  of  the  two  New  Zealand  spheres, 
while  the  same  isolation  exists  between  the  remain- 
ing foiir  spheres  whenever  (i)  the  line  of  railway 
between  Adelaide  and  Brisbane  is  broken,  or  (2) 
by  the  voluntary  segregation  of  those  spheres  en- 
forced by  the  freedom  of  the  enemy's  movements. 

Any  concentration  of  all  the  forces  into  one 
sphere  results  in  the  unhindered  occupation  of  the 
other  six.  So  decisive  are  the  determinate  condi- 
tions of  the  geography  of  Australia  in  favor  of  the 
invader    that   any   such    concentration   will    result 

>  Chart  II. 
78 


I  N  D  I 


CPo 


^ 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    PACIFIC 

in  the  capitulation  of  the  defense.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  not  knowing  where  the  attack  is  to  fall,  mili- 
tary activity  is  restricted  to  the  purely  home  de- 
fense of  these  respective  spheres,  we  are  compelled 
to  witness  by  a  single  movement  of  the  invading 
force  their  complete  isolation  and  destruction  in 
detail. 

The  seizure  of  Australasia  is  primarily  restricted 
to  two  strategic  spheres :  ^ 

1.  The  New  South  Wales  sphere,  the  city  of  Syd- 
ney being  the  base.  This  base  constitutes  the  arc 
of  invasion. 

2.  The  Victoria  sphere,  Melbourne  being  the 
center  of  the  arc  of  invasion. 

As  will  be  apparent  later,  these  two  strategic 
spheres  constitute  the  defensive  area  of  entire 
Australasia. 

The  second  condition  that  is  preventive  of  pro- 
tracted Australasian  land  defense,  without  ultimate 
naval  succor,  is  due  to  the  fact  that  nine-tenths  of 
the  Australasian  population  live  adjacent  to  the 
seaboard.  More  than  that,  they  are  concentrated 
into  the  five  spheres^  already  considered.  Approxi- 
mately half  of  the  population  of  Western  Australia  is 
dependent  upon  the  Perth  sphere;  three-fourths  of 
of  South  Australia  are  constrained  within  the  Ade- 
laide sphere;  while  two-fifths  of  the  state  of  Vic- 
toria are  confined  to  the  city  of  Melbourne;  in 
New  South  Wales  over  half  the  population  is  re- 

'  Chart  11. 
79 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

stricted  to  the  Sydney  sphere;  the  same  is  approxi- 
mately true  of  the  Brisbane  region  in  Queensland. 

It  is  this  fatality,  the  restriction  of  Australia's 
population  to  coast  regions,  that  is  the  determinate 
factor  in  the  impossibility  of  prolonged  land  defense 
against  a  nation  in  control  of  the  ocean.  The  sea- 
board population  of  Australia  is,  in  a  military  sense, 
very  different  from  that  of  other  countries.  It  is 
not  alone  the  beginning  of  the  state's  population; 
it  is  the  beginning  and  the  end.  Australia,  while 
a  continent,  is  also  an  atoll;  without  the  ocean, 
within  the  desert.  Both  the  sea  and  the  desert  are, 
as  regards  military  calculations,  identical.  To  re- 
treat toward  the  ocean  in  control  of  the  enemy  is 
disaster;  to  flee  to  the  desert  is  death. 

The  land  defense  of  Australia  against  invasion  is 
the  antithesis  of  any  other  modem  state  exposed 
to  invasion  from  the  sea.  Ordinarily,  in  the  defense 
of  sea  frontiers,  each  retrograde  movement  should 
be  concentric  and  toward  the  wealth  and  population 
centers  of  the  nation.  But  in  the  case  of  Australia 
there  could  be  no  retrograde  movement  that  would 
be  concentric  and  toward  a  common  base.  There 
is  no  main  base.  Each  sphere  possesses  its  own,  not 
distant  from,  but  in  the  center  of,  its  theater  of 
hostilities.  So  delimited  and  segregated  are  these 
spheres  that  the  retreat  of  a  single  week  puts  the 
defense  beyond  the  means  of  waging  war. 

Once  the  defense  of  eastern  Australia  is  thrown 
westward  of  the  Blue  Mountains,  and  the  defense 

80 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    PACIFIC 

of  southern  Australia  is  pushed  north  of  the  Aus- 
traHan  Alps,  organized  defense  in  the  form  of  armies 
will  pass  into  that  final  stage  of  inutile  warfare, 
guerrilla  and  predatory,  until,  self  -  exhausted,  it 
reaches  its  end. 

What  nature  gave  the  Boors  it  has  denied  Aus- 
tralia. 

The  defense  of  Australasia  is  the  defense  of  Aus- 
tralia, and  is  divisible  into  two  parts: 

1.  The  temporary  defense  depends  upon  land 
forces  whose  numbers,  owing  to  the  segregation  of 
its  defensive  spheres,  must  be  equal  in  each  sphere 
to  the  probable  force  of  the  enemy's  invading  armies. 
Australian  defensive  forces  must  not  be  considered 
in  the  aggregate.  Their  maximum  defensive  capac- 
ity is  never  greater  than  that  of  the  strongest  single 
sphere. 

The  character,  armament,  and  training  of  Aus- 
tralian forces  are  determinable,  not  by  Australian 
legislation,  but  by  the  character,  armament,  and 
training  of  the  strongest  probable  enemy. 

2.  The  permanent  defense  of  Australasia  is  naval, 
the  strength  of  which  is  determined  by  the  maximum 
naval  capacity  of  the  strongest  maritime  power 
capable  of  attack. 

This  degree  of  naval  power  can  never  be  attained 
by  Australasia. 

It  is  possible  only  to  a  unified  British  Empire. 


VII 


THE   SAXON   AND    EASTERN   ASIA 

Principle  on  Which  National  Activities  Must  be  Based. — Empire 
Must  be  Defended  as  a  Whole. — Danger  to  a  Nation  in  Concen- 
trating Defense  to  One  Frontier.  —  International  Alliances. — 
Equilibrium  in  Pacific. — Expansion  of  China. — Effect  of  Russian 
Defeat  by  Japan. 

WE  will  later  continue  the  conclusions  of  Aus- 
tralasian defense.  Our  present  purpose  is  only 
to  show  the  essentials  of  Imperial  progression  and 
the  dependence  of  Australia  upon  its  solidarity:  to 
right  the  errors  of  their  former  conceptions  and  make 
plain  that,  in  the  preservation  of  their  Saxon  ideals, 
they  have  set  out  upon  a  way  that  leads  from  in- 
stead of  toward  their  consummation. 

There  is  but  one  principle  upon  which  must  be  based 
all  of  their  national  activities  and  toward  which  all  of 
their  aspirations  must  be  directed — the  principle  of 
Imperial  solidarity.  Likewise,  there  is  but  a  single 
truth  to  guide  them,  the  very  opposite  of  the  de- 
lusion that  now  holds  sway  over  their  minds — 
the  truth  that  their  survival  as  a  state  belongs  not  to 
themselves,  but  to  their  race,  to  the  continuance 
and  progression  of  the  Empire. 

"*  In  the  interdependability  of  the  various  parts  of 

82 


THE    SAXON    AND    EASTERN    ASIA 

the  Empire,  and  for  the  defense  of  their  respective 
regions,  there  must  be  determined  a  definite  inter- 
changeabiHty  of  the  means,  a  definite  place  and  pre- 
determined plan  for  each  division  of  the  Empire 
upon  the  never-ending  battle-fields  of  the  world. 

While  Australasia  possesses  for  its  own  preserva- 
tion those  obligations  toward  Imperial  defense  which 
we  have  already  considered,  the  Empire,  in  turn  for 
its  preservation,  possesses  equivalent  obhgations 
toward  the  defense  of  Australasia. 

It  must  be  regarded  as  an  inviolable  principle 
that  any  loss  of  territory  reacts  upon  the  Empire, 
the  fatality  of  which  is  in  direct  ratio  to  the  politi- 
cal importance  of  the  region  lost.  In  the  govern- 
ment of  a  maritime  empire  it  can  be  considered  as 
axiomatic  that  the  loss  of  previously  acquired  politi- 
cal and  territorial  rights,  or  even  the  tendency  to 
acquiesce  in  any  such  loss,  is  indicative  of  national 
retrocession  and   Imperial  decadence. 

The  difference  in  effect  of  Imperial  defeat  to 
Australasia  and  the  loss  of  Australasia  to  the 
Empire  is  only  that  of  time.  Imperial  disintegra- 
tion results  in  the  immediate  end  of  Saxon  Aus- 
tralasia. On  the  other  hand,  the  loss  of  so  large  a 
portion  of  the  Empire  as  Australasia  is  the  be- 
ginning of  Imperial  disintegration,  since  the  causes 
productive  of  the  loss  are  the  results  of  nothing 
more  nor  less  than  a  corresponding  degree  of  Im- 
perial weakness. 

The  most  dangerous  belief  that  ever  laid  hold  of 

83 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

the  Saxon  race  is  the  delusion  that  by  defending 
separately  their  segregated  portions  of  the  Empire 
they  are  able  to  defend  the  whole;  whereas  it  is 
only  true  that  by  the  defense  of  the  Empire,  in  its 
concrete  character,  are  the  components  protected. 

While  Australasia  has  not  provided  for  its  pro- 
portionate obligation  in  the  defense  of  the  Empire, 
the  Imperial  obligations  toward  the  commonwealth 
have  not  been  met  to  any  greater  degree.  There 
is  a  salient  difference  between  the  obligations  of 
the  dominions  and  those  of  the  Empire.  The  former 
are  simple,  the  latter  complex.  Hence  it  can  be 
said  that  to  the  degree  that  this  complexity  exists 
are  the  Imperial  responsibilities  increased.  So  in- 
volved are  these  responsibilities  that,  unless  there 
exists  a  singleness  of  purpose  in  Imperial  policy, 
those  very  expedients  made  use  of  as  protective 
measures  may  in  turn  become  the  source  of  many 
dangers. 

The  defense  of  a  nation  or  its  dependencies  does 
not  always  involve  the  use  of  force.  Statesmen  de- 
fend and  lose  greater  interests  than  soldiers,  and  it 
is  more  generally  upon  their  wisdom  or  ignorance 
that  national  greatness  or  survival  depends.  Wars 
result  from  the  maximum  of  their  intelligence, 
which  is  national  growth,  and  from  the  maximum 
of  their  ignorance,  which  is  national  retrocession. 

The  failure  of  the  Imperial  government,  in  the 
discharge  of  its  obligations  to  the  Pacific  dominions 
and  colonies,  has  been  due  to  a  false  differentiation 

84 


THE    SAXON    AND    EASTERN    ASIA 

of  the  Empire's  political  and  military  development 
in  the  two  hemispheres.  This  progress  should  not 
be  erratic,  but  should  be  governed  in  its  development 
by  well-defined  laws.  It  is  only  the  shifting  interests 
of  men,  and  the  transitory  character  of  their  ex- 
pedients in  the  government  of  the  Empire,  that 
give  to  its  military  and  political  expansion  that 
lack  of  imity  and  cohesion  that  should  mark  its 
progress. 

It  was  this  undue  concentration  of  Louis  XIV.  and 
Napoleon  upon  continental  affairs  that,  blinding 
them  to  the  potentiality  of  a  sea  power,  brought 
about  their  downfall.  It  was  this  same  delimitation 
of  Russia's  horizon  that,  in  the  vastness  of  China, 
Japan  was  not  apparent.  In  the  same  manner  Eng- 
land's concentration  against  France  and  Russia  per- 
mitted the  birth  and  the  maturity  of  the  German 
menace.  And  now,  while  the  attention  of  the  whole 
Empire  is  directed  toward  this  most  apparent  peril, 
Russia  is  still  moving  along  her  predetermined  way. 

In  the  Pacific,  scorned  by  Saxon  vanity  or  de- 
nied by  Saxon  ignorance,  broods  a  new  peril  in  a 
kind  of  sullen  gentleness  not  unlike  the  typhoon 
that  also,  in  these  purple  solitudes,  awaits  those 
who  forget. 

It  is  not  always  potent  reasons  that  force  the 
attention  of  nations  upon  a  single  frontier  to  the 
neglect  of  the  others.  This  is  more  apt  to  happen 
through  the  most  trivial  occurrences.  Like  the 
mariners   of   antiquity,  nations   crowd  their   fears 

85 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

toward  the  barkings  of  Scylla  while  being  sucked 
into  the  whirlpools  of  Charybdis. 
j~  In  the  philosophy  of  nation -building  we  are  at 
first  confronted  with  such  a  complexity  of  apparent 
principles  that  it  appears  an  almost  impossible 
labor  to  burrow  down  to  those  basic  conditions,  few 
in  number,  yet  the  determinate  factors  of  political  life. 

The  peculiarity  of  life  is  its  ultimate  simplicity. 

The  building-up  of  an  empire  and  its  preservation 
is  reducible  to  two  principles: 
-J       I.  The  use  of  the  militant  power  of  the  nation 

itself. 
.^      2.  The  use  or  neutralization  of  the  militant  power 
of  other  nations. 

The  latter,  which  alone  concerns  us  at  present, 
is  generally  exemplified  in  international  alliances. 
The  essential  characteristic  of  national  defense  or 
expansion  based  upon  alliances  is  the  increase  of 
national  strength,  either  negatively,  by  neutralizing 
the  enemy's  military  power,  or  positively,  by  de- 
stroying it. 

International  alliances  should  be  governed  by 
three  elemental  conditions: 

1.  An  alliance  should  not  be  made  with  a  state 
that  increases  the  probabilities  of  war  and  augments 
through  war  the  power  of  that  nation  with  whom 
the  alliance  is  made. 

2.  No  alliance  is  permissible  between  nations 
whose  lines  of  expansion  and  interests  are  acutely 
convergent. 

86 


THE    SAXON    AND    EASTERN    ASIA 

3.  That  in  the  event  of  a  successful  war  the  allied 
power  will  not  gain  by  its  victory  such  pohtical 
power  and  strategic  position  as  to  encroach  upon 
the  political  and  economic  sphere  of  its  ally. 

It  is  objected,  when  the  error  of  an  alliance  be- 
comes apparent,  that  the  ultimate  consequences  of 
such  compacts  are  unable  to  be  determined.  This 
is  wrong.  Alliances  are  made  in  peace  for  the  pur- 
poses of  war;  and,  being  made  prior  to  war,  the 
conditions  governing  their  association  extend  no 
further  than  the  war.  The  conditions  resultant 
from  war,  whether  victorious  or  otherwise,  should 
constitute  the  decisive  factors  in  the  formation  of 
the  alliance. 

It  was  this  indifference  to  future  consequences 
that  led  the  Empire  into  the  Japanese  Alliance, 
creating  the  third  most  potent  factor  in  those  forces 
which  tend  to  bring  about  the  dissolution  of  the 
Empire.  While,  on  the  other  hand,  the  piirpose  for 
which  this  alliance  was  made  has,  as  will  be  shown 
later,  increased  the  very  dangers  which  the  alliance 
endeavored  to  modify. 

The  policy  of  opposing  an  Oriental  power  against 
European  advance  in  Asia  is  correct,  provided  it 
succeeds  in  checking  the  actual  expansion  directed 
toward  the  Asian  frontiers  of  the  Empire  and  does 
not  at  the  same  time  result  in  creating  in  the  Orient 
an  Asiatic  military  power  superior  to  those  Euro- 
pean nations  whose  advance  it  was  deemed  neces- 
sary to  check. 

87 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

The  defeat  of  Russia  by  Japan  resulted  in  four 
disastrous  conditions :  ^ 

1 .  Instead  of  driving  Russian  expansion  back  upon 
Europe,  it  has  diverted  that  power's  advance  from 
northeastern  Asia  to  central  Asia,  where  the  most 
vital  interests  of  the  Empire  are  exposed  upon 
frontiers  which,  if  broken,  will  result  in  Imperial 
dissolution. 

2.  Japan  has  become  more  powerful  in  the  Pacific 
than  the  British  Empire. 

3.  Russian  defeat  resulted  in  the  creation  of  the 
Japanese  sphere  of  political  and  economic  expansion 
that  is  inclusive  of  all  British  interests  in  the  Pacific. 

4.  Russian  defeat  resulted  in  depriving  England 
of  her  advantageous  position  of  being  the  only- 
insular  power  in  the  world  by  the  creation  of  a  second 
naval  nation  whose  geographical  relationship  to 
Asia  is  identical  with  that  of  England  to  Europe, 
and  its  potentialities  in  the  Pacific  immeasurably 
greater  than  England's  in  the  Atlantic. 

By  these  four  results  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War 
are  betrayed  the  errors  of  British  statesmanship 
and  the  wisdom  of  the  Japanese. 

In  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  Japan  conformed 
to  those  three  principles  laid  down  as  determinate 
conditions  in  the  formation  of  such  compacts,  while 
Great  Britain  overlooked  essential  factors  that  con- 
cerned the  future  interests  of  the  Empire.  It  was 
in  the  renewal  of  this  alliance  that  the  Empire 

1  Chart  III. 


THE    SAXON    AND    EASTERN    ASIA 

finally  failed  in  its  duty  toward  its  Pacific  dominions 
to  even  a  greater  degree  than  has  Australasia  failed 
in  its  subordination  to  Imperial  interests  and  unity. 

However  essential  it  was  that  Russian  advance  in 
north  China  should  be  checked,  the  British  Empire 
should  have  reserved  to  itself  such  freedom  of  action 
and  balance  of  power  that  neither  nation,  in  its 
victory,  could  secure  that  strategic  position  or  mili- 
tary potentiality  that  would  encroach  upon  or  invade 
Saxon  interests  or  act  as  a  check  upon  their  expansion. 

In  these  principles,  that  should  control  the  motives 
and  formation  of  international  alliances,  the  basic 
element  is  that  no  nation  should  assist  in  the  crea- 
tion or  upbuilding  or  protection  of  any  other  state 
whose  interests  or  lines  of  expansion  are  acutely 
convergent.  Such  aid  only  increases  the  capacity 
to  expand,  and  augments  their  rate  of  movement 
along  those  given  lines. 

In  the  rise  of  Japan  a  new  era  has  been  ushered 
into  the  world.  The  predatory  march  of  the  West 
hesitates  much  in  the  same  manner  as  that  of  the 
East  some  centuries  ago.  In  this  hesitation  the 
British  Empire  is  confronted  with  this  condition: 
A  second  insular  power  has  been  bom  to  live  as  it 
has  Hved,  and  to  loot  as  it  has  looted  the  highways 
of  the  sea. 

How  significant  is  this  fact  was  not  realized  at  the 
time  of  its  advent.  Nor  were  the  means  employed 
to  bring  it  about  understood.  It  is  only  now  dimly 
realized. 

89 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

The  destiny  of  Japan  belongs  to  the  future. 

Japan  is  stronger  in  the  Pacific  than  the  British 
Empire  is  in  the  Atlantic. 

Japan's  naval  control  over  the  Pacific,  comprising 
one-third  of  the  world,  is  increasing  in  its  absolute 
character,  while  the  naval  tenure  of  the  Atlantic 
is  becommg  more  and  more  tentative.  Japan's 
military  forces  and  their  oceanic  mobility  are  hardly 
inferior  to  the  armies  of  Germany,  while  the  ex- 
peditionary forces  of  the  Empire  are  less  than  seven 
Japanese  divisions. 
;  Nations  in  their  development  are  constrained  to 
given  lines  by  their  geographical  environment. 
Two  nations  situated  in  different  parts  of  the  world 
and  inhabited  by  different  races  will  progress  along 
identical  lines  if  the  geography  and  climatic  con- 
f  ditions  of  their  respective  countries  are  relatively 
the  same.  When,  moreover,  we  find  two  nations 
whose  welfare  and  greatness  are  dependent  upon  the 
acquisition  of  the  same  sources  of  wealth  or  power, 
and  to  secure  which  the  same  means  are  employed, 
then  we  are  at  once  cognizant  of  this  salient  and  at 
the  same  time  ominous  condition,  that  so  long  as 
these  two  nations  continue  to  be  of  relative  strength 
their  interests  and  lines  of  expansion  are  so  acutely 
convergent  that  in  due  time  they  enter  into  that 
fatal  Punic  era  wherein  even  peace  is  war. 

The  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  has  made  possible, 
in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  term,  the  Japanese  Empire. 
It  may  result  in  giving  over  to  her  sovereignty  one- 

90 


THE    SAXON    AND    EASTERN    ASIA 

third  of  the  world.  On  the  other  hand,  the  British 
Empire  not  only  has  received  no  return  from  this 
arrangement,  but  has,  on  the  contrary,  been  placed 
where  the  works  of  yesterday  are  the  mines  of 
to-day. 

It  is  evident  that  whenever  assistance  is  given 
another  nation  to  curtail  or  destroy  the  political 
and  territorial  expansion  of  a  common  enemy  it 
involves  two  obligations,  neither  of  which  in  this 
instance  was  observed.  So  that  by  the  time  this 
alliance  comes  to  an  end  we  will  find  the  Indian 
frontiers  more  vulnerable  than  ever  —  the  western 
marches  of  China  occupied,  and  Japan  impregnable 
in  the  Pacific. 

The  forces  that  constitute  the  propulsion  of 
Japanese  expansion  are  apparent;  but  the  direction 
that  it  will  take  has  still  the  appearance  of  being 
wrapped  in  mystery.  It  should,  however,  be  mani- 
fest as  the  forces  themselves,  since  the  expansion 
of  nations  is  not  an  erratic  progress,  but  is  con- 
trolled and  directed  by  known  laws. 

Japan's  relation  to  Asia  and  the  Pacific  is  identi- 
cal with  England's  relation  to  Europe  and  the 
Atlantic  prior  to  her  Pacific  expansion.  The  only 
difference  between  the  extension  of  the  Japanese 
Empire  and  that  of  England  is  that  Japan's  activ- 
ities will  be  restricted  to  the  Pacific,  of  which  she 
constitutes  the  strategic  center.^  Japan's  present 
continental  extension  of  her  empire  is  within  her  true 

^  The  Valor  of  Ignorance. 
7  91 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

scheme  of  expansion,  as  were  England's  continental 
wars  a  part  of  her  development.  Should  Japan, 
to  extend  her  sovereignty  on  the  Asian  continent, 
neglect  to  first  gain  control  of  the  Pacific,  then  the 
duration  of  her  national  greatness  will  draw  to  an  end. 

The  basic  principle  governing  the  growth  and  de- 
fense of  an  insular  power  not  only  belongs  to  the 
naval  supremacy  of  the  sea  in  which  the  nation  is 
located,  but,  in  modern  times,  the  radii  of  this  con- 
trol must  be  lengthened  in  distance  proportionately 
as  the  time  to  traverse  them  is  shortened  by  the  in- 
creasing rapidity  and  capacity  of  modem  trans- 
portation. Because  of  this  law  Japan's  maritime 
frontiers  must  extend  eastward  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  and  southward  of  the  Philippines.  For 
Japan  not  to  possess  the  control  of  the  Pacific  is  to 
lose  her  sovereignty  in  Asia,  and  would  be  equivalent 
to  England  warring  against  Germany  with  the  latter 
in  control  of  the  Atlantic.  Because  of  this  Japan 
draws  near  to  her  next  war — a  war  with  America — 
by  which  she  expects  to  lay  the  true  foundation  of 
her  greatness.^ 

The  Republic's  indifference  to  the  development 
and  potentiahty  of  Japan,  its  submersion  in  the  ebb 
and  flux  of  party  poUtics,  its  heterogeneous  racial 
elements,  the  supremacy  of  the  individual  over  the 
welfare  of  the  nation,  and,  finally,  the  nation's  vain 
and  tragic  scorn  of  the  soldier,  predetermines  the 
consummation  of  this  fatal  combat. 

*  The  Valor  of  Ignorance. 
92 


THE    SAXON    AND    EASTERN    ASIA 

Subsequent  to  this  war  the  strategic  position  of 
the  British  Empire  in  the  Pacific  becomes  so  vulner- 
able as  to  be  subject  to  the  will  of  Japan. ^  And  as 
in  the  same  manner  Wei-Hai-Wei  is  now  rendered 
useless  by  Port  Arthur,  Korea,  and  the  Japanese 
Islands,  so  will  Hongkong  be  wedged  in  between 
Formosa  and  the  Philippines,  Singapore  segregated, 
and  Australasia  cut  off  from  North  America. 

Should  the  British  Empire,  following  this  war  and 
the  expiration  of  the  alliance,  become  involved  in 
Europe  or  on  the  Indian  frontiers,  her  defeat  would 
result  in  the  eventual  inclusion  of  Australasia  under 
Japanese  sovereignty.  Japan  will  not  falter  nor 
hesitate  to  give  expression  to  that  basic  principle 
already  laid  down,  that  there  must  be  no  cessation 
to  the  militant  growth  and  expansion  of  a  nation 
if  it  is  to  survive. 

When  we  consider  what  constitutes  the  essentials 
of  national  power  and  supremacy  over  other  nations, 
realizing  at  the  same  time  that  they  are  all-potential 
in  Japan,  we  may  well  halt  and  wonder.  While  the 
militancy  of  our  race  has  been  decreasing  propor- 
tionately with  the  increased  complexity  of  our 
civilization,  there  exists  no  such  deterioration  in 
Japan;  for  what  we  evolved  slowly  with  the  wear 
and  tear  of  it  upon  our  militancy  they  have  taken  as 
a  whole,  and  strapped,  or  perhaps,  as  time  will  de- 
termine, welded,  it  to  their  valor. 

In  the  re-establishment  of  the  political  and  mili- 

*  The  Valor  of  Ignorance. 
93 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

tary  equilibrium  of  the  Pacific  the  British  Empire 
has  not  only  to  consider  the  strategic  impregnability 
of  Japan's  position,  but  Japan  itself  and  the  char- 
acter of  the  elements  that  constitute  it.  Here  the 
vain  and  ignorant  populace  has  no  place  in  the  con- 
duct of  the  affairs  of  the  nation,  and  the  loud  noises 
of  haranguing  multitudes  carry  no  intimidation  into 
the  council-chambers  of  the  state.  Silently,  with- 
out haste,  slowly,  with  an  intentness  which  is  con- 
scious of  neither  hesitation  nor  diversion,  this  mili- 
tant empire  moves  across  the  sea.  The  nation 
vanishes.  It  has  been  metamorphosed  into  a  sol- 
dier. This  soldier  is  the  genius  of  the  nation.  He 
has  elevated  martyrdom  to  heroism,  and  heroism 
to  duty.  He  does  not  haggle  over  eternity,  but, 
having  found  a  God  in  his  country,  has  discovered 
a  sanctuary  in  his  valor.   . 

The  restoration  of  the  former  equilibrium  in  the 
Pacific,  where  a  balance  of  power  will  make  all  con- 
quest tentative  and  prevent  the  tenure  of  this  third 
of  the  world  from  passing  under  the  sovereignty  of 
an  alien  power,  is  a  duty  that  the  Empire  not  only 
owes  to  its  Pacific  dominions,  but  to  itself,  of  which 
they  constitute  a  component  part.  Their  isolation 
presages  the  eventual  shrinkage  and  dissolution  of 
the  same  inevitability  as  would  the  loss  of  a  more 
vital  portion  of  the  Empire  entail.  Time  alone  is 
the  differentiating  principle. 

The  permanent  defense  of  Australasia  in  the  fu- 
ture is  not  only  naval,  but  belongs  to  a  navy  whose 

94 


THE    SAXON    AND    EASTERN    ASIA 

combative  strength  is  equal  to  or  exceeds  that  of 
the  strongest  naval  power  in  the  Pacific.  This,  it 
is  evident,  can  only  be  accomplished  by  the  Empire 
in  its  entirety. 

The  political  and  military  equilibrium  of  the 
Pacific  is  not,  primarily,  opposition  to  Japan.  It 
belongs  to  a  relative  equalization  of  power  among 
Pacific  nations,  so  that  the  British  Empire  is  able 
to  maintain,  in  its  capacity  of  a  Pacific  state,  that 
balance  of  power  which  will  insure  the  integrity 
of  its  possessions  and  interests. 

From  those  principles  already  considered  as  deter- 
mining the  potential  character  of  alliance,  and  the 
policy  of  supporting  an  Oriental  nation  against  the 
Asiatic  expansion  of  a  European  power,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  China,  and  not  Japan,  was  the  nation  with 
whom  such  an  alliance  should  have  been  made. 
While  this  was  impossible  at  the  time  the  agreement 
was  entered  into,  on  account  of  the  weakness  of 
that  nation,  it  should  have  been  the  policy  of  the 
British  Empire  years  before  such  an  alliance  was 
necessary  to  create  in  China  a  great  continental 
power.  This  necessity  still  remains  and  is  reducible 
to  three  conditions. 

The  frontiers  of  China  are  contiguous  with  those 
of  Russia  from  the  Pamir  to  the  Pacific  for  a  dis- 
tance of  over  six  thousand  miles,  and  form,  with 
the  Indian  boundaries,  homogeneous  frontiers  hav- 
ing such  interests  in  common  against  the  aggres- 
sion   of    Russia    that    their   allegiance    is   perma- 

95 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

nent,  and  not  the  temporary  expedient  of  states- 
men. 

China  is  even  more  than  Russia  a  continental 
nation.  Its  development,  its  policy,  and  military 
expansion  will  be  controlled  by  those  characteristics 
which  govern  the  development  of  such  a  state. 
The  expansion  of  China  is  antagonistic  to  Russia 
more  than  to  any  other  nation.  Had  Russia  at- 
tempted the  strengthening  of  China,  as  the  British 
Empire  succeeded  in  doing  for  Japan,  Russia  would 
have  committed  the  same  mistake.  As  British 
and  Japanese  progression  are  basically  convergent 
on  the  sea,  so  are  Russia  and  China  convergent  on 
land.  It  is  this  convergence  that  constitutes  the 
value  of  China's  alliance  to  the  Empire.  With  the 
development  of  China  and  a  diffusion  of  its  central 
population  along  the  railroads  which  will  be  con- 
structed to  its  northern  and  western  frontiers,  it 
can  be  said  that  the  ■worth  of  this  alliance  increases 
proportionately  with  China's  increase  in  power  and 
extension  of  her  empire.  This  is  the  reverse  of 
Saxon  relations  with  Japan. 

The  principle  of  protecting  India  from  Russia 
through  the  continuance  of  the  Anglo- Japanese 
Alliance  is  one  of  those  tragic  delusions  which  are, 
from  time  to  time,  forced  upon  nations.  To  under- 
stand that  Russian  victory  would  affect  the  security 
of  India  was  not  difficult;  but  to  realize  that  Rus- 
sian defeat  increased  the  vulnerability  of  these 
frontiers  to  even  a  greater  extent  did  not  occur  to 

96 


THE    SAXON    AND    EASTERN    ASIA 

the  British  nation.  In  this  bitter  paradox  we  find, 
moreover,  that  the  destruction  of  British  power  in 
India  results  not  alone  in  Russian  supremacy  on 
the  Asian  continent,  but  eliminates  Saxon  power 
from  the  Pacific  and  extends  Japanese  maritime 
sovereignty  over  the  whole  of  it.  Japan  and  Russia 
are  natural  allies  —  not  Japan  and  England.  The 
true  extension  of  their  respective  empires  is  not  con- 
vergent. One  is  continental,  the  other  maritime. 
But  more  than  that  the  Saxon  race,  which  opposes 
Russian  expansion  by  land,  must  in  due  time  op- 
pose with  equal  determination  Japanese  expansion 
by  sea.  A  victory  by  either  of  these  nations  over 
the  British  Empire  is  equally  fortuitous.  The 
Saxon  bars  the  natural  expansion  of  both.  This 
creates  between  them  that  cohesive  community  of 
interests,  the  destruction  of  the  common  enemy, 
that  some  day  will  result  in  a  specific  alliance. 

China  presents  the  opposite  of  the  above  condi- 
tions. While  Japan  could  consimimate  her  am- 
bitions for  Pacific  supremacy  through  the  conquest 
of  India  by  Russia,  such  a  conquest  would  for  China 
presage  her  eventual  destruction.  The  interest  of 
China  in  the  preservation  of  India's  integrity  is  as 
essential  to  her  as  the  security  of  her  own  terri- 
torial and  political  entity.  Russian  conquest  of 
China  determines,  to  an  equal  degree,  the  eventual 
destruction  of  British  power  in  India.  So  identical 
are  the  interests  of  China  and  the  British  Empire 
that,  while  their  progression   and  expansion  affect 

97 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

a  common  enemy,  the  expansion  or  greatness  of 
that  enemy  or  its  allies  is  as  invariably  dangerous 
to  one  as  the  other.  Danger,  therefore,  consoli- 
dates the  interests  of  these  two  empires,  and  pros- 
perity does  not  draw  them  apart. 

It  is  not  alone  the  interdependence  of  China  and 
the  British  Empire  for  the  preservation  of  their 
political  and  territorial  integrity  in  Asia  that  deter- 
mines the  natural  character  of  their  relationship; 
but  the  same  fact  is  true  in  every  phase  of  their 
national  activities  and  expansion.  The  same  char- 
acteristics that  make  Russia  and  Japan  allies  belong 
also  to  China  and  the  British  Empire.  While 
Russian  expansion  is  continental,  so  also  is  China's; 
while  Japan's  expansion  is  maritime,  so  is  that  of 
the  Saxons.  There  is  no  national  convergence  of 
interests,  and  where  this  does  not  exist  that  an- 
tagonism which  results  in  war  cannot  arise.  What 
the  Saxon  sea  power  is  to  China,  China's  land  forces 
are  to  the  Empire — a  defense  that  neither  nation 
can  alone  evolve.  The  extension  of  these  militant 
activities  being  entirely  counterbalanced  can  never 
hold  for  the  other  those  future  dangers  which  are 
the  product  of  an  alliance  with  a  nation  whose  ex- 
pansion is  convergent. 

An  alliance  with  a  rehabilitated  China  results  in 
the  restoration  of  the  poUtical  and  military  equi- 
librium not  only  in  the  western  Pacific,  but  to  an 
almost  equal  degree  in  Central  Asia.  On  the  other 
hand,   China,  continued  in  chronic  decadence,  in- 

98 


THE    SAXON    AND    EASTERN    ASIA 

creases  proportionately  the  dangers  which  threaten 
Saxon  dominion  in  Asia  and  the  Pacific.  While  the 
conquest  of  India  predetermines  the  fate  of  China, 
so  with  equal  certitude  can  we  say  that  the  disso- 
lution of  China  only  precedes  the  expulsion  of  Saxon 
power  from  Asia  and  the  western  Pacific. 


VIII 

THE  SAXON  AND  THE  RUSSIAN 

Self -segregation  of  the  East  Now  Impossible. — Convergence  of 
European  Interests  in  Asia. — Predetermined  Expansion  of  Rus- 
sia.— Three  Homogeneous  Lines  of. — India's  Importance  to. 

AS  we  study  the  evolution  and  development  of 
i  the  human  race  relative  to  the  political  inter- 
course of  its  parts,  we  are  confronted  for  the  first 
time  in  its  history  with  this  singular  condition:  the 
association  of  Oriental  nations  with  those  of  the 
Occident  on  a  basis  of  equaHty  and  permanency  in 
all  the  activities  of  political  life.  Heretofore  the 
contact  of  the  West  with  the  East  has  been  a  clash, 
a  struggle,  then  a  recoil,  each  upon  itself — except 
where  one  or  the  other  remained  hesitantly  supreme 
over  its  spoil,  or  momentarily  paramount  amidst  the 
debris  of  conquest. 

Conditions  permitting  the  voluntary  self-segrega- 
tion of  the  East  and  the  West  now  no  longer  exist. 
Nations  cannot  in  this  age  still  hide  themselves  be- 
hind their  mountain  walls  or  their  moats  of  space 
and  sea.  Their  wealth  or  their  poverty,  their 
strength  or  their  weakness,  is  known,  not  to  a  por- 
tion, but  to  the  entire  world.  Science,  unlike  God, 
has  no  chosen  people.     Those  by  the  simrise  and 

lOO 


THE  SAXON  AND  THE  RUSSIAN 

those  by  its  going  down  are  one  and  the  same.  It 
has,  in  its  impartial  and  relentless  manner,  crushed 
this  once  vast  world  into  a  little  ball  around  which 
go,  each  day,  the  whisperings  of  a  hundred  tongues. 
It  is  now  a  hundred  cubits  less  in  size  than  the 
Tower  of  Babel.  So  small  has  this  once  immeasur- 
able world  become  that  man  sees  all  its  sides  at 
once.  He  hears  simultaneously  all  its  noises.  He 
knows  each  day  the  storm  and  sunshine  of  every 
quarter;  the  quarrels  and  laughter,  the  hunger  and 
waste,  the  hates  and  deception  still  toiling  on  in 
these  old  and  new  lands  where,  simultaneously,  man 
boycots  time  and  God  and  space. 

But  what  does  this  permanency,  this  equality, 
this  crushed-together  interassociation  of  the  Orient 
with  the  Occident  hold  for  the  latter  in  its  numeri- 
cal inequality?  Who  is  to  say  that  it  is  not  the 
renascence  in  a  new  and  terrible  earnestness  of  the 
old  menace? 

Mankind,  both  as  individuals  and  as  nations,  is 
moved,  in  all  his  essential  activities,  by  motives  that 
have  their  origin  in  defined  primal  instincts.  The 
antagonism  of  the  East  to  the  West,  and  conversely, 
belongs  wholly  to  this  basic  principle:  the  struggle 
for  survival  and  mastery  between  the  two  pre- 
dominant races  of  mankind. 

While  it  is  true  that  changed  association,  altered 
environment,  and  numerous  other  mutual  condi- 
tions have  a  corresponding  effect  upon  and  modi- 
fication of  prior  racial  characteristics,  yet  this  altera- 

lOI 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

tion  is  not  instantaneous,  but  extends  over  a  period 
of  time  relatively  long  or  short,  as  determined  by 
the  character  of  the  change,  whether  it  belongs  to 
custom,  to  racial  characteristics,  or  to  primitive 
human  instincts.  Man  constantly  deceives  himself 
by  beUeving  in  the  rapidity  of  such  transformation 
by  failing  to  differentiate  between  these  three 
conditions. 

Because  the  customs  of  the  Orient  have  changed, 
that  they  have  adopted  the  essentials  of  Occidental 
civilization,  does  not  mean  a  concurrent  change 
in  their  racial  peculiarities  or  tendencies  nor  a 
simultaneous  metamorphosis  of  more  primal  at- 
tributes which  complete  the  distinction  between 
them  and  the  Occidental.  Such  changes  as  these 
can  only  take  place  after  long  periods  of  time  as 
compared  to  the  adoption  and  even  assimilation 
of  customs  and  outward  forms  of  another  race. 

Who,  then,  would  assert  that  the  old  antagonism 
of  the  East  and  West  has  vanished  because  distance 
between  them  has  been  reduced?  To  decrease  dis- 
tance between  antagonisms  is  to  increase  propor- 
tionately their  intensity.  To  augment  the  prob- 
abilities of  a  struggle  it  is  only  necessary  to  increase 
the  proximity  of  antagonists.  Though  the  means 
of  warfare  and  the  manner  of  its  conduct  are  no 
longer  those  by  which  Alexander  waded  his  way  to 
the  Orient,  or  by  which  Genghis  Klian  fell  upon 
Europe,  yet  the  causation  of  this  everlasting  struggle 
remains  the  same. 

I02 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    RUSSIAN 

/     Mukden  is  only  an  echo  of  Arbela. 

J     The  sudden  crowding  together  of  the  East  and 
the  West  through  the  medium  of  science  does  not 
mean,  therefore,  the  cessation  or  elimination  of  their 
combats   and   contentions.     It   only    signifies   that 
I    their  warfare,  which  was  at  one  time  as  intermittent 
Ar  as  the  tempests  of  Koko  Nor,  has  now  become  a 
^  factor  in  the  ebb  and  flow  of  their  affairs  that  is 
^  constant  in  causation  and  effect.     It  is  the  immu- 
table character  of  this  confused  struggle  that  neces- 
sitates a  political  readjustment  of  the  entire  world 
and  postpones  to  a  dim  and  uncertain  future  the 
fulfilment  of  that  despairing  cry  of  ' '  Peace  on  Earth." 
^       We  have  witnessed  in  Europe  from  time  to  time 
\  those  long  periods  of  war  that  preceded  and  were 
^concurrent    with    every    readjustment    of    political 
^  1  conditions.     This   the   progression  of  mankind  ne- 
yj  cessitates  at  unequal  intervals,  not  only  in  Europe, 
\  but  in  every  portion  of  the  globe  where  races  of  men 
1/live  adjacent  to  one  another  in  separate  political 
/    entities.     Though    the    wars    of    the    seventeenth, 
eighteenth,  and  nineteenth  centuries  for  the  adjust- 
ment of  European  politics  were  beHeved  to  be,  in 
their  time,  final,  yet  Europe  even  now  prepares  to 
enter  upon  the  old  combat.     The  Punic  Wars  have 
\\t\)een  forgotten,  and  the  Napoleonic  struggles  have 
y  \  been  stilled  for  a  hundred  years;  yet   the   causes 
^  through  all  these  centuries  remain  identical  in  their 
y^*-  basic  impulse,  unaltered  except  in  the  manner  of 
their  expression. 

103 


.  y  er 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

When,  however,  we  consider  the  world,  instead 
of  Europe,  and  all  its  diverse  races,  encompassed 
in  a  combative  area  less  than  that  continent,  we 
may  realize,  though  ever  so  dimly,  the  portent  of 
this  dreadful  fact:  that  we  are  just  entering  upon 
the  first  era  of  this  political  readjustment  of  the 
world;  that  these  eras  will  succeed  one  another 
with  the  same  inevitability  as  do  the  recurring 
cycles  of  Time. 

How  pitiful  it  is,  in  the  realization  of  these  facts, 
to  behold  a  great  race  padding  itself  with  the  valor 
of  its  forefathers  and,  at  the  same  time,  shirking 
those  struggles  upon  which  depends  their  racial  great- 
ness and  siirvival.  No  line  of  demarcation  between 
cowardice  and  evasion  exists,  whether  it  is  individ- 
ual or  national.  To  attempt  to  escape  responsi- 
bility by  subterfuge  is  only  the  consummation  of 
fear. 

For  the  survivors  of  those  who  crucify  their  race 
under  the  delusion  that  they  can  deride  the  God 
that  led  it,  there  remains  only  an  endless,  country- 
less  trek  forever. 

The  political  readjustment  of  the  world,  due  to 
the  circumstances  we  have  mentioned,  does  not 
alone  concern  contentions  between  the  white  and 
colored  races ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  approach- 
ing period  of  adjustment  will  be  more  or  less  re- 
stricted on  the  Asian  continent  to  those  white 
races  whose  expansion  and  interests  in  Asia  have 
been  and  are  convergent.     This  acuteness  in  the 

104 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    RUSSIAN 

convergence  of  European  interests  in  Asia  has  re- 
sulted from  two  conditions: 

1.  The  reduction  of  communicable  time  and  dis- 
tance by  mechanical  invention. 

2.  The  awakening  of  Asia. 

In  direct  ratio  to  the  increase  of  effectiveness 
in  these  two  conditions  has  the  convergence  of 
European  interests  in  Asia  been  increased  and  the 
rate  of  their  expansion  augmented  in  intensity.  Of 
the  nations  most  affected  by  these  altered  circum- 
stances France  is  least  concerned,  and  the  British 
Empire  most,  since  the  Asiatic  convergences  of 
both  Germany  and  Russia  are  directed  against  the 
strategic  center  of  British  Asia. 

We  have  heretofore  called  attention  to  a  strange 
fatality  that,  from  time  to  time,  seizes  hold  upon 
all  nations,  and  in  numerous  instances  is  the  in- 
direct cause  that  leads  to  their  final  dissolution. 
This  characteristic  is  concentrating  the  entire  at- 
tention of  the  nation  against  one  enemy,  while  the 
movement  against  its  other  frontiers  by  an  equally 
dangerous  foe  remains  unchecked.  This  has  never 
been  more  completely  exemplified  than  by  the 
British  nation.  In  its  fear  of  German  conquest  it 
has  concealed  from  itself  the  advance  of  Russia 
against  that  portion  of  the  Empire  which,  if  once 
seized,  destroys  it  more  effectually  than  the  German 
invasion  of  England. 

In  the  development  of  the  Russian  Empire  man 
has  more  nearly  approached  those  characteristics 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

that  mark  the  measured,  unhurried  growth  of 
Nature.  In  its  extension  it  has  moved  onward 
with  elemental  propulsion.  Like  a  glacier,  its  move- 
ment is  only  apparent  by  periods  of  time.  So  im- 
perceptible is  the  terrible,  imperturbable  grind  of  its 
way  that  we  do  not  perceive  its  progress  until  it 
has  passed  a  given  point.  What  it  does  not  crush 
it  erodes.  What  it  does  not  erode  it  forces  on  in 
front  imtil  into  some  crevasse,  great  or  small,  it 
pushes  the  debris  that  impedes  its  way. 

It  moves  on. 

It  was  this  glacial,  timeless,  measured  movement, 
this  calm  and  dreadful  certitude,  that  even  terri- 
fied Napoleon  when  the  breath  of  it  chilled  into 
cinders  his  highway  of  flame. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century  Rus- 
sia was  less  than  two  hundred  and  seventy-five 
thousand  square  miles.  In  seven  generations  it  in- 
creased until  it  comprised  nearly  nine  millions,  or 
one-seventh  of  the  land  surface  of  the  world.  Rus- 
sia in  Europe  alone  is  now  larger  than  all  other 
European  nations.  During  the  same  period  of 
time  its  population  increased  from  twelve  millions 
to  more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  millions.  At 
its  present  rate  of  increase,  by  propagation  alone, 
it  will  exceed  four  hundred  millions  in  three  gen- 
erations. From  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth 
century  to  the  present  time  there  has  been  a  corre- 
sponding increase  in  its  revenue  from  one  million 
pounds  to  more  than  two  hundred  million. 

io6 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    RUSSIAN 

It  is,  however,  not  this  net  result  of  Russian 
growth  and  greatness  that  inspires  us  with  those 
feeHngs  of  its  invincibility  to  which  we  have  just 
given  expression,  but  rather  the  manner  of  this 
progression.  The  expansion  of  Russia,  unlike  that 
of  most  great  empires,  has  never  been  erratic  nor 
dependable  upon  fortuitous  circumstances.  In- 
stead of  being  the  result  of  an  aggregate  of  fortu- 
nate expedients,  it  has  been  the  ruthless  exemplifi- 
cation of  a  predetermined  plan. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century  Russia 
was  consolidated  to  the  extent  that  it  was  possible 
to  proceed  definitely  to  that  expansion  decided  upon 
during  the  seventeenth  century.  In  the  preceding 
hundred  years  five  lines  of  expansion  had  been  pre- 
determined :  ^ 

1.  In  the  northwest  to  force  Sweden  from  the 
Baltic  Httoral  and  establish  the  Russian  frontier  on 
that  sea.  This  work  had  been  begun  by  the  Tsars 
John  III.  and  IV. 

2.  In  the  west  to  gain  Little  and  White  Russia 
from  Poland.  This  work  had  been  begun  by  the 
Tsar  Alexei-Michaelovitch. 

3.  In  the  south  to  gain  the  Black  Sea,  to  create 
unrest  in  Turkey  preparatory  to  invasion.  This 
work  had  been  laid  out  by  the  Grand  Dukes  Oleg 
and  Sviatosloff. 

4.  In  the  southeast  to  secure  the  Caspian  Sea 
and  the  Caucasus.     This  work  had  been  begun  by 

^  Kuropatkin. 
S  107 


THE    DAY   OP   THE    SAXON 

the  Tsars  Theodore  -  Ivanovitch  and  Boris  Godu- 
noff. 

5.  In  the  east  to  move  toward  the  Pacific  and 
India. 

During  the  eighteenth  century,  for  which  these 
five  labors  had  been  predetermined,  only  three  were 
accomplished.  On  the  northwest  frontier,  con- 
stituting at  that  time  the  most  essential  line  of 
Russian  expansion,  the  control  of  the  Baltic,  Russia, 
after  twenty-one  years  of  war,  completed  this  work, 
and  in  the  destruction  of  Swedish  power  assumed 
that  supremacy  in  the  north  that  has  never  yet 
been  altered.  On  the  western  frontier,  to  gain 
Little  and  White  Russia,  necessitated  three  wars 
with  Poland.  These  struggles  ended  not  only  in 
the  consolidation  of  these  portions  of  Russia  with  the 
empire,  but  in  the  destruction  of  Poland  as  an  in- 
dependent kingdom.  The  advance  toward  the 
Black  Sea  and  the  weakening  of  Turkey  resulted 
in  four  wars  with  that  power,  the  first  ending  in 
Russian  defeat,  as  did  the  initial  campaign  against 
Sweden;  but  in  the  fourth  the  object  of  Russian 
advance  was  accomplished.  Russia  had  reached 
the  Black  Sea,  possessed  the  Crimea  and  the  lands 
beyond  the  Dniester  and  the  Bug. 

The  nineteenth  century  was  only  a  continuation 
of  Russian  expansion  and  consolidation.  On  the 
northwest  frontiers,  after  a  war  of  fifteen  months, 
Finland  was  annexed  to  the  empire.  On  the  west 
Poland  was  dismembered  and  a  portion  added  to 

108 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    RUSSIAN 

Russia.  The  extension  of  Russian  sovereignty  and 
its  consolidation  on  the  Black  Sea  resulted  in  three 
more  wars  with  Turkey  and  one  with  a  European 
coalition.  The  first  ended  with  the  annexation  of 
a  part  of  Bessarabia;  the  second  in  securing  the 
mouths  of  the  Danube  and  three  hundred  and 
seventy  miles  of  the  Black  Sea  Httoral;  the  third 
in  the  acquisition  of  Batoum  and  Kars. 

During  the  eighteenth  century  no  movement  had 
been  made  on  the  eastern  line  of  expansion;  and  an 
effort  in  the  direction  of  India  had  ended  during 
the  early  part  of  the  eighteenth  century  in  the  re- 
pulse at  Khiva.  This  apparent  restriction  of  Rus- 
sian activities  to  the  expansion  of  its  European 
frontiers  during  the  whole  of  the  eighteenth  century 
led  Europe  to  beHeve  that  the  extension  of  Russia 
to  the  Pacific  and  the  conquest  of  India  had  been 
put  aside  forever.  Yet,  during  this  time,  the  pre- 
destined movement  of  Russia  toward  the  Pacific 
and  India  was  going  on,  without  noise  or  bluster, 
imperceptibly  and  glacier-like.  Its  progress  was 
only  noted  when  it  passed  a  given  point. 

In  the  nineteenth  century,  to  gain  dominion  over 
the  Caucasus  and  the  Caspian,  Russia  fought  two 
wars  with  Persia  and  a  war  of  sixty-two  years  with 
the  highlanders  of  the  Caucasus.  In  Central  Asia 
wars  were  carried  on  for  thirty  years  to  gain  the 
Afghan  frontiers  of  India.  During  this  same  cen- 
tury Russia  gained  the  Pacific  by  the  annexation  of 
Amur   and   Ussure   regions,    Kamchatka,   and   the 

109 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

peninsula  of  Kwang-tung.  It  consolidated  and  drew 
together  in  one  compact  mass  the  whole  of  these 
vast  possessions. 

Russia  is  European.     It  is  also  Asian. 

As  we  follow  the  expansion  and  study  the  develop- 
ment of  this  nation  from  those  plans  determined 
upon  in  the  seventeenth  century,  we  seem  to  con- 
template the  gradual  evolution  of  some  irrepress- 
ible natural  force  rather  than  the  struggle  of  man. 
During  these  two  centuries  twenty-one  wars  were 
fought  for  the  expansion  of  the  empire  lasting  for 
one  hundred  and  one  years. ^  To  secure  the  Baltic 
it  was  necessary  to  sacrifice  700,000  men  of  1,800,000 
put  into  the  field;  to  gain  the  Black  Sea  750,000 
perished  out  of  3,200,000. 

Russia  in  her  progress  is  concerned  no  more  with 
the  devastation  of  her  wars  than  is  Russian  nature 
with  the  havoc  of  her  winters.  In  the  eighteenth 
century  this  empire  sent  into  her  wars  4,910,000 
troops;  casualties  of  which  were  1,380,000.  In  the 
nineteenth  century  the  nimiber  of  troops  engaged 
was  4,900,000;  the  casualties,  1,410,000.  Yet  the 
population  of  Russia  at  the  beginning  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century  was  only  twelve  million;  at  the  be- 
beginning  of  the  nineteenth  only  thirty-eight  million. 
When,  therefore,  in  consideration  of  these  facts,  we 
contemplate  the  possibilities  of  Russian  expansion 
during  the  twentieth  century,^  we  are  conscious  of  a 
potential  power  for  aggression  which,  relative  to 
»Kuropatkin.  ^  Chart  III. 

no 


THE    SAXON   AND   THE   RUSSIAN 

the  forces  that  must  be  overcome,  is  far  greater 
than  during  the  eighteenth  and  the  nineteenth 
centuries. 

As  we  regard  those  plans  made  in  the  seventeenth 
century  for  the  expansion  of  the  Russian  Empire, 
and  have  for  two  hundred  years  witnessed  the  forti- 
tude  and  determination  with  which  they  have  been 
pursued,  we  are  unable  to  believe  in  their  voluntary 
abandonment.  Heretofore,  these  same  Russians 
have  never  faltered,  never  hesitated ;  without  haste, 
always  hopeful  in  defeat,  reticent  in  victory,  never 
seeing  the  ground  they  have  furrowed  with  combat 
and  hillocked  with  their  dead;  keeping  their  eyes 
constantly  on  those  distant  yet  defined  horizons 
toward  which  they  have  been  directed.  The  be- 
ginning of  the  eighteenth  century  found  Russia 
moving  toward  those  objectives.  From  that  time 
until  the  present  they  have  not  been  led  into  new 
ambitions,  nor  have  they  ever  lost  sight  of  those 
racial  goals  determined  upon  by  their  ancestors. 
While,  of  the  five  tasks  laid  down  for  the  work  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  only  three  were  actively 
engaged  in,  the  other  two  were  put  aside  for  the 
work  of  the  succeeding  century.  In  the  same  man- 
ner the  empire  of  the  nineteenth  century  postponed 
to  the  twentieth  the  consummation  of  these  works. 

The  twentieth  century  opened  with  the  defeat  of 
the  empire  in  Manchuria,  involving  Russia  in  seri- 
ous circumstances.  Defeat  is  an  old  tragedy  with 
Russia.     It  marks  for  her  the  beginning  of  a  new 

III 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

century.  The  eighteenth  began  at  Narva;  the 
nineteenth  with  AusterHtz;  the  twentieth  with 
Mukden.  But  Narva  was  followed  by  Poltava, 
though  twenty-one  years  elapsed  before  the  Swedish 
power  was  broken.  Austerlitz  and  Friedland  were 
followed  by  Moscow  and  the  seizure  of  Paris.  Who 
shall  say  that  there  is  not  a  sequel  to  Mukden? 

Russian  aggression  in  Europe  during  the  eighteenth 
century  made  possible  the  expansion  of  the  succeed- 
ing period,  and  from  this,  in  turn,  the  expansion  of 
the  twentieth  century  receives  its  impulse.^  At  the 
beginning  of  this  century  there  existed  three  homo- 
geneous lines  of  Russian  expansion: 

1.  On  the  right  flank  to  the  Bosphorus. 

2.  On  the  left  flank  to  and  along  the  Pacific. 

3.  On  the  center  to  India  through  Persia. 

It  is  in  the  study  of  these  three  lines  of  expansion 
that  we  realize  the  significance  of  the  rise  of  Japan 
and  its  victory,  the  rise  of  Germany  and  its  ambi- 
tions, as  they  affect  the  Saxon  and  Russian  in  forc- 
ing these  two  powers  with  increasing  intensity  into 
that  war  settled  upon  so  many  generations  ago. 

Nations,  much  in  the  same  manner  as  individuals, 
either  move  along  Unes  of  least  resistance  or  under- 
take those  labors  by  which  the  greatest  returns  are 
to  be  secured  from  the  energy  expended.  When, 
however,  there  is  given  to  nations,  as  to  individuals, 
the  choice  of  two  or  more  lines  along  which  they  must 
progress,  and  since  one  of  the  lines  is  pre-eminent  in 

» Chart  III. 
112 


CHART    III 


SCALE  OF  MILES 
0        100     200  400  600  800 


AS    0  F 
BENGAL 

QORMAY  A  CO., 


THE  SAXON  AND  THE  RUSSIAN 

its  importance,  the  correct  choice  is  seldom  made, 
since  it  stands  in  inverse  ratio  to  the  number  of  Hnes 
to  be  chosen  from.  Hence,  in  regard  to  the  time,  the 
Russian  expansion  of  its  left  flank  to  the  Pacific 
was  ten  years  later  than  it  should  have  been.  The 
advance  of  its  right  flank  on  Turkey,  as  regards 
time,  should  have  been  made  immediately  subse- 
quent to  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit.  The  advance  on 
India,  as  regards  time,  is  the  present,  as  we  will 
hereafter  show. 

In  a  previous  chapter  has  been  shown  that  the 
strategic  position  of  India  is  pre-eminent.  As  a 
part  of  Russia  its  importance  would  be  so  augmented 
that  it  becomes,  in  the  possession  of  Russia,  more 
nearly  the  key  to  universal  empire  than  any  other 
portion  of  the  globe.  Modem  civiHzation,  with 
its  elimination  of  distance  by  its  mechanical  in- 
ventions, has  brought  suddenly  upon  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  world  this  half -world  dominion  of  the 
Indian  sphere;  yet  it  has  been  co-existent  from  re- 
motest  antiquity. 

While  England  gained  control  of  this  vast  region 
through  the  valor  of  her  soldiers,  the  Saxon  people 
have  not  up  to  the  present  become  cognizant  of  the 
fact  that  it  is  upon  India  that  their  Empire  rests. 
On  the  other  hand,  while  Russian  soldiers  have  still 
to  march  for  the  first  time  upon  Indian  soil,  yet  its 
conquest  has  always  formed  the  basic  principle  of 
Russian  expansion.  When  in  that  old,  eventful 
hour  the  five  comer-stones  of  the  Russian  nation 

113 


THE    DAY    OF   THE    SAXON 

were  laid  down,  India  was  the  one  upon  which  the 
main  edifice  of  the  empire  was  to  be  placed.  It  is, 
therefore,  a  melancholy  affair  when  we  compare  the 
self -blindness  of  our  own  race  in  this  age  with  the 
prescience  of  that  monarch  Peter,  who,  more  than 
two  hundred  years  ago,  wrote  down  for  the  guidance 
of  his  people  these  memorable  words:  "Bear  in 
mind  that  the  commerce  of  India  is  the  commerce 
of  the  world,  and  that  he  who  can  exclusively  con- 
trol it  is  the  Master  of  Europe;  no  occasion  should, 
therefore,  be  lost  to  provoke  war  with  Persia,  to 
hasten  its  decay,  and  to  advance  to  the  Persian 
Gulf." 

When  there  exists  several  lines  of  national  ex- 
pansion, the  choice  of  and  adherence  to  the  basic 
line  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  tasks  in  the  pro- 
gression of  national  life.  It  seldom  if  ever  finds 
constant  expression,  but  varies  in  accordance  with 
the  shifting  of  national  poHtics — either  as  they  are 
altered  by  the  wisdom  or  ignorance  of  successive 
reigns,  or  by  those  exterior  causes  inherent  in  the 
growth  or  decay  of  adjacent  states.  While  the  prin- 
ciple of  Russian  occupation  of  India  remains  as 
immutable  to-day  as  during  the  age  of  Peter  the 
Great,  the  effect  of  such  a  conquest  upon  the  entire 
world  is  immeasurably  more  decisive  than  during 
his  time. 

When  the  Tsar  Alexander,  immediately  subse- 
quent to  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit,  did 
not  force  the  extension  of  Russia  to  the  Bosphorus 

114 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    RUSSIAN 

by  way  of  the  Balkans,  the  opportunity  passed 
away.  No  longer  can  the  empire  progress  directly 
along  its  right  flank;  and  with  each  successive  de- 
cade the  impossibiHty  of  returning  to  it  is  augmented. 
Each  new  increment  to  German  power  decreases 
proportionately  Russia's  capacity  to  return  again 
to  this  direct  expansion  through  the  Balkans.  But 
this  does  not  prohibit  Russian  progress  to  the 
Bosphorus.  It  has  only  diverted  her,  lengthened 
her  way,  and  altered  the  manner  of  its  accomplish- 
ment. 

We  have  shown  ^  that  the  strategic  sphere  of  India 
on  the  west  is  inclusive  of  the  strategic  triangle — 
India,  Teheran,  and  Port  Said — within  which  is 
Mesopotamia,  the  Tigris,  and  the  Euphrates.  With 
the  occupation  of  Persia  and  India  all  that  which 
is  now  Saxon  becomes  Russian;  and  Asia  Minor,  in 
due  time,  will  pass  under  her  dominion.  Russia  then 
approaches  the  Bosphorus  by  the  southern  bank.  So 
long  as  German  miHtary  power  and  Austrian  military 
power  remain  constant  in  their  positive  progression, 
and  the  Saxon  defense  of  India  and  its  sphere  re- 
mains constant  in  its  deterioration,  then  the  line 
of  least  resistance  for  Russian  advance  to  the  Bos- 
phorus is  by  way  of  Persia  and  India.  Whenever 
the  Russian  armies  look  out  over  the  Indian  Ocean 
they  can  cry  out  truthfully,  "We  have  reached  the 
Bosphorus!" 

When  Russia  began,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  nine- 

1  Chart  I. 

115 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

teenth  century,  the  expansion  of  her  left  flank 
through  Siberia  to  the  Pacific,  it  was  correct  in  prin- 
ciple. With  the  completion  of  the  Siberian  railway 
that  seaboard  ceased  to  be  distant  from  the  heart 
of  the  empire.  It  became  possible  to  reach  the 
Pacific  from  Moscow  in  less  time  than  it  required, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  same  century,  to  travel  to 
St.  Petersburg.  But  so  subordinate  is  this  line  of 
imperial  extension  to  that  upon  India  that  it 
should  have  only  necessitated  a  corresponding  de- 
gree of  military  exertion.  That  the  results  to 
be  gained  from  the  expenditure  required  on  this  left 
flank  can  never  be  commensurate  is  due  to  four 
facts : 

1.  Had  a  war  with  Japan  occurred  prior  to  or 
immediately  subsequent  to  the  Chinese- Japanese 
War,  only  then  would  the  degree  of  expenditure 
have  been  small  enough  to  be  commensurate  with 
the  benefits  derived  from  reaching  the  Pacific  sea- 
board. This  is  determinable  by  comparing  the 
inability  of  such  force  to  accomplish  like  results 
in  an  advance  against  Persia  and  India. 

2.  The  benefits  accruing  to  Russia  subsequent  to 
Russian  victory  in  the  war  of  1904  would  not  have 
been  commensurate  with  the  cost  Russia  did  incur. 
This  is  determinable  by  comparing  the  resvdts  ob- 
tainable from  an  identic  effort  against  Persia  and 
India. 

3.  That  in  the  future  any  Russian  advance  against 
the  north  Pacific  will  entail  a  minimum  of  expendi- 

n6 


THE  SAXON  AND  THE  RUSSIAN 

ture  that  will  be  in  excess  of  the  maximum  expendi- 
ture of  the  war  of  1904-05. 

4.  Each  new  increment  to  Japanese  power  de- 
creases proportionately  Russian  capacity  to  move 
along  this  line. 

Such  is  the  result  of  Japan's  victory.  Russia  has, 
in  her  advance  to  the  Pacific,  been  cast  back  much 
in  the  same  manner  as  she  was  turned  aside  from 
her  old  highway  through  the  Balkans.  But  these 
repulses,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  accelerate  rather 
than  retard  Russian  expansion.  So  exact  has  this 
result  been  that  we  can  reduce  it  to  this  almost 
invariable  law:  that  the  impulse  of  Russian  ex- 
pansion along  alternate  lines  is  measured  by  the 
degree  of  retrocession  on  other  lines  of  aggression, 
the  ratio  of  expansion  to  that  of  retrogression  being 
as  three  is  to  two.  It  is  because  of  this  law  that 
Russia  continues  to  spread  over  Asia  and  Europe 
in  defeat  as  well  as  in  victory. 

For  the  Russian  the  Japanese  War  was  only  a 
repulse.  For  the  Saxon  race  it  was  a  disaster. 
When  Japan  forced  Russia  back  from  the  north 
Pacific,  it  was  upon  India  that  she  hurled  this  great 
empire. 

We  have  already  shown  that  the  strategic  sphere 
of  India  in  the  East  is  inclusive  of  the  triangle^ — 
India,  Hongkong,  Singapore.  The  conquest  of 
India  would  then  insure  her,  in  the  possession  of 
this   strategic   triangle,    the   control   of   those   Far 

» Chart  I. 

117 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

Eastern  regions  which  are  now  under  Saxon  domin- 
ion. By  this  Russia  would  segregate  by  land  and  by 
sea  the  whole  of  the  Orient  from  the  whole  of  Europe. 
Hurled  back  from  the  Pacific  by  Japan,  and  from 
the  Bosphorus  by  Germany,  Russia  is  now  forced 
to  her  basic  line  of  expansion,  through  Persia  to  the 
Plains  of  India,  where  are  found  both  the  Pacific 
and  the  Bosphorus. 


IX 


THE    SAXON    AND    EUROPE 

Russian  Expansion  Concentrated  by  Disaster. — Conditions  Govern- 
ing Alliances  Made  against  a  Common  Objective. — Coalition 
Directed  against  England. — Causes  of  Its  Formation. — Results 
to  Each  Nation. — Danger  of  German  Expansion. 

TO  Russia,  having  learned  the  philosophy  of 
disaster,  there  comes  no  final  defeat.  Her 
policy  of  predetermined  expansion,  while  cumulative 
with  victory,  is,  on  the  other  hand,  concentrated  by 
disaster.  This  concentration  of  national  forces 
through  national  misfortune  insures  the  empire 
not  only  against  destruction  from  external  forces, 
but  eventual  victory.  Holding  the  interior  lines  of 
Eurasia,  her  radii  of  aggression  are  directed  against 
those  diverse  portions  of  the  world  that  are  politi- 
cally and  geographically  incapable  of  cohesive 
coalition.  When  Russian  movement  is  checked  in 
one  sphere  the  propulsion  of  her  expansion  in  other 
spheres  receives  that  proportionate  impetus  we  have 
indicated.  The  expansion  of  Russia  in  its  intensity 
never  ceases.  Those  tides  that  recede  from  one 
shore  recede  only  to  break  upon  another.  Oceanic 
in  its  greatness,  it  is  oceanic  in  the  expression  of  its 
forces. 

119 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

The  cumulative  effect  of  Russian  victory  in  the 
extension  of  the  empire  is  shown  by  the  expansion 
of  her  center  line,  the  conquest  of  White  Russia 
being  succeeded  by  that  of  Little  and  Southern 
Russia;  these  by  the  conquest  of  the  Black  Sea, 
the  Caucasus,  and  central  Asia.  This  center  will 
in  due  time  move  on  to  that  natural  objective  deter- 
mined upon  two  centuries  ago.  The  conquest  of 
Persia  will  be  followed  by  that  of  India,  by  the  con- 
trol of  Asia  Minor  and  its  environment  on  the  west, 
Burma  and  its  environment  on  the  east.^  The 
possession  of  the  Red  Sea  and  the  Indian  Ocean  will 
then  give  to  Russia  the  same  domination  in  Africa 
and  the  Pacific  now  held  by  the  Saxon  race. 

At  this  period  the  Russian  Empire  draws  to  a 
close. 

It  approaches  the  Empire  of  the  World. 

The  concentration  of  Russian  propulsion  through 
disaster  is  not  an  anomalous  condition,  but  is  a 
natural  sequence  due  to  three  factors: 

1 .  The  territorial  homogeneity  and  interior  strateg- 
ic situation  of  Russia  relative  to  Asia  and  Europe. 

2.  The  geographical,  racial,  and  poHtical  segrega- 
tion of  the  nations  constituting  Russian  frontiers. 

3.  The  automatic  adjustment  of  Russian  mili- 
tary equilibrium  as  regulated  by  the  maximum  mili- 
tary expansion  of  her  strongest  neighbor. 

The  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century  opened 
with  the  defeat  of  Russia  at  Narva.     The  propul- 

1  Chart  II. 
120 


THE    SAXON    AND    EUROPE 

sion  and  concentration  given  to  Russian  expansion 
by  this  disaster  resulted  in  an  increase  of  power 
which  exceeded  that  of  Sweden,  her  strongest  neigh- 
bor, and  led  to  the  expansion  of  Russia  south  and 
eastward.  On  the  other  hand,  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury began  with  Russian  defeat  at  Austerlitz,  and 
resulted  in  that  military  development  which  brought 
about  the  expansion  of  the  empire  south  and  east- 
ward during  the  nineteenth  century.  These  two 
elemental  defeats  increased  indirectly  the  Russian 
Empire  from  less  than  three  hundred  thousand 
square  miles  to  more  than  nine  million.  The  twen- 
tieth century,  like  the  two  previous,  opened  with  the 
third  elemental  defeat  of  Russia  by  Japan.  The 
result  of  this  war  will  be  the  same  as  disasters  in 
the  past;  the  same  concentration  and  the  same  in- 
crease in  the  propulsion  of  Russian  expansion  in 
other  spheres  when  the  old  augmentation  and  re- 
habilitation of  these  forces  have  been  accomplished. 
Had  Germany,  instead  of  Japan,  been  responsible 
for  this  defeat  of  Russia  at  the  commencement  of 
the  twentieth  century,  the  result  would  have  been  the 
same,  except  (i)  that  the  degree  of  Russia's  military 
rehabilitation  would  have  been  as  much  greater  as 
Germany  is  militarily  stronger  than  Japan,  and  as 
the  interests  involved  are  more  vital;  (2)  that  the 
sphere  of  subsequent  Russian  expansion  might  have 
been  in  northwest  Asia  instead  of  Persia  and  India. 
During  this  century  Russian  aggression,  subse- 
quent to  the  readjustment  of  her  military  power, 

121 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

seeks  that  line  of  expansion  where  the  minimum  of 
resistance  is  to  be  found  commensurate  with  the 
means  employed  and  the  resiilts  gained.  This  we 
have  already  shown  is  in  central  xAsia,  Persia,  and 
India,  since  the  Saxon  defenses  of  these  regions  have, 
relative  to  Russia's  increased  opportunities  and 
capacity,  fallen  so  low  as  to  be  almost  a  negligible 
quantity,  while  the  gains  of  victory-  to  Russia  have 
increased  in  inverse  ratio.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
defenses  of  the  Balkans  by  the  Teutons  and  north- 
east Asia  by  the  Japanese  have  been  augmented  to 
such  a  degree  that  the  rewards  of  success  would 
not,  in  the  beginning  of  this  century,  be  commen- 
surate to  the  labor  and  expenditure  required  of  the 
Russian  Empire.  The  result  of  this  is  the  concen- 
tration of  Russian  expansion  to  central  Asia,  Persia, 
and  India. 

This  resume  now  brings  us  to  the  consideration  of 
that  fatal  interpolitical  relationship  of  Russia, 
Japan,  and  Germany,  which  has  now  assumed 
through  the  agency  of  natural  forces  a  coahtion 
directed  against  the  survival  of  Saxon  supremacy. 
In  this  dreadful  Dreibund  statesmen  have  played 
but  Httle  part.  It  is  the  result  of  a  succession  of 
fatalities  which,  deUmiting  the  control  of  man,  re- 
solves it  back  to  those  basic  principles  we  have 
shown  to  be  immutable.  They  var>-  only  in  the 
manner  in  which  they  affect  the  duration  of  national 
existence  or  its  circimiscription. 

AUiances  made  by  man  and  directed  against  a 

122 


THE    SAXON    AND    EUROPE 

common  objective  conform  to  two  conditions:  they 
are  made  for  mutual  self -protection  or  mutual  gain. 
Strange  as  it  may  appear,  those  coaUtions  made  for 
common  gain  are  stronger  than  those  made  for 
mutual  safety.  The  reason  for  this  is  simple.  When 
a  union  is  the  result  of  mutual  desire  for  gain,  it  is 
positive  in  its  action;  when  the  aUiance  is  for 
mutual  defense,  the  resultant  action  is  negative. 
The  coahtion  for  gain  is  convergent,  since  it  is  the 
direction  of  different  parts  to  a  common  objective. 
The  coalition  of  defense  is,  on  the  other  hand, 
divergent,  since  its  movement  is  a  retrocession  from 
a  common  point  to  as  many  separate  parts  as  there 
are  members  of  the  alliance. 

When,  however,  we  understand  the  significance 
of  a  coahtion  of  races  formed  and  directed  by  natural 
forces  against  a  soHtar^^  and  scattered  race,  we  be- 
come cognizant  of  those  eventuaHties  that,  in  the 
near  future,  await  the  Saxon  race.  The  Dreibutid 
of  Germany,  Italy,  and  Austria  is  to  the  British 
Empire  a  negative  menace.  Being  made  b}'  man 
and  based  on  pohtical  considerations,  it  is  as  tran- 
sient as  it  is  artificial.  Xotwithstanding  the  effort 
of  a  member  of  the  coahtion  to  change  the  character 
of  this  aUiance  to  one  of  aggression  against  the 
Saxon  race,  it  will  not  occur.  For  the  Teutons  to 
succeed  in  reversing  the  motif  of  this  coahtion  froni 
one  of  defense  to  one  of  aggression,  it  must  insure 
to  Italy,  subsequent  to  the  dissolution  of  the  British 
Empire,  that  degree  of  gain  which  would  permit  of 

9  123 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

her  future  national  expansion  being  independent  of 
the  Teutonic.  The  reverse  of  this  would  happen. 
Germany,  because  of  her  vast  initial  power,  and  not 
Italy,  would,  subsequent  to  the  overthrow  of  the 
British  Empire,  succeed  to  the  control  of  the  Medi- 
terranean and  all  that  which  is  now  British  in  or 
upon  its  shores.  Italy  would  then  become  no 
longer  free  to  pursue  even  her  present  circumscribed 
destiny,  but  would  pass  completely  under  Teutonic 
domination  not  only  by  land,  but  by  sea. 

It  can  be  considered  as  a  maxim  that  in  exact 
ratio  as  the  Teutonic  race  increases  in  power  and 
domination  the  Italian  kingdom  decreases  pro- 
portionately in  these  two  factors.  Because  it  is 
paradoxical  that  Italian  national  security  is  in- 
herent, not  in  the  successes  of  its  allies,  but  in  their 
destruction,  do  we  finally  ascertain  the  fallacious 
and  artificial  character  of  this  Dreibund,  in  so  far 
as  the  future  of  Italy  is  concerned  in  the  dissolution 
of  the  British  Empire. 

We  now  pass  from  this  ephemeral  coalition  in- 
stituted by  man  to  the  consideration  of  that  other 
Dreibund  which  is  the  product  of  natural  forces  and 
forms  a  definite  segment  in  the  curve  of  history  by 
which,  knowing  the  causes  of  its  formation,  we  are 
able  to  determine  its  progression  and  consummation. 
In  the  constitution  of  a  coalition  directed  against  the 
British  Empire  there  are  only  three  nations — Japan, 
Russia,  and  Germany — that  can  become  parties  to 
such  an  agreement  wherein  their  efforts  and  re- 

124 


THE    SAXON    AND    EUROPE 

sponsibilities,  singly  and  in  coalition,  are  not  in 
disproportion  to  their  gains.  This  is  due  to  three 
factors : 

1.  The  policies  of  these  three  nations  will  not  be 
vitally  convergent  until  after  the  dissolution  of  the 
British  Empire,  since  the  primary  radii  of  their 
political  and  geographical  expansion  are  directed 
against  the  dominions  of  the  Saxon  race. 

2.  That  so  long  as  ordinary  political  intelligence 
is  exercised  and  the  passions  of  their  respective  popu- 
lace do  not  intervene,  there  will  be  no  internal  dis- 
ruption of  this  natural  coalition,  since : 

(a)  A  war  between  Russia  and  Germany,  while 
resulting  disastrously  to  the  defeated  nation, 
brings  no  gains  to  the  victor  that  would  be  com- 
mensurate with  the  expenditures. 

(b)  A  war  between  Japan  and  Germany  would 
result  negatively  to  both  victor  and  vanquished, 
while  Russia  would  receive  no  advantage,  since  the 
geographical  location  plus  the  approximation  of 
the  military  progression  of  these  two  nations 
prevents  a  decisive  blow  and  leaves  both  nations 
at  the  conclusion  of  the  war  militarily  stronger 
than  at  its  beginning. 

(c)  A  second  war  between  Russia  and  Japan 
would  again  result  negatively  to  both  nations, 
except  such  territorial  increments  acquired  from 
China,  which  are  not  commensurate  with  the  ex- 
penditure made  by  either  nation.  Germany 
would  gain  no  advantage,  but  would,  on  the  other 

125 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

hand,   be  loser  in  a  general  sense  from  the  in- 
creased militancy  of  both  nations.     A  Japanese 
victory    would    increase    the    insecurity    of    her 
tenure  in  east  Asia  and  the  Pacific.     A  Russian 
victory  would  decrease  the  rate  and  security  of 
her  propulsion  in  the  Balkans. 
3.  The  dismemberment  or  defeat  of  the  British 
Empire,  on  the  other  hand,  results  advantageously 
alike  to  Germany,  Japan,  and  Russia.     The  gain 
to  these  nations  is  measured  by  the  degree  of  com- 
pleteness  of   British   ruin.     The   gain   accruing   to 
each  of  these  empires  from  the  destruction  of  the 
British  Empire  is  manifold  greater  than  the  maxi- 
mum expenditure  required  from  any  one  of  them, 
or  all  in  coalition.     Should  the  dissolution  of  Saxon 
power  originate  in  the  conquest  of  India  by  Russia, 
or  through  the  supremacy  of  Japan  in  the  Pacific, 
or  by  the  invasion  of  the  United  Kingdom  by  Ger- 
many, the  result  is  the  same  as  if  these  activities 
were  predetermined  by  the  three  nations  and  were 
simultaneous  in  their  occurrence.     To  Japan  would 
go  the  predominance  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  its 
islands;    to  Russia  that  of  the  southern  Asian  con- 
tinent and  the  Indian  Ocean;    to  Germany  that  of 
western  and  southern  Europe,  the  Mediterranean, 
and  the  Atlantic. 

Such  is  this  coalition  constituted  by  natural 
forces  and  directed  by  natural  laws;  such  are  the 
causes  of  its  formation,  the  manner  and  motives 
of  its  progression,  the  rewards  and  greatness  result- 

126 


THE    SAXON    AND    EUROPE 

ing  from  the  attainment  of  its  ends.  It  is  the  unity 
of  purpose  inherent  in  the  international  progression 
of  these  three  powers  that  must  always  be  con- 
sidered before  preparation  for  the  defense  of  the 
Saxon  Empire  is  restricted  specifically  to  any  one 
of  them. 

We  have  heretofore  dealt  with  the  political  and 
military  growth  of  Japan/  its  expansion  in  eastern 
Asia,  and  those  necessities  that  predetermine  its 
struggles  with  the  Saxon  for  the  ultimate  sov- 
ereignty of  the  Pacific.  We  have  considered  the 
expansion  of  Russia  southward  and  the  conditions 
which  lead  toward  the  conquest  of  Persia  and  India. 
That  we  have  reserved  for  so  late  a  chapter  the 
consideration  of  the  expansion  of  Germany  and 
the  ruthless  elbowing  of  its  way  into  the  dominions 
of  the  Saxon  is  due  not  to  its  less,  but  its  greater 
importance.  It  is  not  that  the  Teutonic  angle  of 
convergence  against  the  British  Empire  is  more 
acute  than  that  of  Japan  or  Russia  that  determines 
its  dangers,  but  because  German  convergence  is 
directed  against  a  more  vital  part  of  the  Empire 
than  is  that  of  Japan,  while  the  rate  of  propulsion 
with  which  it  moves  along  this  convergent  line  is 
greater  than  that  of  Russia  in  its  expansion  toward 
India.  By  this  it  is  apparent  that  Japan's  aggres- 
sion against  the  Empire,  relative  to  that  of  Germany, 
is  remote  in  exact  proportion  as  the  sphere  of  ex- 
pansion is  less  vital  than  that  of  the  Teutons.     The 

*  The  Valor  of  Ignorance. 
127 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

danger  of  Russian  aggression,  relative  to  that  of  the 
Germans,  is  remote  as  regards  time,  in  exact  pro- 
portion as  Russia's  rate  of  movement  toward  India 
is  less  than  that  of  Germany  against  the  United 
Kingdom. 

Unfortunately,  the  Saxon  race,  because  of  the  su- 
premacy of  individual  ideals  over  those  belonging  to 
the  nation  or  race,  have  become  ignorant  of  the  effects 
of  racial  unity  and  national  cohesion.  Because  of 
this  the  basic  dangers  of  Teutonic  expansion  remain . 
to  them  unknown,  while  that  knowledge  which  they 
should  ascertain  they  seek  to  evade. 

The  convergence  of  the  Teutonic  and  Saxon  races 
to  that  ultimate  point  of  contact  which  is  war  does 
not  belong  to  those  ephemeral  causes  that  now 
agitate  the  British  mind  and  out  of  which  are 
manufactured  the  sorriest  and  pettiest  fabrics  of 
political  strife.  The  supplanting  of  the  British 
Empire  by  that  of  Germany  has  nothing  to  do 
primarily  with  the  passions  or  hopes  or  fears  of 
man,  but  is  the  exemplification  of  laws  which  have 
governed,  from  the  beginning  of  himian  association, 
the  rise  and  decline  of  nations. 

The  melancholy  error  that  now  burdens  the  Brit- 
ish nation  is  this  ignorance  of  the  basic  character 
of  their  danger — the  fear,  and  not  the  knowledge,  of 
their  fate. 


X 

THE  SAXON  AND  THE  GERMAN 

Law  of  Political  Environment. — Tendency  to  Expand  Dominant 
in  First  Struggles  of  a  Race. — German  Expansion  Determined  by- 
German  Power. — Future  Relationship  between  the  Saxon  and 
Teuton. — Value  of  Holland,  Denmark,  and  Austria  to  Germany. 

IN  this  chapter  will  be  considered  but  three  of 
the  successive  stages  by  which  the  Germans  have 
progressed  toward  war  with  the  British  Empire,  a 
conflict  which  is  apparent  to  Saxon  consciousness, 
yet  at  the  same  time  denied  by  it  in  the  old  way 
men  and  nations  conceal  from  themselves  all  that 
is  bitter  and  tragic.  -^ 

One  of  the  principal  causes  responsible  for  much 
that  is  erroneous  in  our  ideas  of  national  existence 
is  due  to  the  indifference  with  which  we  form  our 
conceptions  of  the  forces  that  control  the  forma- 
tion, progress,  and  dissolution  of  states — the  sub- 
ordination of  the  individual  to  natural  laws,  and 
the  circumscription  or  propulsion  of  his  efforts. 
Conditions  determined  upon  by  environment  are 
ordinarily  known,  but  it  is  seldom  recognized  that 
nations  are  subordinates  to  like  ordinances  from 
which  they  also  have  no  appeal.  Their  environ- 
ment determines  for  them,  as  well  as  for  individuals, 
the  manner  and  the  way  of  their  progress.  "^ 

129 


%. 


r 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

In  the  environment  of  an  individual  there  are 
numerous  conditions  more  vital  than  that  of  his 
political  peace;  but  to  a  nation  the  poHtical  en- 
vironment is  of  such  importance  that  it  determines 
the  possibilities  and  duration  of  national  greatness. 
This  law  of  political  environment  we  state  as  follows : 

1.  National  expansion  moves  in  direction  of  those 
arcs  constituting  the  nation's  political  environment, 
where  the  power  of  resistance  is  least  and  the  pro- 
pulsion is  equal  to  or  greater  than  toward  any  other 
arc. 

2.  National  retrogression  proceeds  from  those 
arcs  of  the  nation's  political  environment  where  the 
inward  power  of  resistance  is  least  and  the  outward 
pressure  equal  to  or  greater  than  toward  any  other 
arc. 

From  the  most  ancient  times  until  the  present  we 
have  witnessed  the  unvarying  application  of  this 
law — the  attempted  evasion  of  its  decrees,  and  the 
ever-recurring  futility  of  such  efforts. 

Of  the  nations  now  considered  great  all  have 
growTi  powerful  through  the  agency  of  this  law. 
American  expansion  has  never  succeeded  against 
Canada,  the  strongest  arc  in  its  political  environ- 
ment, but  has  invariably  proceeded  against  those 
arcs  least  capable  of  resistance — against  scattered 
Indian  tribes,  Alexicans,  Hawaiians,  and  Spaniards. 
It  has  passed  from  the  Western  to  the  Eastern 
Hemisphere. 

Russian  expansion  has  been  similar  to  that  of 

130 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    GERMAN 

America.  It  has  gone  toward  those  arcs  of  its  en- 
vironment least  capable  of  resistance.  Eastward 
and  southeastward  its  political  government  has  been 
extended,  w^hile  westward  against  those  arcs  whose 
power  of  resistance  has  exceeded  that  of  Russian 
propulsion  the  frontiers  have  remained  almost 
stationary. 

On  the  other  hand,  though  English  sovereignty- 
has  been  extended  throughout  all  portions  of  the 
globe,  it  3'et  remains  west  of  the  English  Channel. 
The  lands  closest  to  it  are  freest  from  its  power. 
This  condition  has  not  been  decreed  by  British 
statesmen,  nor  by  the  will  of  the  English  people, 
but  has  been  due  to  the  law  just  expressed,  whereby 
the  expansion  of  the  British  Empire  has  proceeded 
not  with,  but  even  contrary  to,  the  volition  of  that 
nation. 

By  the  operation  of  this  same  law  is  German  ex- 
pansion given  its  basic  impulse.  Only  the  manner 
of  its  expression  and  the  degree  of  its  propulsion  are 
left  to  the  will  of  the  German  people.  The  funda- 
mental error  in  the  English  conception  of  German 
expansion  is  the  belief  that  it  results  from  some 
transient  plan,  the  conception  of  an  individual 
finding  a  momentary-  response  in  the  German  people. 

Conditions,  and  not  individuals,  determine  national 
expansion.  Indi\4duals,  and  not  conditions,  deter- 
mine the  manner  and  degree  of  its  propulsion.  When 
conditions  productive  of  expansion  occur  during  the 
lifetime  of  an  individual  whose  genius  grasps  their 

131 


THE    DAY   OF    THE    SAXON 

significance  and  whose  position  in  the  state  permits 
him  to  make  use  of  his  discernment,  then  occur 
those  tragic  epochs  in  national  Hfe  when  out  of  the 
wreckage  of  one  state  another  is  created.  Such  was 
the  combination  between  Peter  and  Russia,  Na- 
poleon and  France,  Bismarck  and  Germany.  To 
this  combination  the  genius  of  such  men  is  its  soul. 

Ordinarily  this  soul  is  transient. 

In  Germany  it  is  otherwise. 

The  spirit  of  Bismarck  has  departed  only  to 
diffuse  itself  into  the  genius  of  his  race.  While 
other  nations  must  await  the  suitable  adjustment  of 
conditions  to  human  genius,  Germany  waits  only 
for  opportunity. 

The  British  Empire,  in  its  relationship  to  German 
expansion  and  the  consequent  dissolution  of  the 
British  dominion,  has  not  to  deal  with  the  German 
people,  but  only  with  conditions  that  determine 
Germanic  expansion.  The  German  nation  waits 
only  as  Bismarck  waited  for  conditions  to  shape 
themselves.  So  imbued  is  this  race  with  his  ideals 
that  it  can  do  without  his  genius.  It  has  become 
Bismarckian.  His  heavy  spirit  has  settled  upon  it. 
It  wears  his  scowl.  It  has  adopted  his  brutality, 
as  it  has  his  greatness.  It  has  taken  his  criterion 
of  truth,  which  is  Germanic;  his  indifference  to 
justice,  which  is  savage;  and  his  conception  of  a 
state,  which  is  sublime. 

This  nation  has  forgotten  God  in  its  exaltation 
of  the  Germanic  race. 

132 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    GERMAN 

In  the  development  of  Germany  and  its  conse- 
quent relationship  with  the  world  no  attempt  has 
been  made  to  differentiate  between  its  future  and 
that  of  the  British  Empire,  which  stands  across  the 
way  it  is  soon  to  take. 

A  nation  reaches  its  highest  degree  of  wealth 
subsequent  to  its  era  of  conquest  and  coincident 
with  the  limitation  of  its  greatest  power.  But  a 
nation,  ceasing  to  expand,  retrogrades.  In  national 
existence,  as  in  individual,  there  is  no  permanency. 

External  weakness  is  determined  by  the  degree 
of  its  internal  power. 

In  the  first  struggles  of  a  race  the  tendency  to 
expand  is  most  dominant.  The  more  severe  the 
struggle  the  more  intense  does  this  characteristic 
become.  But  when  expansion,  and  the  militancy 
that  has  made  it  possible,  ceases,  then  the  nation 
approaches  the  end  of  its  political  existence.  Ger- 
many, on  the  one  hand,  and  England,  on  the  other, 
occupy  these  two  extremes.  The  British  Empire  is 
accepted  by  its  people  as  the  culmination  of  their 
expansion;  Germany  has  not  entered  upon  its  era 
of  conquest  as  predetermined  as  it  was  for  the  Saxon. 

The  development  of  Germanic  power  is  not  recent. 
It  had  its  origin  in  the  philosophy  of  an  Italian,  its 
amplification  by  the  labors  of  Frederic,  its  renas- 
cence by  the  genius  of  Bismarck.  What  Germany  has 
done  heretofore  has  only  been  a  preparation.  This 
is  not  completed.  As  yet  Germany  has  sought  no 
conquest.     Its  wars  have  been  only  for  racial  con- 

133 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

solidation.     It  has  not,  in  the  true  sense  of  expan- 
sion, gone  beyond  its  own  frontiers,  yet  has  become 
more  powerful  than  the  Saxon  nations.     While  they 
are  politically  disunited  and  geographically  segre- 
gated,  Germany  is  a  single  mass.     From  struggle 
and  conquest  the  Saxon  race  now  seeks,  as  others 
have  sought,  to  leave  the  battle-fields  of  the  world 
and  yet  retain  through  evasion  and  subterfuge  the 
treasure  of  a  thousand  looted  cities.     The  Teuton, 
emerging  from  his  struggles  to  survive,  steps  forth 
upon  this  same  battle-field  of  the  world  at  the  zenith 
of  his  miUtancy,  and  at  the  same  time  not  less  in 
wealth,  in  population,  nor  in  potential  power.     On 
the  one  hand  we  find  a  bewildered  race  led  hither 
and  thither  through  labyrinthine  ways;  on  the  other, 
a    military   power   in    which   neither   theories   nor 
sophistry  find  a  place,  but  where  the  intentness  of 
its  aims  knows  no  discouragement,  its  progress  no 
diversion  of  the  terribleness  of  its  energy  nor  fatigue. 
The  movement  of  such  a  nation  resembles  that  of 
fate  in  the  certitude  of  its  progression.     The  noise 
of  its  approach  tallies  the  destiny  of  many  states. 
It  is  difficult  for  the  Saxon  to  understand  that 
German    expansion    is    not    circumscribed    by    the 
European  continent,  but  is  determined  only  by  the 
limitations  of  Teutonic  power.     This  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  natural  obstacles  as  oceans,  great  distances 
by  land,  or  unfavorable  climatic  conditions  no  longer 
limit  the  conquest  of  nations.     Prussian  troops  can 
now  be  moved  to  the  ends  of  the  strategic  world  in 

134 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    GERMAN 

less  time  than  a  hundred  years  ago  they  could  go 
from  Berlin  to  Paris.  Owing  to  this  elimination  of 
space  and  time,  while  the  geographical,  political, 
and  racial  segregation  of  the  balance  of  nations  re- 
mains constant,  Germany  could,  subsequent  to  the 
destruction  of  the  British  Empire,  control  her  por- 
tion of  the  world  with  no  greater  difficulty  than  did 
Napoleon  at  one  time  direct  the  affairs  of  Europe. 

There  is  no  recognition  in  the  British  Empire  of 
the  actual  conditions  in  which  originate  the  pro- 
pulsion of  German  expansion.  This  understand- 
ing is  lost  in  the  personal  character  the  Saxon  gives 
to  war.  But  in  neither  the  hate  nor  greed  nor 
insolence  of  the  Teutonic  race  is  to  be  found  the 
impulse  of  its  expansion.  The  hate  of  a  nation  can 
be  no  greater  than  the  hate  of  a  single  individual. 

Races  in  their  greater  movements,  such  as  now 
confront  the  Teutonic,  are  affected  in  their  basic 
impulses,  which  are  remote  from  individual  passions. 
Ordinarily  this  propulsion  comes  from  necessity. 

Necessity  is  a  racial  god. 

From  time  immemorial  this  god  has  led  the  treks 
of  races,  has  furrowed  the  seas  for  their  passage, 
and  has  with  pillars  of  fire  marked  the  way  to  the 
lands  destined  for  them.  Bismarck  and  the  fac- 
tories of  Germany  have  again  called  down  this  god. 

That  German  expansion  must  of  necessity  result  in 
a  struggle  with  the  Saxon  race  is  not  due  to  Bis- 
marck, nor  to  these  same  smoking  chimneys,  but 
belongs  to  the  Saxon  and  Saxon  activity.     German 

135 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

expansion  is  only  brought  in  conflict  with  those 
nations  whose  territories  and  suzerainty  barricade 
its  progression.  And  in  proportion  as  they  block 
Teutonic  power,  to  the  same  degree  are  German 
energies  directed  toward  the  destruction  of  that 
power.  If  the  Saxon  race  were  situated,  relative 
to  the  lines  of  German  expansion,  as  are  the  Spanish 
and  Italian,  the  improbabilities  of  war  would  be  in 
like  proportion.  While  Spain  and  Italy  are  removed 
from  the  sphere  of  German  growth,  German  politi- 
cal and  geographical  progression  are  encompassed 
by  the  Saxon  race.  There  is  now  no  part  of  the 
world  that  is  open  to  Teutonic  extension  without 
encroaching  to  a  corresponding  degree  upon  those 
rights  and  sovereignty  pre-empted  by  the  Saxon. 

The  German  Empire  is  less  in  area  than  the  single 
State  of  Texas,  while  the  Saxon  race  claims  political 
dominion  over  one-half  the  landed  surface  of  the 
earth  and  over  all  its  ocean  wastes.  Yet  the  Ger- 
man Empire  possesses  a  greater  revenue  than  the 
American  Republic,  is  the  richest  nation  in  pro- 
ductivity, and  possesses  a  population  50  per  cent, 
greater  than  the  United  Kingdom.  Its  actual  mili- 
tary power  is  manifold  greater  than  that  of  the  en- 
tire Saxon  race. 

Germany  is  so  tightly  encircled  by  the  Saxon  race 
that  it  cannot  make  even  a  tentative  extension  of  its 
territory  or  political  sovereignty  over  non-Saxon 
states  without  endangering  the  integrity  of  the  Saxon 
world.     Germany  cannot  move  against  France  with- 

136 


THE  SAXON  AND  THE  GERMAN 

out  involving  or  including  in  its  downfall  that  of  the 
British  Empire.  It  cannot  move  against  Denmark 
on  the  north,  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  on  the 
east,  or  Austria  on  the  south,  without  involving  the 
British  nation  in  a  final  struggle  for  Saxon  political 
existence.  Any  extension  of  German  sovereignty 
over  these  non-British  states  predetermines  the 
political  dissolution  of  the  British  Empire.  In  a  like 
manner  any  extension  of  Teutonic  sovereignty  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere,  though  against  non-Saxon 
races  and  remote  from  the  territorial  integrity  of 
the  American  Republic,  can  only  succeed  the  de- 
struction of  American  power  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere. 

The  position  in  which  Germany  is  now  placed — 
the  causes  and  responsibilities  inherent  in  its  posi- 
tion— is  not  new.  Germany  is  not  the  first  nation 
whose  national  activities  have  been  circumscribed 
by  powers  weaker  than  itself,  nor  will  it  be  the  last. 
This  is  an  old  anomaly,  and  has  a  definite  place  in 
racial  expansion.  It  precedes  those  epochal  periods 
that  mark  the  extinction  of  decadent  states  and 
the  readjustment  of  the  political  world.  The  con- 
stancy of  these  causes  and  effects,  the  inevitability 
of  their  recurrence,  regardless  of  time  or  geographi- 
cal isolation,  permits  us  to  determine  these  facts 
with  relative  accuracy. 

Unfortunately,  it  is  customary  for  nations  in  their 
own  time  to  deny  the  application  of  natural  forces 
to  their  own  activities.     They  believe  that  the  hu- 

137 


THE    DAY    OF   THE    SAXON 

man  race  moves  forward  in  a  straight  line,  instead 
of  in  widening  cycles,  and  that  they  have  reached 
a  point  where  all  that  is  past  cannot  affect  them, 
since  they  have  created  new  conditions  to  which  old 
laws  are  not  applicable.  This  assumption  only 
exemplifies  the  delusive  character  of  the  knowledge 
they  pretend  to  possess.  Throughout  all  ages  man- 
kind has  believed  in  this  same  directness  of  his 
progress:  that  the  human  race  would  not  again 
come  upon  its  own  spoor.  Yet  we  have  not  found 
a  single  instance  in  modem  times,  either  in  the  crea- 
tion or  extinction  of  political  entities,  that  differs 
in  fundamental  principles  from  those  of  ancient 
eras. 

Man  is  only  wiser  than  those  who  have  preceded 
him  in  a  wiser  application  of  the  laws  that  govern 
his  activities.  The  future  relationship  between  the 
Teutonic  and  the  Saxon  races  is  determined  by  five 
conditions : 

1.  Whenever  one  nation,  in  the  extension  of  its 
sovereignty,  is  circimiscribed  and  limited  by  another 
nation,  and  at  the  same  time  possesses  equal  or 
greater  physical  power,  then  the  encompassing 
nation  is  destroyed,  since  a  state  of  equal  or  greater 
military  power  occupying  interior  lines  is  as  many 
times  stronger  as  there  are  political  segments  in 
the  circumscribed  circle. 

2.  The  elemental  weakness  of  an  encompassing 
nation  is  that,  being  territorially  vaster,  it  acts  on 
the  defensive.     This  defense  is  not  equal  to,  but  is 

138 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    GERMAN 

less  strong  than,  the  defense  of  the  strongest  part. 
The  weakness  is  proportionate  to  the  number  of 
entities  composing  the  empire  and  the  degree  of 
their  segregation. 

3.  The  mihtary  power  of  the  encompassing  nation 
must  always  exceed  that  of  the  nation  encircled  in 
that  proportion  which  insures  the  restriction  of  the 
theater  of  war  to  the  territory  of  the  encircled  nation. 

4.  The  subjugation  of  an  encircled  nation  must  be 
complete  to  result  in  victory  to  the  encompassing 
nation.  On  the  other  hand,  the  defeat  of  a  single 
segregated  entity  of  the  encompassing  nation  may 
result  in  the  complete  downfall  of  the  whole. 

5.  In  a  struggle  between  nations  situated  as  the 
Teutonic  and  the  Saxon,  the  one  whose  preparation 
for  war  permits  the  seizure  of  the  initiative  insures 
to  itself  the  probabilities  of  victory. 

German  expansion  is  made  up  of  two  distinct 
phases :  the  extension  of  German  sovereignty  or  po- 
litical control  over  non-Saxon  states;  the  other  by 
direct  seizure  of  the  British  dominions.  Heretofore 
we  have  only  witnessed  the  extension  of  German 
sovereignty  over  the  Teutonic  states,  an  amalgama- 
tion in  which  is  to  be  found  the  origin  of  the  power 
that  is  forcing  its  way  toward  the  dismemberment 
of  the  British  Empire.  Could  England  have  pre- 
vented this  amalgamation  at  a  loss  of  one-half  of 
her  colonial  possessions,  it  would  have  perpetuated 
the  stabiHty  of  British  power  more  completely  than 
any  other  sacrifice  could  have  insured.  When  Eng- 
10  13.9 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

land  yielded  up  the  center  of  Europe  to  Germanic 
unity  she  lost  the  citadel  of  her  European  power. 

Germany  can  eventually  dissolve  the  British  Em- 
pire by  other  means  than  the  absorption,  in  one  form 
or  another,  of  continental  Europe. 

When  one  European  state  secures  to  itself  that 
degree  of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe  so  that  it 
cannot  be  affected  by  any  coalition,  inclusive  of  the 
British  Empire,  then  British  world  sovereignty  is  at 
an  end. 

The  duration  of  the  British  Empire  rests  primarily 
upon  the  preservation  of  the  balance  of  power  to 
Europe  itself.  It  must  struggle  for  this  more  than 
for  its  most  valued  possession,  for  upon  it  the  in- 
tegrity of  all  its  possessions  depends. 

For  England  to  preserve  to  herself  the  balance  of 
power  in  Europe,  it  is  necessary  to  limit  the  political 
and  territorial  expansion  of  any  European  state. 

The  amalgamation  of  Austria,  the  amalgamation 
of  Italy  were  blows  to  British  power;  but  when 
England  permitted  the  amalgamation  of  the  Ger- 
manic race  it  prepared  the  plans  of  its  own  sar- 
cophagus. 

Had  Europe  been  divisible  into  no  greater  number 
of  political  entities  during  Napoleon's  time  than  it 
is  to-day,  and  had  he  exercised  the  same  degree  of 
power  that  he  did  at  the  beginning  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  the  British  Empire  would  have  been 
dissolved  subsequent  to  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit. 

When  Germany  completes  the  amalgamation  of 

140 


THE  SAXON  AND  THE  GERMAN 

those  racial  elements  constituting  the  Teutonic 
power  in  Europe,  the  British  Empire  will  find  itself 
entirely  without  the  sphere  of  European  poHtics  and 
incapable  of  forming  a  coalition  against  or  assisting 
in  the  destruction  of  Germanic  political  and  mili- 
tary institutions. 

Germanic  amalgamation  has  heretofore  omitted 
three  spheres  —  Denmark,  the  Netherlands,  and 
Austria — that  are  strategically,  politically,  and 
economically  more  important  to  its  world  greatness 
than  are  all  its  other  subsidiary-  states.  Not  until 
these  have  passed  into  the  Germanic  confederation 
will  the  world  become  cognizant  of  Germanic  power. 

Each  of  these  spheres  is  as  essential  to  the  future 
of  the  German  Empire  as  was  Prussia  necessary  for 
the  basis  of  Teutonic  amalgamation.  So  vital  are 
these  states  to  Germanic  expansion,  and  so  inherent 
are  the  rights  of  the  German  race  to  their  possession, 
that  they  can  now  be  considered  a  portion  of  the 
empire  in  all  but  the  alteration  of  their  outward 
sovereignty;  a  change  that  will  either  just  precede 
or  occur  concurrently  with  an  Anglo-Saxon  war,  in 
the  same  manner  as  Schleswig-Holstein  became  part 
of  the  German  nation,  and  the  Austrian  war  pre- 
ceded the  Franco-Prussian  conflict.  In  a  war  with 
Great  Britain  the  occupation  of  Denmark  and  the 
Netherlands  by  Germany  is  just  as  necessary  as 
was  the  occupation  of  Korea  by  Japan.  They  con- 
stitute German  bases.  Should  British  defense  be 
capable   of   holding,   by   superior  preparation  and 

141 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

initiative,  the  eastern  frontiers  of  the  Netherlands 
and  the  southern  frontiers  of  Denmark,  the  great- 
ness of  the  British  Empire  goes  dow^l  upon  these 
two  undisputed  theaters  of  war. 

The  absorption  of  Denmark  b}^  Germany  is  gov- 
erned, not  by  German  greed,  but  by  natural  forces. 
The  intensity  of  their  appHcation  alone  is  influenced 
by  that  racial  avarice  characteristic  of  the  Teuton. 
Controlling  this  assimilation,  we  estabHsh  the  fol- 
lowing conditions: 

WTien  a  small  state  possesses  territories  that  are 
geographically  part  of  a  more  powerful  nation,  the 
exterritorial  expansion  of  the  latter  is  invariably 
preceded  by  the  absorption  of  the  lesser  state  under 
the  follo\\*ing  conditions: 

1.  ^\Tien  the  small  state  is  so  placed  strategically 
that  its  possession  is  essential  in  the  subsequent 
wars  of  the  greater. 

2.  When  the  small  state  is  so  placed  geographi- 
cally that  its  independence  interferes  with  the 
economic  growth  of  the  greater. 

3.  Wlien  the  small  state  is  so  placed  politically 
that  its  absorption  is  essential  to  the  greater  nation 
for  the  purposes  of  its  political  expansion. 

4.  WTien  the  people  of  the  small  state  are  racially 
the  same  and  are  racially  associated. 

Denmark  occupies  one  of  the  first  places  in  the 
strategic  spheres  of  Europe,  and  is  as  essential  to 
Germanic  power  in  the  north  of  Europe  as  is  the 
possession  of  Gibraltar  to  the  power  of  Great  Britain 

142 


THE  SAXON  AND  THE  GERMAN 

in  the  Mediterranean.  Germany  in  her  expansion 
must  consider  not  alone  the  present,  but  the  future, 
not  so  much  the  increases  of  her  own  wealth  as  the 
augmentation  of  those  strategic  places  by  which 
she  can  control  the  wealth  and  power  of  other 
nations,  bringing  about  in  due  time  those  conditions 
upon  which  depend  the  future  of  the  Teutonic  race, 
the  dissolution  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  Empire  and  the 
curtailment  of  the  Russian. 

Because  of  this  duality  of  German  progress  the 
possession  of  those  strategic  positions  that  increase 
simultaneously  her  power  over  both  empires  con- 
stitutes a  permanent  basis  upon  which  her  future 
expansion  must  rest.  In  this  category  Denmark  is 
more  essential  to  the  progress  of  German  military 
power  than  any  other  single  territory  in  this  sphere.^ 

Denmark  is  the  continuation  of  Germany.  One 
might  say  that  it  is  the  thumb  of  the  Teutons,  by 
which  she  will  crush  the  greatest  of  sea  and  land 
empires,  leaving  upon  the  world  in  this  thumb- 
print the  knowledge  of  her  identity  forever. 

The  value  of  the  Netherlands  to  the  German  Empire 
is  determined  by  the  above  laws,  and  not  by  the  fact 
that  its  harbors  give  to  Germany  the  opportunity 
of  attack  on  the  British  Islands.  The  proximity  of 
Holland  to  England  does  not  constitute  the  true 
value  of  the  Netherlands  to  Germany,  which  is 
twofold : 

I.  It  is  essential  to  the  economic  development  of 

1  Chart  IV. 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

western  Germany  and  the  amalgamation  of  the 
Teutonic  races. 

2.  Its  strategic  value  to  Germany  lies,  not  within, 
but  outside,  of  Europe. 

With  the  acquisition  of  Holland  the  German  Em- 
pire expands  simultaneously,  not  alone  to  the  West- 
em  Hemisphere,  but  across  the  Pacific,  securing  a 
landed  area  three  times  greater  than  that  of  Ger- 
many and  a  native  population  equal  to  that  of 
France.  Germany  becomes  an  Oriental  empire, 
standing  across  the  trade  routes  of  eastern  Asia 
and  Europe  and  segregating  Australasia  to  the 
solitudes  of  the  southern  Pacific. 

We  have  already  formulated  in  a  previous  work  * 
certain  laws  governing  naval  expansion.  These  laws 
are  as  applicable  to  Germany  as  to  any  other  empire : 

1.  The  number  of  naval  bases  must  be  increased 
in  proportionate  ratio  to  the  increase  of  the  navy. 

2.  The  efficiency  of  the  navy  is  lessened  whenever 
the  number  and  capacity  of  naval  bases  is  less  than 
required  by  such  fleets  as  conditions  of  warfare 
may  force  to  base  on  them. 

3.  The  possession  of  too  few  or  not  widely  spaced 
bases  means  the  restriction  of  naval  activity  to  a 
defined,  and  perhaps  unimportant,  portion  of  the 
theater  of  war,  as  well  as  periods  of  complete  in- 
activity consequent  upon  undue  restriction. 

4.  The  efficiency  of  the  navy  is  correspondingly 
weakened   where   there   are   within   such   strategic 

^  The  Valor  of  Ignorance. 
144 


THE    SAXON    AND    THE    GERMAN 

triangles  as  are  formed  by  two  or  three  or  more 
of  its  bases  fortified  positions  belonging  to  the 
enemy. 

By  the  operation  of  these  laws  it  is  apparent  that 
in  the  extension  of  the  German  navy  to  an  equality 
with  that  of  Great  Britain  its  utility  is  determined 
by  a  territorial  expansion  without  Europe.  Other- 
wise the  sphere  of  its  operations  is  confined  to  the 
North  Sea.  The  effect  of  a  navy  upon  the  world 
and  its  trade  is  no  greater  than  the  radii  of  its 
operations. 

At  the  time  of  the  creation  of  the  modern  Ger- 
man navy  one  of  three  conditions  was  predeter- 
mined upon: 

1 .  The  absorption  of  the  Netherlands  and  the  util- 
ization of  her  colonial  possessions  as  naval  bases. 

2.  The  destruction  of  British  naval  supremacy, 
and  the  seizure  of  British  oversea  possessions  as 
naval  bases. 

3.  The  absorption  of  the  Netherlands  and  her 
colonial  territories  simultaneously  with  the  destruc- 
tion of  British  sea  power  and  the  seizure  of  her 
possessions. 

It  is  in  the  acquisition  of  the  colonial  possessions 
of  the  Netherlands  that  rests  the  basic  value  of  this 
kingdom  to  Germany.  As  the  Dutch  East  Indies 
would  establish  German  power  in  the  Orient,  so 
the  Dutch  possessions  on  the  north  coast  of  South 
America  and  the  Dutch  islands  in  the  southern  part 
of  the  Caribbean  Sea  permit  what  would  be  other- 

145 


THE    DAY    OF   THE    SAXON 

wise  impossible — German  naval  activity  in  those 
regions.  With  the  acquirement  of  the  Dutch  colonial 
possessions  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  Germany 
enters  upon  her  career  to  curtail,  if  not  destroy,  the 
nebulous  sovereignty  the  Saxon  race  now  imposes 
upon  South  America. 

While  the  Monroe  Doctrine  forbids  the  acquisi- 
tion of  territory  by  European  nations  subsequent 
to  its  enunciation,  it  cannot  interfere  with  Dutch 
sovereign  rights,  though  the  Dutch  state  becomes 
a  part  of  the  German  Empire.  This  is  the  beginning 
of  Teutonic  sovereignty  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

As  the  value  of  Holland  to  the  German  Empire 
lies  without  itself,  so  is  it  true  of  the  extension  of 
German  sovereignty  over  Austria.  It  is  not  the 
twenty  millions  added  to  the  German  race  or  their 
territory  that  constitutes  the  value  of  Austria  to 
Germany. 

It  lies  in  Asia  Minor. 

It  belongs  to  the  Mediterranean. 

Already  this  Teutonic  race,  certain  of  its  destiny, 
conscious  of  its  strength,  has  stepped  across  the 
Bosphorus. 

As  Germany  gains  a  sea  by  the  occupation  of 
Denmark,  so  Austria  brings  to  her  another.  With 
the  absorption  of  Austria  the  Mediterranean  and 
its  littoral  passes  within  the  environment  of  BerHn. 

The  destruction  of  Austrian  sovereignty  is  the 
means  to  a  great  end.  There  is  a  savage  sublimity 
in  this  thought — to  use  empires  as  stepping-stones. 

146 


BOOK    II 

All  states  are  in  perpetual  war  with  all.  For  that  which 
we  call  peace  is  no  more  than  merely  a  name,  whilst  in 
reality  nature  has  set  all  communities  in  an  unproclaimed 
but  everlasting  war  with  each  other. — Plato. 


THE   BRITISH   EMPIRE   AND   THE   WORLD 

British  Empire  Subject  to  Same  Laws  as  Others. — Not  Immune 
from  Attack. — Recession  of  Saxon  along  Original  Lines  of  Ex- 
pansion.— Military  Expansion  Not  Arbitrarily  Determined. — 
Japan's  Special  Sphere  Pacific  Ocean. — Development  of  Russia 
in  Central  Asia. — Preservation  of  Frontiers  of  Belgium,  Holland, 
and  Denmark  Necessary. 

WE  have  in  the  previous  book  examined  into 
the  relationship  the  Saxon  race  bears  to  the 
balance  of  the  world,  and  have  found  it  not  what  it 
is  ordinarily  supposed  to  be — an  empire  durable  as 
the  world  itself — but  one  similar  in  its  vulnerability 
to  all  other  nations  that  have  preceded  it. 

The  instabiUty  of  the  British  Empire  is  not  due 
to  the  manner  of  its  establishment,  but  to  a  sub- 
sequent denial  of  those  immutable  factors  that  de- 
termine not  alone  the  formation  of  nations,  but 
their  progression  and  duration.  The  Saxon  race, 
and  those  who  from  time  to  time  directed  its  course, 
have  with  increasing  frequency  sought  the  greatness 
of  the  shadow  for  the  durability  of  the  substance. 
This  Cheopian  empire,  built  up  by  the  old  valor  and 
genius  of  the  race  upon  comers  that  were  the  four 
comers  of  the  world,  is  now  turned  upon  its  apex. 

149 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

Though  its  shadow  lies  upon  more  parts  of  the  earth 
than  ever  heretofore,  its  durabiUty  rests,  not  upon 
the  breadth  of  its  base,  but  upon  the  strength  of  a 
single  part.  Toward  this  point,  unhindered  by  the 
great  shadow  that  falls  upon  them,  the  nations  of 
the  world  are  crowding;  and  when  the  last  of  the 
unsubstantial  bastions  are  passed  this  great  inverted 
pyramid  of  Saxon  power  will  be  cast  down  by  the 
finger  of  some  Cambyses,  and,  like  Egyptian  nation- 
aHty,  to  remain  in  the  midst  of  its  own  ruins,  another 
monument  of  human  vanity  and  credulity. 

We  have  found  in  this  examination  that  the  old 
world  in  its  vastness  is  gone.  Oceans  have  become 
rivers,  and  kingdoms  the  environs  of  a  single  city. 
The  sohtudes  of  the  earth  have  vanished,  and  the 
whole  of  the  human  race  now  struggles  within  a 
space  no  greater  than  was  once  allotted  to  a  single 
empire.  Small  populations  have  become  vast,  and 
their  hungers  have  grown,  not  proportionately  to 
the  increase  of  their  nimibers,  but  a  thousandfold, 
more  through  the  necessities  of  their  civilization 
and  the  activity  of  their  sciences. 

Science  has  become  the  scavenger  of  the  world. 
What  once  lasted  mankind  a  generation  is  now  con- 
sumed in  a  single  day.  And  of  what  is  left  of  Na- 
ture's resources  the  Saxon  lays  claim  to  seven-tenths. 
It  is  in  consequence  of  these  conditions  that  the  races 
of  the  world  are  converging  toward  those  resources 
under  political  dominion  of  the  Saxon  race.  This 
convergence  is  not  from  nor  toward  widely  separated 

ISQ 


BRITISH    EMPIRE    AND    THE    WORLD 

spheres,  but  so  jammed  together  are  the  races  of 
the  world  that  one  hears  the  whisper  of  the  oth- 
er. Secrecy,  Hke  soHtude,  has  abandoned  man- 
kind. 

The  British  Empire  owed  its  former  immunity 
from  attack  and  dissolution,  not  to  its  own  power, 
but  to  the  lack  of  power  in  others.  This  security 
departed  with  the  advent  of  the  era  of  mechanical 
invention,  when  science  brought  within  the  en- 
virons of  Europe  the  most  remote  of  British  pos- 
sessions and  at  the  same  time  increased  the  neces- 
sity of  European  expansion.  Convergent  with  the 
advent  of  these  conditions  the  multiplicity  of  Euro- 
pean kingdoms,  upon  which  rested  the  basic  element 
of  Saxon  safety,  gave  way  through  amalgamation 
to  the  present  great  powers,  while  in  Asia,  where  for 
so  many  generations  Saxon  conquest  had  been  un- 
opposed, the  dead  have  awakened  and  new  empires 
have  risen  to  dismay  or  destroy  all  that  in  Asia 
is  left  of  Saxon  power. 

As  it  is  more  difficult  to  preserve  to  one's  heirs 
that  which  has  been  gained  during  a  lifetime  than  it  is 
to  secure  it,  so  is  this  true  with  states.  No  individual 
spendthrift  is  more  careless  of  his  heritage  than  a 
nation,  and  none  parts  with  it  more  freely  than  do 
those  great  empires  whose  power  appears  illimit- 
able. 

No  receptacle  is  so  shallow  as  the  coffers  of  an 
heir. 

The  laws  governing  the  contact  of  states,   the 

151 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

aggrandizement  of  one  and  the  dissolution  of  the 
other  through  the  convergence  of  their  interests, 
and  the  wars  that  ensue  from  this  convergence, 
have  already  been  given. ^  By  these  we  find  that 
any  contraction  of  the  spheres  within  which  nations 
contend  for  superiority  increases  the  proximity  and 
frequency  of  wars  to  the  same  degree  as  would  fol- 
low from  an  increased  acuteness  of  their  angles  of 
convergence.  The  significance  of  this  to  the  British 
Empire  is  threefold.  The  world  in  a  military  sense 
is  no  larger  than  western  Europe  a  hundred  years 
ago.  Its  every  portion  comes  within  the  military 
activity  of  a  great  state.  The  world  is  now  a  single 
theater  of  war;  and  in  this  theater,  widely  segre- 
gated, lies  the  Saxon  Empire,  claiming  dominion 
over  all  its  seas  and  more  than  half  its  lands,  con- 
stituting the  larger  portion  of  those  future  theaters 
of  war  toward  which  all  non-Saxon  nations  are  con- 
verging. Innumerable  conditions,  changing  from 
time  to  time,  may  alter  their  convergence,  accele- 
rate or  retard  the  speed  with  which  they  advance; 
but  there  remains  one  constant  factor  that  ever 
brings  them  nearer  to  the  destruction  of  the  British 
Empire  and  the  absorption  of  its  possessions — the 
progressive  militant  decadence  of  the  Saxon.  When- 
ever this  decadence  falls  upon  a  race,  as  it  has  upon 
the  Saxon,  then  the  race  not  only  ceases  to  advance, 
but  recedes  along  the  lines  it  originally  traversed. 
The  consequent  convergence  of  surrounding  nations 

'  The  Valor  of  Ignorance,  chap,  iv,  book  i. 
152 


BRITISH    EMPIRE    AND    THE    WORLD 

at  once  becomes  acute,  and  their  speed  is  accelerated 
in  direct  ratio  to  the  increasing  defenselessness  of 
the  decadent  empire. 

Nations  never  advance  to  their  doom.  They  re- 
treat to  it. 

While  the  British  Empire  is  now,  geographically, 
more  vast  than  ever  heretofore,  its  wealth  and 
power,  in  a  world  sense,  reached  their  maximum 
subsequent  to  the  Napoleonic  wars.  National 
wealth  and  power  are  only  relative.  At  that  time 
there  was  no  modem  Germany  nor  France  nor 
America  nor  Russia  nor  Japan.  England  was  su- 
preme, and  in  this  supremacy,  due  rather  to  the 
weakness  of  others  than  to  British  strength,  the 
militant  decline  of  the  nation  began. 

While  some  victories  are  the  genesis  of  empires, 
some  are  their  ruin,  and  in  others  germinate  the 
causes  of  eventual  decay. 

Waterloo  was  a  victory  of  this  latter  kind.  It 
was  the  beginning  of  Germanic  militant  greatness 
and  of  Saxon  militant  decay. 

At  the  close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  the  elemental 
character  of  European  economic  wants  and  the  re- 
moteness from  Europe  of  all  British  possessions 
permitted  for  a  time  a  parallel  progression  of  British 
and  continental  interests.  The  way  to  England's 
vast  territories  was  by  the  sea,  and  that  way  the 
British  sea  power  held  secure.  Toward  the  middle 
of  the  nineteenth  century  began  not  alone  an  altera- 
tion of  political  ideals  in  Europe,  but  the  era  of 

153 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

mechanical  invention.  Each  subsequent  decade  de- 
limited British  security. 

The  steam-engine  and  the  racial  unification  of 
Europe  were  the  first  enemies  to  British  power. 

Military  expansion  is  not  determined  arbitrarily 
by  legislation,  but  by  conditions  over  which  they 
have  no  control.  It  is  only  by  circumscribing  these 
conditions  endangering  national  security  that  a 
state  can  determine  for  itself  the  degree  of  its  mili- 
tary expansion.  The  exercise  of  such  sovereignty, 
however,  presupposes  a  dominant  power  over  those 
states  or  conditions  that  might  in  their  progress  and 
development  threaten  Saxon  supremacy.  Instead 
of  Waterloo  resulting  in  a  declination  of  British 
militant  expansion  it  should  have  been  the  begin- 
ning of  a  constant  military  growth  not  alone  equal 
to  the  vulnerability  of  the  Empire,  consequent  upon 
the  segregation  of  its  constituent  parts,  but  to  those 
greater  dangers  resulting  from  European  racial 
amalgamation  and  the  shrinkage  of  the  world 
brought  about  by  the  constantly  increasing  effi- 
ciency of  international  communication  and  trans- 
portation. 

Waterloo  should  have  been  an  inspiration.  It 
became  a  memory. 

To  contemplate  this  memory  is  to  shudder. 

In  the  preceding  book  we  have  dealt  specifically 
with  those  conditions  productive  of  British  dissolu- 
tion as  they  exist  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  in 
Asia,  in  Europe,  and  upon  the  seas,  showing  that 

154 


BRITISH    EMPIRE    AND    THE    WORLD 

this  tentative  destruction  is  not  the  result  of  the 
old  call  of  conquest  upon  the  non-Saxon  nations, 
but  necessity  forcing  their  expansion  in  direction  of 
the  greatest  gain  and  upon  lines  of  least  resistance. 
By  a  strange  fatality  these  lines  coincide  with  those 
now  being  vacated  by  the  retrocession  of  the  Saxon 
race  through  the  decay  of  its  militant  capacity, 
racial  atrophy,  and  political  dissolution. 

In  the  entire  world  we  have  not  found  a  single 
sphere  toward  which  the  expansion  of  other  nations 
is  directed  that  does  not  encroach  upon  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  British  Empire,  and  to  the  extent  that 
its  disintegration  goes  on  concurrently  with  each 
extension  of  their  power.  Up  to  the  present  time 
the  movement  of  these  nations  has  been  restricted 
to  those  two  phases  of  preparation  that  invariably 
precede  all  great  wars  and  periods  of  conquest — 
internal  consolidation  and  the  establishment  of 
extra-territorial  spheres  of  restrictive  aggrandize- 
ment. It  can  be  considered  as  an  historical  maxim 
that  no  great  power  ever  restricts  to  itself  a  sphere 
of  special  interest  over  a  decadent  state,  except  with 
the  predetermination  to  eventually  extend  over  it 
sovereign  rights.  Defeat  alone  averts  this  con- 
stmimation.  Whenever  a  decadent  state,  over 
which  has  been  imposed  restrictive  rights  or  com- 
plete sovereignty,  lies  in  the  avenue  of  the  con- 
quering power's  expansion,  the  adjoining  state  be- 
comes subject  to  an  identical  fate  if  its  capacity  for 
defense  is  less  than  that  of  the  expanding  power. 
11  iSS 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

In  the  growth  and  victories  of  Japan  have  been 
evolved  in  natural  sequence  the  essential  characteris- 
tics of  this  principle.  The  Pacific  Ocean  is  Japan's 
sphere  of  special  interest  and  aggrandizement.  This 
is  not  an  ambition.  It  is  a  necessity.  It  is  forced 
upon  Japan  by  the  insular  character  of  its  empire, 
and  by  the  action  of  certain  natural  laws  which  we 
now  establish: 

1.  The  security  of  an  insular  empire  is  deter- 
mined, not  by  the  defense  of  its  own  shores,  but  by 
the  control  of  the  coasts  encompassing  the  sea  in 
which  it  is  situated. 

2.  Sea  power  in  an  insular  empire  is  not  measured 
by  the  number  of  its  ships  of  war,  but  by  its  capacity 
to  prevent  the  maritime  superiority  of  any  state 
placed  on  the  external  shores  of  the  sea  in  which 
it  is  located.  This  capacity  is  primarily  inherent 
not  in  naval  but  in  military  power. 

3.  Whenever  a  continental  state  abuts  upon  the 
sea  in  which  is  situated  an  insular  kingdom,  and 
acquires  a  relative  equality  in  maritime  power,  the 
probabilities  of  eventual  victory  rest  entirely  with 
the  continental  nation. 

Whenever  the  possibility  of  establishing  Japanese 
sovereignty  over  the  Pacific  passes  without  the  sphere 
of  Japan's  activity,  the  dissolution  of  that  empire 
begins.  In  Japan  the  entire  nation  is  intuitively 
cognizant  of  these  laws,  and  because  of  them  the 
Russian  war  was  undertaken,  not  for  the  acquire- 
ment of  continental  possessions,  but  for  the  preserva- 

156 


BRITISH    EMPIRE    AND    THE    WORLD 

tion  of  her  maritime  supremacy  in  northern  Asia  by 
the  preclusion  of  Russia  from  the  Httoral  of  the  Pacific. 

It  is  the  continuity  of  this  progression  and  the 
maritime  expansion  of  the  Japanese  Empire  that 
now  brings  it  into  conflict  with  the  Saxon  race. 
Upon  the  success  or  failure  of  this  struggle  the  future 
of  Japan  rests,  and  with  the  supremacy  of  that 
empire  all  that  is  Saxon  in  power  and  dominion  de- 
parts from  the  Pacific. 

In  the  middle  East,  in  India,  its  seas  and  environs, 
we  find  the  same  essential  principle  directed  against 
the  tenure  of  the  British  race.  As  the  Pacific, 
through  the  decay  of  Saxon  militancy,  has  now  be- 
come the  sphere  of  Japanese  expansion,  so  by  this 
same  lack  of  military  progression  those  vast  terri- 
tories of  the  middle  East  have  passed  within  the 
sphere  of  Russian  conquest.  Russia  has  not  forced 
the  Saxon  from  the  frontiers  of  India,  but  has  only 
followed  slowly  and  unopposed  along  those  avenues 
of  expansion  made  possible  by  the  retrocession  of 
British  power.  The  development  of  central  Asia, 
bringing  it  within  the  environs  of  Greater  Russia 
by  the  railroads  that  now  traverse  it — the  tentative 
extension  of  Russian  dominion  over  Persia — has  all 
come  within  the  character  of  peaceful  internal  de- 
velopment and  consolidation.  Yet  it  has  also  been, 
as  we  will  hereafter  show,  the  most  complete  and 
extensive  preparation  for  the  conquest  of  a  definite 
reign  ever  undertaken  in  modem  times. 

In  Europe,  to  a  greater  extent  than  in  the  Pacific 

157 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

or  Asia,  has  it  become  an  established  truism  that  all 
further  territorial  expansion  is  dependent  upon  the 
dissolution  of  the  British  Empire.  In  the  amalgama- 
tion of  minor  European  states  British  political 
domination  over  Europe  came  to  an  end.  With 
the  violation  of  England's  Danish  obligations  and 
its  military  inability  to  preserve  that  nation's  in- 
tegrity, British  power  vanished  utterly  from  the 
councils  of  European  nations. 

When  England  withdrew  to  the  solitudes  of  her 
seas,  it  was  not,  as  is  ordinarily  assumed,  upon  her 
own  volition.  She  was  forced  upon  these  waste 
places  of  the  world  in  the  futile  hope  that  power 
established  there  intervened  between  her  possessions 
and  those  states  in  Europe  with  whom  she  could  no 
longer  contend.  This  was  not  an  advance;  it  was 
a  retreat,  and  one  full  of  bitterness.  Sea  power  has 
not  had,  nor  can  it  have,  any  salient  effect  upon  the 
internal  political  or  military  growth  of  continental 
states  when  their  development  is  not  dependent 
upon  oceanic  control.  British  sea  power  has  done 
nothing  to  retard  or  prevent  that  unification  and 
development  of  European  power  which,  in  due 
time,  is  to  be  directed  to  its  own  destruction.  This 
prevention  or  diversion  could  alone  be  accomplished 
by  the  exercise  of  British  military  power  within  the 
continent  itself.  England  has  not  until  recent  years 
become  cognizant  of  the  dangers  that  resulted  from 
her  failure  to  provide  for  a  continuous  expanding 
military  establishment. 

158 


BRITISH    EMPIRE    AND    THE    WORLD 

This  is  the  old  and  pitiful  bHndness  that  comes 
upon  nations,  not  from  a  lack  of  sight  or  knowledge, 
but  from  the  intermittent  fevers  of  their  pride  and 
credulity. 

Ordinarily  the  readjustment  of  political  and  terri- 
torial boundaries  proceeds  concurrently  with  changes 
that  occur  in  international  political  and  economic 
relationship.  But  in  the  internal  development  and 
racial  consoHdation  of  Europe  the  readjustment  of 
frontiers  has  been  deferred.  This  alteration  is  now 
determinable  solely  by  the  utilization  of  the  maxi- 
mum mihtary  power  of  the  strongest  European 
nation.  Whenever  the  disruption  of  old  frontiers 
succeeds  political  consoHdation  these  changes  are 
not  only  marked  by"  violence,  but  usher  in  those 
Napoleonic  periods  of  warfare  that  fall,  from  time  to 
time,  upon  this  fretful  world. 

The  excessive  poUtical  and  military  development 
of  a  single  nation  or  of  a  closely  associated  coalition 
of  nations  is  now  manifest  in  growth  of  Teutonic 
power  and  its  ruthless  entrance  into  the  affairs  of 
the  world.  The  tentative  establishment  of  German 
dominion  in  the  past,  not  only  over  European  states, 
but  in  the  most  distant  parts  of  the  world,  is  now 
about  to  give  way  to  that  consummation  of  sover- 
eignty once  exercised  by  Saxon  elements. 

In  the  modem  extension  of  racial  sovereignty  the 
expenditure  of  physical  power  is  directed,  not 
against  the  minor  states  intended  to  be  absorbed, 
but  toward  the  greatest  power  concerned   in   the 

159 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

preservation  of  their  integrity  and  independence. 
When  that  power  is  destroyed  they  fall,  quite  nat- 
urally, within  the  domain  of  the  conqueror,  as  shown 
in  the  absorption  of  Korea  by  Japan. 

To  absorb  Belgium,  Holland,  and  Denmark,  it 
is  necessary  that  Germany  destroy  England. 

It  is  the  British  Empire,  more  than  all  the  other 
powers,  that  is  involved  in  every  manifestation  of 
German  expansion.  While  the  Saxon  race  and  its 
possessions  on  every  continent  constitute  the  foci 
of  the  convergent  interests  of  all  other  nations,  Ger- 
man expansion  embodies  in  a  single  concrete  ex- 
pression all  these  diverse  interests,  since  its  conver- 
gence is  not  upon  the  frontiers  of  the  British  Empire, 
but  upon  the  very  center  of  it.  The  anomalous 
condition  of  Teutonic  progression,  however,  per- 
mits the  Saxon  race  to  conceal  from  itself  the  dangers 
and  disasters  it  involves.  The  Saxon  has  seized 
upon  this  self-deception  with  that  eagerness  peculiar 
to  peoples  militarily  decadent. 

As  Prussia's  seizure  of  Schleswig-Holstein  ended 
the  period  when  England  gave  down  the  law  to 
Europe  and  shaped  the  destinies  of  its  innumerable 
states,  so  its  continued  military  decadence  has  led 
to  its  ejection  from  the  councils  of  those  nations. 
A  new  period,  even  more  portentous  than  the  pre- 
ceding, has  now  made  its  appearance.  While  the 
annexation  of  the  Danish  Duchies  betrayed  the 
weakness  and  falsity  of  British  military  policy,  so 
the   extension   of   Germanic   sovereignty   to   either 

1 60 


BRITISH    EMPIRE    AND    THE    WORLD 

Denmark  or  the  Netherlands  or  Belgium  will  re- 
sult in  the  final  eHmination  of  England  from  Euro- 
pean affairs. 

The  failure  of  England  to  realize  a  half-centvuy 
ago  that  the  southern  frontiers  of  Denmark  were 
her  frontiers,  and  that  her  inability  to  defend  them 
must  subsequently  result  disastrously  to  her  in- 
tegrity, now  bears  its  bitter  fruit  in  forcing  upon  her 
an  identical  but  greater  necessity  of  defending,  not 
alone  the  present  frontiers  of  Denmark,  but  the 
eastern  frontiers  of  the  Netherlands  and  Belgium. 
Should  this  inexorable  obligation  be  met  with  the 
same  national  defalcation  and  military  bankruptcy 
as  was  the  case  a  half -century  ago,  then  the  penalty 
will  not  alone  be  Saxon  ejection  from  Europe,  but 
the  eventual  dissolution  of  their  Empire. 

Throughout  the  preceding  book  we  confined  our- 
selves to  the  consideration  of  basic  dangers  that 
threaten  Saxon  survival  in  every  portion  of  the 
world.  In  this  inquiry  we  put  aside  all  ephemeral 
conditions  and  difficulties  such  as  appear  to  impede 
and  endanger  the  Empire's  existence.  We  have 
taken  into  account  only  those  elemental  influences 
and  principles  that  determine  in  all  ages  the  dura- 
tion and  extinction  of  nations.  The  futurity  of  the 
British  Empire  has  been  considered  only  in  its  en- 
tirety— in  its  relation  to  the  natural  destiny  of 
political  existence,  and  the  tragic  phenomena  that 
record  its  rise  and  decHne.  Its  destiny  is  marked, 
as  that  of  other  empires,  in  the  ever-recurring  tides 

i6i 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

of  national  virility  and  decay,  in  the  flood  and  ebb 
of  human  greatness. 

The  British  Empire,  as  well  as  all  others  that  have 
preceded  it,  betray  characteristics  peculiar  to  each. 
It  is  these  characteristics,  varying  from  generation 
to  generation,  that  lead  nations  to  deceive  them- 
selves in  the  belief  that  their  progress  is  alone  wise 
and  their  government  imperishable.  These  passing 
vsingularities,  marking  only  the  transient  idealities 
of  successive  periods,  we  have  excluded  from  con- 
sideration, restricting  ourselves  to  those  principles 
that  are  constant  in  their  application  through  every 
age  and  over  every  race. 

God  has  not  transgressed  these  laws,  and  His 
people  have  gone  the  same  way  as  those  who  knew 
nothing  of  Him  or  His  decrees. 

That  finality  upon  the  brink  of  which  the  British 
Empire  now  hesitates,  perhaps  for  no  more  than  a 
moment  of  time,  is  or  is  not  an  immediate  con- 
summation only  as  the  Empire  accepts  or  continues 
to  deny  those  principles  which  the  progression  and 
dissolution  of  nations  have  established. 

It  is  now  that  we  turn  from  the  contemplation 
of  the  Empire  and  the  perils  that  are  coexistent 
with  its  vastness  to  the  consideration  of  the  causes 
that  have  been  productive  of  these  dangers.  As  in 
the  preceding  book,  we  will  consider  only  those  con- 
ditions that  are  universal  in  their  effect  upon  its 
security.  Removed,  as  we  are,  far  from  the  ring- 
side of  party  politics,  with  its  pitiful  aspirations  and 

162 


BRITISH    EMPIRE    AND    THE    WORLD 

small  bruised  noses,  we  will  view  these  causes  of 
Saxon  decadence  without  prejudice  or  bitterness, 
though  not  without  sorrow,  as  we  witness  what  is 
perhaps  destined  to  be  the  final  passage  of  this  vast 
Empire. 


II 


LIMITATIONS    OF   NAVAL   WARFARE 

National  Ideals. — Principles  Governing  Army  and  Navy  in  Hos- 
tilities.— Navy  of  an  Insular  and  Army  of  a  Continental  Power 
Determine  Expansion  of  Opponent. — Naval  and  Land  Warfare. 
— Disaster  in  War  Result  from  Victory  as  weU  as  Defeat. — 
Kinds  and  Degrees  of  Battle. — Lines  of  Communication. 

NATIONAL  ideals  are  of  two  kinds — the  present 
and  the  historic.  By  their  character  and  the 
degree  of  influence  they  exercise  upon  the  nation 
are  we  able  to  determine,  in  a  certain  sense,  the 
direction  of  its  progression. 

When  national  ideals  are  divorced  from  the  his- 
toric and  belong  wholly  to  the  present,  as  those 
based  upon  party  politics  or  political  expedients, 
they  are  as  transitory  as  the  conditions  that  give 
them  birth.  National  decadence  then  proceeds  in 
inverse  ratio  to  the  increased  dominance  of  these 
ideals  over  national  policy. 

When  national  ideals  are  the  unused  products  of 
events  existent  only  in  an  historical  sense,  there 
results  an  inflexibility  of  governmental  progression 
that  culminates  in  national  atrophy  and  decay. 

When  national  ideals  are  derived  from  those  his- 
toric events   productive   of   the   state's   maximum 

164 


LIMITATIONS   OF    NAVAL   WARFARE 

greatness,  and  constitute  the  principles  directing 
present  ideals,  there  results  a  truer  association  of 
the  past  with  the  present.  So  long  as  this  con- 
tinues national  ideals  cease  to  be  either  transient 
or  atrophied,  but,  maintaining  the  state  at  its  rel- 
ative maximum  power,  are  coexistent  with  it. 

When  national  ideals  are  founded  upon  conditions 
no  longer  existent  yet  maintained  under  the  delusion 
of  their  immutability,  they  become  not  a  possible 
but  an  actual  cause  of  national  dissolution. 

It  is  in  relation  to  these  last  ideals,  as  they  affect 
the  Saxon  race,  that  we  are  to  consider  the  false 
interpretation  now  given  to  the  old  ideals  of  British 
sea  power,  the  unreality  of  its  permanence  under 
existent  conditions,  and  the  limitations  of  its  func- 
tions. 

Sea  power  is  not  an  entity.  It  is  not  self-existent 
nor  absolute,  but  remains  constant  in  its  subordina- 
tion to  numerous  basic  conditions  that  determine, 
from  time  to  time,  the  rise,  duration,  and  decline  of 
nations  situated  within  or  upon  the  environs  of  the 
sea. 

Sea  power  is  the  exercise  of  physical  force  in  that 
specific  theater  of  war  where  national  welfare  neces- 
sitates its  use  in  varying  degrees  of  potentiality.  It 
differs  only  in  the  means  of  its  application  from  con- 
flicts waged  on  land.  Those  principles  that  govern 
the  empire  in  its  extension  or  defense  remain  con- 
stant, whether  the  struggle  is  by  land  or  by  sea. 
Fleets,  as  armies,  are  but  the  agencies  of  nations 

i6s 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

when  their  activities  pass  from  peace  to  war.  As 
the  purposes  of  a  campaign,  the  character  of  the 
theater  of  war  and  the  objective  to  be  attained 
specify  the  greater  or  lesser  use  of  cavalry  or  in- 
fantry or  artillery,  so  do  the  general  conditions  of 
war  and  the  ultimate  objective  of  the  struggle  de- 
termine the  relative  significance  of  the  main  com- 
bative elements  of  the  belligerents,  the  army  or  the 
navy.  In  a  general  sense  these  are  governed  by 
three  principles: 

1.  In  a  war  between  two  insular  powers  the  navy 
constitutes  the  arm  of  supreme  importance. 

2.  In  a  war  between  two  continental  powers  the 
army  constitutes  the  arm  of  supreme  importance. 

3.  In  a  war  between  an  insular  power  and  a  con- 
tinental nation  a  superior  navy  plus  a  relative 
equaUty  of  land  forces  constitutes  the  true  pro- 
portion of  the  two  arms. 

The  first  two  principles  are  self-evident,  but  in 
the  third  we  find  the  development  of  British  mili- 
tant power  to  fulfil  but  one  of  these  conditions. 
The  results,  as  we  will  show  in  this  and  subsequent 
chapters,  is  the  nullification  of  its  naval  power  by 
the  inadequacy  of  its  land  forces  when  engaged  in 
war  with  an  equally  great  continental  nation.  In 
such  a  conflict  the  naval  power  of  the  insular  nation 
determines  the  degree  of  naval  superiority  or  equal- 
ity necessary  to  the  continental  state  to  enter  upon 
the  struggle,  but  the  land  forces  of  the  continental 
nation  plus  the  defensive  works  intervening  between 

166 


LIMITATIONS    OF    NAVAL    WARFARE 

its  vital  center  and  the  seaboard  designate  the  de- 
gree of  miHtary  strength  necessary  to  the  insular 
power. 

The  navy  of  an  insular  power  defines  the  expansion 
of  its  continental  opponent,  while  the  land  forces 
of  the  continental  power  determine  the  military 
expansion  of  its  insular  opponent. 

Between  naval  and  land  warfare  there  exist  in- 
herent differences  that,  as  yet,  human  progress  has 
not  altered.  The  causes  and  purposes  of  war,  the 
relative  strength  or  weakness  of  the  combatants,  de- 
fine the  theaters  of  war,  while  the  pecuharities  of 
these  theaters  determine  the  manner  and  char- 
acteristics of  its  conduct.  If  the  conflict  is  between 
an  insular  and  a  continental  state,  the  sea  becomes 
the  first  area  of  the  struggle.  If  the  insular  powder 
suffers  defeat,  its  war  is  at  an  end,  since  a  land  de- 
fense by  an  insular  nation  against  a  continental 
power  in  command  of  the  sea  is  a  poHtical,  military, 
and  economic  impossibility. 

If  the  naval  power  of  the  continental  nation  is 
destroyed,  it  results  only  in  a  transfer  of  the  theater 
of  w^ar  from  the  sea  to  the  land,  from  naval  to  land 
forces,  since  a  continental  state  with  land  frontiers 
is  economically  free  from  the  insular  nation's  con- 
trol of  the  sea.  Its  military  forces  must  be  defeated 
before  its  internal  economies  or  political  powers  are 
affected  to  the  extent  of  suing  for  peace.  In  the 
recent  war  between  Russia,  a  continental  state, 
and  Japan,  an  insular  nation,  this  principle  is  made 

167 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

clear.  Had  Russia  destroyed  the  naval  forces  of 
Japan  the  war  would  have  ended  on  the  date  of 
that  disaster. 

It  is  not  necessary,  in  modem  times,  to  invade  an 
insular  state  to  destroy  it. 

The  naval  \-ictory-  remaining  to  Japan,  the  in- 
sular nation,  resulted  only  in  a  transfer  of  the  theater 
of  war  from  the  sea  to  the  land,  gi\"ing  to  Japan 
no  more  than  a  comparative  equahty  with  Russia, 
but  rendering  secure  her  line  of  communication. 
Had  Japan's  navy  been  a  hundredfold  greater  and 
her  land  forces  inferior  in  numbers  or  constitution 
to  those  of  Russia,  the  dreadful  dramas  of  her  seas 
would  have  marked  rather  the  end  than  the  begin- 
ning of  her  greatness. 

Japan's  naw  and  its  use  during  this  war  show 
the  true  and  Hmited  functions  of  naval  warfare  as 
employed  by  an  insular  nation  against  a  continental 
power.  It  is  defensive  (i)  to  prevent  the  con- 
tinental state  from  gaining  command  of  the  sea; 
(2)  to  safeguard  the  future  lines  of  communication 
between  the  insular  state  and  the  continental,  to 
which  is  transferred  the  theater  of  combat  subse- 
quent to  the  naval  \'ictor>-  of  the  insiilar  power. 

It  is  impossible  to  determine  with  exactitude  the 
conduct  of  a  future  conflict  or  to  apply  to  it  with 
any  degree  of  certainty  the  experiences  of  a  previous 
war.  To  define,  therefore,  the  relative  importance 
of  naval  and  land  warfare  other  than  by  the  gen- 
eral  principles    just    laid    down    is    impracticable, 

168 


LIMITATIONS    OF    NAVAL    WARFARE 

since  the  means  and  utensils  of  war  are  never  iden- 
tical in  any  two  periods  of  time.  Yet  the  laws 
governing  the  militar}^  preparation  of  an  insular 
power  against  a  continental  nation,  and  the  naval 
preparation  of  the  latter  against  an  insular  king- 
dom, remain  constant  to  all  such  nations,  and  iden- 
tical in  all  periods  of  time,  whether  the  ships  of  war 
are  the  wooden  triremes  or  the  most  thunderous 
of  dreadnoughts,  whether  the  soldiers  are  spear 
and  pike  men  or  the  engineers  of  the  destructive 
forces  now  made  use  of. 

The  violation  of  the  above  principles  is  due 
sometimes  to  the  ignorance  of  civilians,  who,  in  all 
nations,  are  largely  responsible  for  the  development 
or  deterioration  of  naval  power;  sometimes  to  er- 
roneous interpretation  by  naval  and  military'  au- 
thorities. The  failure  to  righth'  understand  these 
principles  results  in  that  anomalous  state  of  affairs 
whereby  naval  expansion  is  controlled  by  conditions 
far  removed  from  those  laws  that  should  govern 
its  development. 

In  proportion  as  the  maritime  interests  of  a  nation 
increase  so  does  the  necessity  for  naval  expansion 
make  itself  felt.  It  is  at  this  point  that  insular 
nations  err.  Almost  invariably  they  regard  this 
necessity  of  naval  increase  from  the  defensive  \"iew- 
point ;  yet  the  danger  they  would  guard  against  does 
not  originate  in  nor  belong  to  the  sea.  It  is  inherent 
in  the  political  domination  of  another  state  whose  in- 
terests are  convergent  with  those  of  the  insular  nation. 

169 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

A  successful  defense  of  an  insular  kingdom  leaves 
that  kingdom  worse  off  than  before  the  attack. 
The  power  of  the  continental  state  remains  con- 
stant, while  the  angle  of  convergence  originating  in 
the  nation  itself  is  not  altered.  Only  the  speed  of 
its  movement  has  been  retarded,  and  this  but  in  pro- 
portion to  its  remedial  naval  losses.  Unless  the 
insular  nation  is  now  in  position,  as  was  Japan,  to 
utilize  her  security  by  sea  to  assume  the  offensive 
and  accept  the  transfer  of  the  theater  of  war  to 
the  territories  of  the  enemy,  its  naval  victory  is 
without  value.  The  result  would  be,  in  modem  times, 
no  more  than  an  armistice,  a  dreadful  procrastina- 
tion in  which  insular  nations  are  the  first  to  consume 
themselves. 

Because  of  this  misconception  and  failure  to  real- 
ize that  the  only  objective  of  war  is  to  destroy  the 
enemy's  capacity  to  wage  it,  there  has  been  brought 
about  in  insular  kingdoms  the  expansion  of  naval 
power  to  the  neglect  of  the  land  forces.  Yet  in  a 
war  with  a  continental  nation  the  navy  can  do  no 
more  than  protect  its  oceanic  lines  of  communica- 
tion. Victory  can  only  be  gained  by  use  of  armies. 
.  To  a  similar  misconception  is  due  the  corollary 
of  this  fatal  error,  that  the  safety  of  insular  king- 
doms is  the  consequence  of  their  own  power  as 
derived  from  the  seciuity  of  the  sea,  whereas  it 
has  been  due  to  the  non-naval  expansion  of  con- 
tinental states. 

The  purpose  of  war  is  to  destroy  the  enemy's  re- 
170 


LIMITATIONS    OF    NAVAL    WARFARE 

sources  or  the  government  controlling  them.  It  is 
this  savage  simplicity  that  bewilders  nations  and 
plunges  them  into  the  fatal  maze  of  evasion  and 
conjecture,  from  which,  to  a  militarily  decadent 
state,  there  is  no  exit. 

Disasters  in  war  result  from  victory  as  well  as 
defeat.     There  are  three  kinds  and  degrees  of  battle : 

1.  The  battle  that  makes  possible  a  definite  ad- 
vance and  insures  protection  to  lines  of  communi- 
cation, as  Vicksburg  and  Leipsic. 

2.  The  defeat  of  armies  to  the  extent  of  rendering 
possible  the  destruction  of  their  resources  or  the 
seizure  of  their  governments,  as  Wagram  and  Jena. 

3.  The  destruction  of  the  enemy's  resources  or  the 
seizure  of  its  government,  as  Arbela  and  Sedan. 

The  first  of  these  battles  belongs  to  the  beginning 
of  a  war,  the  second  to  its  progression,  and  the  last 
to  its  culmination. 

A  naval  battle,  with  one  exception,  belongs  to  the 
first  subordinate  class  of  tactical  conflict,  the  sole 
purpose  of  which  is  to  interrupt  or  protect  definite 
lines  of  communication.  A  victory  has  only  the 
relative  effect  of  an  interrupted  or  protected  line, 
the  significance  of  which  depends  upon  the  value  of 
the  communication.  This  value  has  three  grada- 
tions : 

I.  It  reaches  its  maximum  importance  when  the 
war  is  between  insular  nations;  then  the  complete 
interruption  of  these  lines  results  in  victory  to  the 
nation  contr®lling  the  sea. 
12  171 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

2.  It  is  least  important  when  the  war  is  between 
continental  powers  of  the  same  sphere,  since  their 
vital  theaters  of  war  are  not  maritime  and  their 
lines  of  communication  are  restricted  to  land. 

3.  When  a  war  is  between  a  continental  and  an 
insular  power  the  effect  of  victory  is  vital  only  as  re- 
gards the  insular  nation.  As  in  a  war  between  Ger- 
many and  the  British  Empire,  the  destruction  of 
the  British  fleet  is  followed  by  a  complete  severance 
of  its  lines  of  communication  and  its  downfall.  The 
destruction  of  the  German  fleets,  on  the  other  hand, 
results  only  in  a  return  to  conditions  existent  prior 
to  the  war,  unless  the  Empire  possesses,  as  did  Japan, 
land  forces  capable  of  resuming  the  combat  on  the 
land  theater  to  which  the  enemy  has  retired. 


Ill 


LIMITATIONS    OF    NAVAL   WARFARE. CONTINUED 

Conditions  that  Determined  Saxon  Suzerainty  Now  Changed. — 
Inadequacy  of  British  Navy. — Reduction  of  Distance  Increases 
Convergence  of  International  Interests. — Sea  Power  in  an  Insular 
Empire  Not  Measured  by  Ships  of  War. — Struggle  of  All  Great 
Continental  Nations  for  Control  of  the  Sea. — Preliminary  De- 
struction of  British  Empire  Confined  to  Peace. 

WHEN  the  causes  productive  of  certain  condi- 
tions diminish  in  number  or  potentiality,  the 
resultant  conditions  lose  their  corresponding  signifi- 
cance. If  the  same  factors  that  made  possible  the 
British  Empire  were  still  existent,  and  its  sea  power 
constant  in  its  superiority,  the  dominion  of  the 
Saxon  over  the  world  would  continue  undisputed. 
But,  of  these  five  coexistent  conditions  that  once 
determined  Saxon  suzerainty  over  the  earth,  all 
have  passed  away  or  have  been  merged  imper- 
ceptibly into  a  new  aspect. 

I.  The  absence  in  Europe  from  the  sixteenth  to 
the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  of  any  nation 
possessing  power  or  capacity  to  compete  with  the 
Saxon  for  the  possession  of  the  sea  and  newly  dis- 
covered world.  There  was  no  Russian  Empire, 
nor  German,  nor  Austrian,  nor  Italian.     The  de- 

173 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

cline  of  the  Portuguese,  the  Spanish,  the  Dutch, 
and  the  French  left  the  Saxon  supreme.  Upon  the 
collective  wreckage  of  these  latter  nations,  at  a 
time  when  the  primitive  world  made  it  possible,  the 
British  Empire  was  established. 

2.  The  world  outside  of  Europe  presented  at  this 
formative  period  two  phases  peculiarly  favorable 
for  the  extension  of  British  power — (a)  the  tribal 
character  of  the  races  of  the  Western  Hemisphere 
and  its  great  natural  resources;  (b)  the  military  and 
political  impotence  of  the  great  nations  occupying 
Asia. 

3.  The  geographical  situation  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  the  islands  of  the  seas,  the  Levant,  and 
the  Orient,  in  relation  to  Europe,  with  which  inter- 
communication was  restricted  to  the  sea. 

4.  The  strategic  position  of  the  British  Islands 
so  placed  before  the  oceanic  exit  of  Europe  that  if 
Europe  going  out  upon  the  sea  was  not  directly 
forbidden  the  result  was  indirectly  the  same,  since 
these  British  Islands  severed  all  European  lines  of 
oceanic  communication  at  their  most  vital  point — 
that  of  their  convergence  and  dispersion.  As  an 
island  fortress  placed  in  the  center  of  a  waterway 
commands,  on  all  sides,  the  entrance  to  a  harbor, 
so  England,  in  a  larger  sense,  was  placed  before 
Europe. 

5.  The  extremities  of  British  sea  power  have  here- 
tofore rested  upon  those  parts  of  the  world  devoid 
of  naval  strength.     The  Atlantic  radii  terminated 

174 


LIMITATIONS    OF    NAVAL    WARFARE 

in  the  sparsely  inhabited  regions  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  and  the  wastes  of  the  south  coast  of 
Africa.  The  radii  of  the  Indian  Ocean  ended  in 
India  and  the  uninhabited  islands  of  the  Indian 
Ocean.  The  Pacific  radii  terminated  in  the  ex- 
hausted civilization  of  east  Asia  and  in  barren  or 
savage  islands.  The  power  that  might  affect  Brit- 
ish command  of  the  sea  was  relegated  to  Europe, 
and  was  there  aborted  in  its  inception. 

All  of  these  conditions  have  changed.  The 
western  Atlantic,  where  once  the  radii  of  British 
naval  power  rested  upon  the  security  of  savage 
solitudes,  is  now  patrolled  by  great  navies  politi- 
cally and  militarily  aHen  to  British  supremacy.  In 
the  eastern  Atlantic,  in  the  environs  of  the  seas 
where  is  situated  the  base  of  the  Empire,  are  other 
alien  powers  approaching  a  naval  equality  with  that 
of  Britain  and  reversing  those  former  conditions 
that  made  possible  British  naval  supremacy.  Europe 
now  threatens  the  radii  of  British  naval  power  at 
their  inception,  while  the  naval  expansion  of  Medi- 
terranean powers,  once  non-existent,  severs  the  main 
line  connecting  the  center  of  the  Empire  with  its 
termini  in  the  Pacific.  In  that  vast  ocean,  as  in 
the  Atlantic,  those  solitudes  which  were  once  the 
exterior  bases  of  British  naval  power  now  no  longer 
exist.  The  American  republics  dominate  the  east- 
em  Pacific  as  they  do  the  western  Atlantic,  while 
the  western  Pacific  has  passed  under  the  naval 
dominion  of  an  Asian  nation. 

175 


THE    DAY    OF   THE    SAXON 

Heretofore  British  naval  supremacy  has  depended 
upon  the  maintenance  of  its  superiority  by  the  con- 
trol of  two  localities — the  west  coast  of  Europe,  ad- 
jacent to  the  British  Islands,  and  the  Mediter- 
ranean. So  long  as  these  two  theaters  of  maritime 
war  were  mastered  all  exterior  seas  were  subject  to 
British  control. 

The  effectiveness  of  this  early  sea  power  resulted 
not  so  much  from  its  combative  pre-eminence  as 
from  its  political  absolutism,  its  freedom  from  inter- 
national control  and  restriction.  But  as  old  con- 
ditions passed  away  the  absolute  character  of  its 
dominion  over  vast  unfrequented  seas  disappeared 
before  the  rise  of  great  nations  in  the  west  and  east. 
Then  the  restriction  of  insular  maritime  preroga- 
tives by  international  interference  followed  and  have 
altered,  in  their  e  pression,  the  principles  that  once 
conserved  British  sea  power. 

The  simultaneous  development  of  naval  power  in 
Europe,  the  Mediterranean,  the  western  Atlantic, 
the  eastern  Atlantic,  and  the  Pacific  has  resulted 
in  this  portentous  state  of  affairs,  that,  while  the 
naval  expansion  of  European  states  approaches  a 
naval  equality  with  the  total  British  maritime  forces, 
the  Empire's  exterior  bases  and  their  lines  of  com- 
munication are  already  dominated  by  alien  navies 
to  the  extent  that  only  a  withdrawal  of  the  main 
fleets  from  the  defense  of  the  United  Kingdom  can 
diminish  the  naval  supremacy  of  these  distant 
nations  in  their  respective  seas. 

176 


LIMITATIONS    OF    NAVAL   WARFARE 

The  inadequacy  of  the  British  navy  is  due  not 
alone  to  a  lack  of  corresponding  military  power, 
but  to  the  policy  of  arbitrarily  determining  its  ex- 
pansion by  the  formula  of  the  European  two-power 
maxim,  when  its  development  must  alone  be  deter- 
mined by  dangers  threatening  the  Empire  as  a 
whole — her  exterior  Hnes  and  bases  as  well  as  the 
interior. 

As  the  theater  of  war  is  distant  from  the  United 
Kingdom  and  approaches  the  main  base  of  the 
enemy  the  Empire's  naval  capacity,  regardless  of 
niimerical  superiority,  decreases  proportionately. 
Because  of  this  principle  the  danger  of  foreign  naval 
expansion  in  distant  seas  increases  in  constant  pro- 
gression. IMoreover,  as  the  naval  power  of  a  nation 
situated  on  the  exterior  lines  and  bases  of  the  Em- 
pire is  augmented  the  insecurity  of  the  interior  lines 
increases  in  proportion,  regardless  of  European  naval 
growth.  When,  therefore,  British  naval  power  is 
reduced  to  the  state  that  it  is  incapable  of  protecting 
its  exterior  lines  and  bases  simultaneously  with  the 
defense  of  its  interior  lines,  the  end  is  at  hand.  The 
complexity  of  modem  international  relationship  is 
such  that  it  demands  the  simultaneous  defense  of 
two  or  more  frontiers.  This  necessity  is  especially 
true  of  the  British  Empire,  because  of  the  constant 
convergence  of  all  nations  toward  those  dominions 
and  interests  incorporated  in  the  Empire. 

The  area  of  an  ocean  is  never  the  same  during 
any  two  periods  of  time.     As  human  inteUigence 

177 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

progresses  its  vastness  diminishes.  In  ancient  times 
the  oceans  merged  into  and  were  part  of  the  Infinite. 
Only  gods  traversed  them.  Man  has  now  pilfered 
what  these  gods  once  possessed.  He  has  looted 
Olympus.  He  whispers  across  oceans.  His  voice 
is  heard  in  its  depths,  his  cries  overhead.  Yet  he 
is  unconscious  of  the  limitations  of  his  thievery. 

When  the  seas  shrink  the  means  assiiring  their 
control  must  be  increased. 

The  lessening  significance  of  sea  control,  as  di- 
vorced from  political  domination  and  military  power, 
is  due  to  conditions  heretofore  not  experienced  by 
the  human  race.  These  are  reducible  to  two  gen- 
eral phases.  The  progression  of  mechanical  in- 
vention, whereby  the  curtailment  of  distance  has  so 
altered  or  destroyed  old  miHtary  limitations  that 
their  laws  and  axioms  are  now  useless. 

To  reduce  distance  is  to  increase  the  convergence 
of  international  interests.  To  diminish  space,  geo- 
graphical and  political,  is  to  merge  small  states  into 
greater  units.  This  passage  is  war.  This  unifica- 
tion conflict.  Mankind,  like  metals,  is  welded  to- 
gether by  fire  and  by  blows. 

When  communicable  means  are  increased  in  num- 
ber, capacity,  and  speed,  the  world  undergoes  a 
corresponding  shrinkage.  In  the  process  of  this 
contraction  there  results  a  greater  intensity  in  po- 
litical expansion,  a  corresponding  development  of 
military  capacity  to  wage  war.  The  delimitation 
of  distance  by  science,  in  its  relationship  to  warfare, 

178 


LIMITATIONS    OF    NAVAL    WARFARE 

is  nowhere  more  emphatic  than  upon  the  seas,  or 
more  decisive  in  its  effects. 

The  decrease  of  oceanic  space  lessens  propor- 
tionately the  power  of  insular  nations  to  command 
the  seas. 

During  the  preinventive  age  the  dominion  of  the 
oceans  fell  to  insular  states,  because  their  national 
evolution  depended  primarily  upon  their  oceanic 
expansion.  The  reverse  of  this  condition  deter- 
mined the  expansion  of  continental  states,  their 
extension  of  empire  being  almost  invariably  re- 
stricted to  land.  The  sea  is  only  a  means  to  an 
end.  In  its  entirety  it  is  no  more  than  a  desert 
across  which  pass  the  highways  of  the  world.  Here- 
tofore it  was  not  necessary  for  continental  nations 
to  traverse  them,  since  their  immediate  resources 
not  only  exceeded  the  demand,  but  their  production 
involved  less  labor  and  less  time  and  less  risk  than 
was  alone  involved  in  crossing  the  half -known  ocean 
wastes. 

Insular  nations,  on  the  other  hand,  were  obhged 
to  cross  seas  not  only  on  account  of  the  limitations 
of  their  resources,  but  because  the  first  outward 
movement  involved  the  sea.  The  necessity  of  its 
mastery  increased  concurrently  with  the  necessity 
of  insular  expansion. 

Science  has  now  not  only  reduced  the  passage  of  seas 
from  months  to  days  and  brought  all  nations  into 
competition  for  these  highways,  but  it  has  so  aug- 
mented the  hunger  of  all  peoples,  continental  as  well 

179 


THE    DAY    OF   THE    SAXON 

as  insiilar,  that  the  possession  of  the  undeveloped 
resources  of  the  world  is  essential  to  their  pro- 
gression and  survival. 

The  more  vast  the  oceans  were,  as  due  to  the 
Hmited  ability  to  cross  them,  the  more  were  they 
given  over  to  the  undisputed  dominion  of  insular 
powers.  When,  however,  the  economic  necessity  of 
continental  nations  forced  them  overseas  at  a  time 
when  science  had  abridged  oceanic  vastness  so  that 
to  cross  the  seas  was  not  relatively  longer  than  to 
pass  their  land  frontiers,  they  entered  into  com- 
petition for  their  possession.  It  is  this  struggle 
with  which  we  are  now  concerned. 

When  the  supremacy  of  insular  nations  is  alone 
dependent  upon  maritime  strength,  it  is  soon  de- 
stroyed. 

In  the  ruins  of  Carthage  is  to  be  found  the  epitome 
of  this  credulity. 

We  have  already  shown  that  the  security  of  an 
insular  empire  is  determined,  not  by  the  defense 
of  its  own  shores,  but  by  the  control  of  the  coasts 
encompassing  the  sea  in  which  it  is  situated.  This 
defense  must  necessarily  be,  in  many  instances, 
miUtary  rather  than  naval.  Continental  nations 
now  competing  with  the  Saxon  for  the  control  of 
the  seas  are  all  converging  upon  the  British  Empire, 
since  a  passage  from  their  shores  to  the  seas  is  an 
infringement  of  the  dominions  of  this  insular  nation. 

Sea  power  in  an  insular  empire  is  not  measured 
by  its  ships  of  war,  but  solely  by  its  capacity  to  pre- 

i8o 


LIMITATIONS    OF    NAVAL    WARFARE 

vent  military  superiority  in  any  state  placed  upon  the 
external  shores  of  the  sea  in  which  it  is  located. 
This  capacity  is  primarily  inherent  not  in  naval  but 
in  military  power.  Whenever  a  continental  state 
abuts  upon  the  sea  in  which  is  situated  an  insular 
kingdom  and  acquires  a  relative  equality  in  mari- 
time power,  the  probabilities  of  eventual  victory 
rest  entirely  with  the  continental  nation. 

In  the  loose,  irresponsible  way  by  which  man 
defines  conditions  are  we  to  look  for  that  endless, 
depthless  bog  that  swallows  up  so  much  of  his 
tentative  wisdom,  and  in  due  time  his  empires  and 
his  gods.  To  this  error  in  definition  we  must  attrib- 
ute the  present  misconception  of  the  term  "con- 
trol of  the  sea."  This  only  means  the  control  of 
the  sea  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  or  defending 
lands  segregated  by  oceanic  space.  When,  how- 
ever, an  attack  upon  these  territories  is  equally 
feasible  by  land  frontiers,  then  the  "control  of  the 
sea"  becomes  no  more  than  a  hopeless,  delusive 
phrase.  The  importance  of  sea  control  to  military 
enterprise  is  only  as  a  safe  means  of  communication 
between  theaters  of  war  separated  by  oceanic  space. 
The  value  of  the  mastery  of  these  lines  is  deter- 
mined, not  on  account  of  the  lines  per  se,  but  the 
worth  of  the  territories  at  both  ends  and  the  degree 
of  power  exercised  over  these  lands  by  the  pos- 
session of  their  sea-lines  of  communication.  Prior 
to  this  mechanical  age  the  control  of  the  sea  deter- 
mined  the   political   and   economic   supremacy   of 

i8i 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

sea  power  and  its  mastery  over  all  lands  dependent 
upon  it.  With  the  increasing  utilization  of  mechani- 
cal inventions,  as  applied  to  locomotion  and  com- 
munication, the  sea-lines  lost  their  exclusive  sig- 
nificance while  land-lines  of  international  communi- 
cation increased  in  importance.  To-day  European 
intercommunication  is  by  land  rather  than  by  sea. 
Europe  moves  on  Asia,  Russia  on  India  and  the  ex- 
treme Orient,  by  landlnstead  of ,'as  formerly,  by  sea. 
To-morrow  all  of  Asia  and  Africa,  as  well  as  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  w^ill  be  included  in  this  alter- 
nate route  by  which  continental  nations  may  ex- 
tend their  sovereignty  over  the  weaker  states  of 
their  continents  indifferent  to  the  activity  of  naval 
power  as  exercised  by  insular  kingdoms. 

It  is  at  this  point  that  we  are  brought  to  the  con- 
templation of  a  strange  and,  for  insular  nations,  por- 
tentous anomaly — the  simultaneous  struggle  of  aU 
great  continental  powers  to  secure  maritime  su- 
premacy not  only  in  their  adjacent  seas,  but  over  the 
world.  This  is  not  due  to  the  old  principles  of  in- 
sular sea  power,  but  is  the  result  of  economic  problems 
applied  to  old  continental  nations  impelling  them 
toward  the  resources  of  unexploited  continents. 

The  shrinkage  of  oceanic  space  has,  by  bringing 
continental  nations  into  closer  contact,  decreased 
insular  significance  and  increased  the  universality 
and  intensity  of  continental  struggles  and  the  ne- 
cessity to  secure  control  of  the  intervening  sea-lines 
whose  distance  diminishes  with  each  inventive  decade. 

182 


LIMITATIONS    OF    NAVAL    WARFARE 

As  the  seas  grow  smaller  in  their  traversible  time, 
their  control  by  insular  nations  lessens  in  almost 
exact  proportion.  These  two  simultaneous  though 
diametric  movements  result  in  a  third,  the  irrup- 
tion of  continental  states  upon  the  sea  without  a 
diminution  of  their  military  capacity  to  expand  or 
defend  themselves  by  land. 

It  is  through  this  trinitation  made  possible  by 
human  progress  that  the  power  of  insular  kingdoms 
grows  less  and  less.  The  diminution  of  insular  naval 
power  is  not  the  result  of  war.  It  is  the  work  of 
peace;  a  progression  toward  continental  supremacy 
instead  of  insular.  This  movement  is  not  apparent 
in  peace.  It  only  manifests  itself  in  war  in  greater 
or  lesser  degree  according  to  the  significance  of  the 
combatants. 

The  preliminary  destruction  of  British  supremacy 
is  confined  to  peace,  and  is  inherent  in  four  ante- 
bellum conditions,  two  positive  and  two  negative : 

1.  The  increasing  economic  independence  of  con- 
tinental states  from  insular  command  of  the  sea. 

2.  The  increasing  political  dominance  of  con- 
tinental states  in  determining  the  character  of  in- 
ternational naval  restrictions  and  immunities. 

1.  The  increasing  economic  dependence  of  insular 
kingdoms  upon  continental  productions. 

2.  The  decreasing  power  of  insular  nations  in 
international  tribunals  where  ordinances  regulating 
naval  warfare  are  formulated. 

There  are  in  the  world  only  two  insular  empires; 

183 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

all  other  states  are  continental.  In  international 
conferences  where  declarations  are  made  and  agreed 
to  for  the  regulation  of  international  peace  and  war 
those  laws  favorable  to  the  continuance  of  insular 
supremacy  upon  the  seas  and  correspondingly  detri- 
mental to  the  extension  of  continental  sea  power 
diminish  as  the  numerical  disproportion  between 
continental  and  insular  nations  increases. 

Because  of  this  fatal  growth  of  continental  power 
over  international  conferences,  we  witness  at  each 
of  these  congresses  a  diminution  of  those  naval 
prerogatives  that  constitute  the  essential  principles 
of  insular  power  and  survival.  This  determination, 
on  the  part  of  the  greater  continental  states,  to  de- 
prive sea  nations  in  the  time  of  peace  of  their  pe- 
culiar advantages  to  wage  naval  war  will  continue 
until  the  continental  states  secure  their  approximate 
elimination  from  the  international  regulations  of 
maritime  war. 

These  changes  will  be  economic  rather  than  mili- 
tary, since  naval  war  is  not  a  decisive  factor  when 
waged  between  an  insular  and  a  continental  state. 
It  is  basically  restricted  to  the  preservation  of  the 
economic  freedom  of  belligerents.  Continental  pow- 
ers will,  therefore,  insist  upon  the  limitation  of 
neutral  shipping  and  an  extension  of  the  contraband 
of  war.  When  they  extend  the  contraband  to  include 
necessities  vital  to  the  life  of  a  nation,  as  food-stuffs, 
and  at  the  same  time  limit  the  neutrality  of  shipping 
to  the  degree  that  neutral  vessels  conveying  these 

184 


LIMITATIONS    OF    NAVAL    WARFARE 

necessities  to  the  ports  of  either  belligerent  are  sub- 
ject to  capture  and  destruction,  the  capacity  of  an 
insular  nation  to  wage  war  on  a  basis  of  equality 
ends. 

An  insular  state  has  no  neutral  frontiers. 

Every  port  of  entry  belonging  to  a  continental 
state,  except  on  the  seaboard,  is  neutral. 

Modem  economic  conditions  are  now  universal  in 
the  production  and  the  demand  of  human  neces- 
sities. This  economic  universality,  together  with 
the  development  of  overland  transportation,  ren- 
ders continental  nations,  with  their  neutral  land 
frontiers,  immune  from  the  activity  of  such  mari- 
time laws.  Its  only  effect  in  oversea  products  is 
an  overland  transshipment  through  the  territories 
of  an  adjacent  neutral  state. 

In  this  dreadful,  silent  conflict  of  peace  we  witness 
the  first  crumbhng-away  of  Saxon  naval  power. 


IV 

SAXON   STRUGGLE    FOR   SURVIVAL — RUSSIA 

National  Greatness  Based  on  Political  Future. — Principles  Pre- 
scribing Naval  Activity. — Principles  Governing  Probabilities  of 
Victory  or  Defeat  in  War. — Power  Exercised  Through  Control 
of  Sea  Decreases  as  Overland  Communication  Increases. — Navy 
Useless  in  Attack  on  India  by  Russia. — Laws  Governing  De- 
fense of  India. 

THE  destruction  of  an  empire  precedes  the  war 
that  wrecks  it.  Such  a  war  is  not  the  cause; 
it  is  only  the  cuhnination  of  national  ruin,  the  con- 
flagration and  wild  clamor  that  mark  its  end. 

Disastrous  wars  are  the  failures  of  peace. 

One  must  look  to  the  peace  that  preceded  an 
international  struggle  to  determine  its  issue,  and 
never  to  the  war  itself.  This  error  in  failing  to 
differentiate  between  real  and  apparent  causes  leads 
nations  to  trust  themselves  to  the  luck  of  war. 
Yet  cause  and  effect  are  not  dice,  nor  natural  laws 
a  game  of  chance. 

God  does  not  gamble. 

The  defense  of  a  nation,  like  its  progression,  is 
determined  by  conditions  over  which  national  de- 
sire or  character  have  no  mastery.  While  social 
progression  is  as  flexible  as  its  evolution  is  rapid, 

1 86 


SAXON    STRUGGLE    FOR    SURVIVAL 

military  transition  is  governed  by  no  such  impulsion. 
Its  inflexibility  increases,  instead  of  disappearing, 
with  each  augmentation  of  militant  decadence.  The 
failure  to  acknowledge  the  mutability  of  govern- 
mental institutions  is  the  constant  recurring  cause 
of  national  dissolution. 

To  prevent  national  decadence  due  to  the  mili- 
tant indifference  of  its  military  character  consti- 
tutes the  first  elements  of  a  nation's  defense.  To 
prevent  the  expansion  of  those  nations  whose  in- 
terests are  convergent  is  the  second.  These  are 
correlative  and  basic  conditions  upon  which  depends 
national  security,  and  which  the  Saxon  has  within 
the  last  decade  abandoned. 

As  the  eventual  destruction  of  an  empire  is  deter- 
mined by  the  militant  expansion  of  surrounding 
states  plus  its  own  recession,  the  first  principle  of 
defense  is  to  stop,  not  only  the  retrogression  of  the 
empire,  but  the  corresponding  extension  of  those 
states  whose  political  and  geographical  interests  are 
or  may  become  convergent.  The  ability  of  British 
naval  power  alone  to  accomplish  this  has  been 
brought  to  an  end. 

The  political  and  geographical  expansion  of  other 
nations  is  now  taking  place  in  direct  ratio  to,  not 
the  present,  but  the  eventual  shrinkage  or  dissolu- 
tion of  the  British  Empire. 

National  greatness  is  based  upon  the  political 
future;  decadence  upon  the  present;  destruction 
upon  the  past. 

13  187 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

The  elements  that  now  constitute  the  basis  of 
British  Imperial  defense  are  the  antitheses  of  those 
conditions  that  brought  about  its  creation.  The 
determinate  factors  of  that  period  necessitated  a 
great  navy  supplemented  only  by  inferior  land  forces. 
Now,  however,  the  maintenance  and  progress  of  the 
Empire  is  conditioned  by  the  salient  characteristics 
of  this  era,  and  not  those  of  three  hundred  years  ago. 

There  is  no  security  for  a  nation  constituted  as 
the  British  Empire,  except  in  the  positive  prohibition 
of  convergent  expansion  on  the  part  of  other  nations. 
At  one  time  this  was  accomplished  by  the  British 
navy,  and  so  long  as  the  principal  means  of  inter- 
national association  and  intercourse  were  restricted 
to  and  by  the  sea  through  the  inadequacy  of  over- 
land transportation,  any  tentative  extension  of 
political  power  inimical  to  British  supremacy  was 
circumscribed  by  its  naval  forces.  Had  not  land 
intercommunication  progressed  to  the  point  it  has 
now  attained,  or  were  all  nations  insular,  the  su- 
premacy of  the  British  navy  would  still  maintain 
its  old  mastery  over  the  world. 

The  reversal  of  the  burden  of  war  to  the  land 
forces  of  the  Empire  is  due  to  the  inability  of  its 
naval  forces  to  retard  the  expansion  of  those  nations 
whose  growth  can  only  take  place  at  the  expense 
or  destruction  of  the  Empire.  The  elimination  of 
British  sovereignty  from  the  Western  Hemisphere; 
the  expansion  of  Asiatic  nations;  the  extension  of 
Germanic  power  in  Europe  and  Asia  Minor;    the 

i88 


SAXON    STRUGGLE    FOR    SURVIVAL 

passage  of  Russian  sovereignty  over  Persia  and 
India  are,  as  we  will  hereafter  show,  in  no  way 
concerned  with  the  power  of  the  British  navy. 

As  we  now  pass  from  the  consideration  of  prin- 
ciples that  prescribe  the  limitation  of  British  naval 
activity  to  their  application,  we  will  restrict  our 
examination  of  these  changes  to  two  extremes: 

1.  Imperial  dissolution  due  to  the  seizure  or  the 
destruction  of  its  base. 

2.  Imperial  dissolution  through  the  invasion  and 
shrinkage  of  its  most  remote  frontiers. 

It  is  by  showing,  in  these  two  extreme  theaters 
of  war,  the  uselessness  of  naval  power  alone  to  pre- 
serve the  integrity  of  the  Empire,  that  we  establish 
the  invariability  of  these  principles  in  all  inter- 
mediate theaters  governed  by  the  same  conditions. 
We  have  heretofore  laid  down  as  laws  certain  mod- 
em factors  that  control  the  means  and  conduct 
of  war  between  insular  and  continental  states. 
These  conditions  are  not  new.  They  are  as  old  as 
war  itself.  It  is  their  transmutation  through  the 
medium  of  modem  science  that  makes  them  appear 
strange  and  unreasonable  to  the  human  mind.  It 
is  because  of  man's  adherence  to  established  customs 
and  his  unwillingness  to  depart  from  the  ideals  of 
his  forefathers  that  we  are  conscious  of  his  inability 
to  accept  these  principles,  though  evolved  out  of  his 
old  labors  and  triumphs  and  disasters.  Because  of 
this  refusal  he  continues  to  build  up  his  empires, 
only  to  dwell  in  their  ruins. 

189 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

We  know,  from  the  study  of  peace  conditions  pre- 
ceding the  extinction  of  great  empires,  the  cause  that 
led  to  their  dissolution.  We  know,  moreover,  that 
the  acquisition  of  such  knowledge  was  possible  to 
these  nations  prior  to  their  destruction.  But,  owing 
to  the  fact  that  a  nation  is  never  more  vain  of  its 
strength  than  on  the  eve  of  destruction,  this  knowl- 
edge passes  with  their  vanity  into  the  slag  and  cin- 
ders of  their  ruin. 

We  cannot  foretell  the  conduct  of  future  wars 
conditioned  by  transient  elements — the  expedients 
of  man  and  time  and  place — but  we  are  able  to  deter- 
mine the  consummation  of  definite  struggles  within 
specific  theaters  of  war  by  ascertaining  during  the 
peace  that  precedes  the  conflict  the  basic  factors 
that  constitute,  in  the  final  quotient,  victory  or 
defeat.     These  are  reducible  to  three  principles: 

1.  When  the  preparations  of  two  belligerents, 
during  the  preceding  peace,  are  opposed,  one  hasten- 
ing away  from  and  the  other  toward  war,  the  prob- 
abilities of  victory  belong  to  the  warlike  nation 
in  proportion  to  the  influence  their  respective  in- 
clinations exercise  over  the  ideals  of  the  state.  This 
is  so  absolute  that  history  has  recorded  no  exception. 

2.  When  identical  victories  have  not  identical 
results,  but  possess  different  values  to  each  belliger- 
ent, then  the  probabilities  of  final  success  belong 
to  that  belligerent  whose  strategic  and  military  ad- 
vantages give  to  his  victories  a  maximum  value. 
This  is  applicable  to  the  military  relationship  exist- 

190 


SAXON    STRUGGLE    FOR    SURVIVAL 

ing  between  Germany  and  the  British  Empire.  A 
British  naval  victory  only  transfers  the  theater  of 
war  from  the  sea  to  the  land;  a  German  victory  de- 
stroys the  Empire. 

3.  When  the  forces  of  one  belligerent  are  inca- 
pable of  acting  against  the  forces  of  the  other  in  the 
determinate  theater  of  war  because  of  its  composi- 
tion, then  victory  goes  to  the  combatant  who  pos- 
sesses that  capacity.  In  a  war  between  England 
and  Russia,  if  the  decisive  theater  is  the  sea,  we  are 
cognizant  of  British  victory;  but  if  the  area  of  com- 
bat upon  which  the  war  is  to  be  ultimately  de- 
cided is  Persia  and  India,  the  inutility  of  the  navy 
is  apparent. 

When  we  ascertain,  under  varying  conditions, 
what  is  the  maximum  power  necessary  to  assure 
victory  and  then  gain  that  power,  we  are  able  to 
determine  not  only  the  means  to  the  end,  but  the 
end  itself.  Russia,  failing  to  estimate  the  power 
necessary  to  conquer  Japan,  was  herself  defeated. 
Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  judged  differently.  She 
did  not  commit  herself  to  the  erroneous  belief  which 
now  enmeshes  the  British  Empire — the  belief  that 
naval  victory  constitutes  final  success.  Japan, 
measuring  with  exactitude  the  limitations  and  spe- 
cific functions  of  her  navy,  built  up  her  land  forces 
to  that  degree  of  power  plus  strategic  advantages 
that  would  insure  to  her  the  probabilities  of  victory, 

The  failure  of  the  Saxon  race  to  realize  the  limita- 
tions of   naval   force   under   modern   conditions   is 

191 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

primarily  due  to  the  decadence  of  military  compre- 
hension. A  nation's  mentality  is  no  more  than  the 
composite  mentality  of  the  individuals  that  compose 
it.  The  degree  of  acuteness  in  judging  the  complex 
conditions  that  its  progression  involves  is  deter- 
mined by  the  mental  characteristics  predominant  in 
its  population.  The  viewpoint  of  a  tradesman  is 
not  that  of  a  soldier;  that  of  a  soldier  not  the  same 
as  a  lawyer.  Acuteness  and  exactitude  in  judgment 
are  the  result  of  their  respective  mental  environment, 
training,  and  inclination.  This  is  equally  true  of 
the  nation's  composite  mind  circumscribing  its  per- 
ception and  judgment  to  the  specific  character  de- 
termined by  popular  inclination. 

The  national  mind  of  Japan  is  militant.  Its 
comprehension  is  correspondingly  acute  and  exact 
in  the  military  phase  of  human  progress.  The  mod- 
em British  mind,  on  the  other  hand,  had  substi- 
tuted the  pre-eminence  of  the  individual  for  that  of 
the  state  and  the  evasiveness  of  the  legal  mind  for 
the  perception  of  the  soldier.  Brilliancy  is  reduced 
to  individual  achievement.  The  power  and  grandeur 
of  the  state  disintegrate,  and  the  nation  enters 
upon  an  era  of  self-deception.  In  this  condition  of 
national  fraud  military  perception  departs  from  the 
common  mind,  leaving  only  to  a  minority  that  old 
militant  omniscience  which  makes  possible  the  sur- 
vival of  a  race. 

Militancy  is  the  palladium  God  gives  once  to  each 
race.     It  is  His  token  of  their  equality. 

192 


SAXON  STRUGGLE  FOR  SURVIVAL 

The  military  judgment  of  a  non-militant  public 
mind  is  worthless.  This  is  evident  in  the  divergent 
judgments  of  the  Japanese  and  British  nations  rela- 
tive to  the  modem  defense  and  progression  of  their 
respective  empires.  Both  are  insular,  and  both  are 
confronted  by  identic  conditions.  The  Japanese 
recognize  the  true  functions  and  limitations  of  naval 
power;  the  Saxons  do  not. 

For  an  insular  kingdom  to  understand  those  mod- 
em conditions  that  impose  upon  it  the  expansion  of 
its  naval  forces,  and  yet  at  the  same  time  circum- 
scribe its  maritime  power,  is  to  understand  a  para- 
dox only  intelligible  to  the  composite  intuition  of  a 
militant  state.  It  is  incomprehensible  to  the  popu- 
lar mind  of  a  commercial  state. 

This  paradox  is  composed  of  two  principles : 

1.  As  continental  states  in  their  expansion  pass 
without  the  maritime  control  of  insular  nations,  the 
more  essential  does  the  control  of  the  sea  become 
to  island  kingdoms,  since  their  naval  power  passes 
from  the  offensive  to  the  defensive. 

The  defeat  of  an  offensive  movement  is  retarda- 
tion.    The  defeat  of  a  defensive  position  is  disaster. 

2.  The  command  of  the  sea  means,  not  the  sea, 
but  the  nations  situated  upon  its  shores.  It  means 
the  control  of  their  lines  of  communication  and  the 
segregation  of  one  nation  from  another  to  the  advan- 
tage of  the  dominant  sea  power. 

As  overland  lines  of  international  communication 
increase  in  number  and  length  and  efficiency,  the 

193 


_THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

power  exercised  through  the  control  of  sea-routes 
diminishes  proportionately.  Once  it  was  necessary 
for  European  states  to  approach  the  world  by  the 
sea.  England,  in  command  of  the  sea,  circum- 
scribed and  conditioned  their  activities. 

Europe  now  moves  upon  Asia  and  Africa  by  land, 
not  by  sea.  The  United  States,  at  one  time  subject 
to  the  British  control  of  the  Atlantic,  now  moves  up 
and  down  the  Western  Hemisphere  by  rail. 

Until  recently  Russian  movement  in  force  against 
the  Far  East  and  India  was  restricted  to  the  sea. 
So  long  as  England  continued  in  control  of  the  sea- 
routes  to  India  and  the  Pacific,  these  theaters  of 
expansion  and  war  were  without  the  sphere  of 
Russia.  Now  all  is  changed.  The  sea  power  of  the 
British  Empire  has  no  longer  any  effect  upon  the 
expansion  of  Russia  in  eastern  Asia,  nor  her  advance 
upon  Persia  and  India. 

Unless  the  forces  of  a  nation  possess  specific  and 
decisive  power  in  one  or  more  of  the  three  phases 
of  war — the  strategic,  the  economic,  and  the  com- 
bative— then  those  forces  are  useless,  and  the  na- 
tion must  secure  other  ways  and  other  means  of 
conducting  war. 

It  is  in  the  examination  of  these  three  phases  of 
international  struggle  that  we  discover  the  useless- 
ness  of  the  British  navy  as  a  means  to  prevent  the 
conquest  of  India  and  Persia  or  the  expansion  of 
Russia  in  eastern  Asia. 

The  strategic  prohibition  of  the  British  navy 
194 


SAXON    STRUGGLE    FOR    SURVIVAL 

from  a  participation  in  this  conflict  is  due  to  a  single 
fact — the  sea  does  not  intervene  between  Russia 
and  the  extreme  Hmits  of  her  future  conquests.  In 
no  place  does  the  Russian  advance  come  in  contact 
with  the  sea,  except  at  the  conclusion  of  her  ex- 
pansion on  the  seaboard  of  eastern  Asia,  Persia, 
Asia  Minor,  or  India.  Only  when  Russia,  complet- 
ing her  conquest  of  these  regions,  attempts  to 
dominate  the  Pacific  or  Indian  Ocean  with  her  naval 
forces  do  the  British  fleets  become  a  factor  in  the 
struggle. 

The  inability  of  the  British  navy  to  prevent  the 
destruction  of  the  Empire  east  of  the  Suez  is  only 
partially  accepted,  since  truth  is  here  intercepted 
by  another  delusion — that  the  British  navy  can 
bring  about  the  economic  ruin  of  Russia,  even 
though  debarred  from  the  combative  sphere  of  this 
war. 

Though  the  international  economic  relationship 
has  been  entirely  altered  since  the  establishment  of 
the  British  Empire,  there  still  remains  unchanged, 
as  inflexible  as  it  was  in  the  beginning,  the  belief 
that  the  same  factors  still  control  the  trade  of  the 
world,  and  that  those  factors,  as  potent  as  they  are 
unchangeable,  belong  to  the  British  Isles.  To  the 
same  degree  that  this  was  true  at  one  time  it  is  un- 
true under  modern  conditions.  When  overland  com- 
munication between  continental  states  reached  that 
degree  of  efficiency  that  their  intercommunication 
in  speed  and  capacity  equaled  or  exceeded  that  by 

195 


THE    DAY   OF    THE    SAXON 

sea,  continental  nations  become  exempt  from  the 
economic  domination  held  by  insular  powers  through 
their  command  of  the  sea -routes  of  trade.  Now 
the  old^conditions  are,  and  in  the  future  will  be,  re- 
versed, and  freedom  from  circumscription  during 
war  has  passed  to  the  continental  states.  Economic 
dependence  and  complete  circumscription  during 
war  has  become  the  lot  of  insular  powers.  Nowhere 
is  this  law  of  economic  inviolability  now  conserved 
to  continental  states  more  clearly  shown  than  in  an 
attempted  economic  destruction  of  Russian  trade 
by  British  control  of  the  sea. 

Approximately  two-thirds  of  Russian  imports  and 
exports  are  by  land  frontiers,  which  makes  this  pro- 
portion immune  from  British  naval  power.  Of  the 
other  one-third,  or  bceanic  trade,  more  than  ninety  per 
cent,  is  carried  by  vessels  other  than  Russian.  Not 
one  per  cent,  of  Russian  trade  would  be  affected  in 
time  of  war  by  British  control  of  the  sea,  since  only 
one-third  of  its  trade  is  oceanic,  and  this  is  carried 
almost  entirely  by  neutral  vessels.  Should  it  be- 
come necessary  for  Russian  trade  to  abandon  oceanic 
waterways,  this  one- third  of  her  foreign  trade  would 
be  passed  to  the  sea  through  her  neutral  land 
frontiers,  leaving  the  entire  British  navy  to  stare 
and  wonder,  helpless  upon  the  seas. 

When  one  nation  contemplates  the  economic  sub- 
jugation of  another  nation  in  the  time  of  war,  its 
determination  must  be  governed  by  the  character 
of  the  enemy's  exports  and  imports.     If  the  enemy's 

196 


SAXON    STRUGGLE    FOR    SURVIVAL 

exports  are  principally  manufactured  goods,  and  its 
imports  food-stuffs,  then  its  economic  subjugation  is 
certain  if  the  routes  by  which  these  food-stuffs  are 
imported  are  seized.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
nation  has  abundance  of  food  and  its  imports  are 
principally  merchandise  and  manufactured  articles, 
then  its  economic  subjugation  is  impossible,  even  if 
all  the  routes  by  which  this  merchandise  is  carried 
are  seized. 

The  character  of  the  economic  interrelationship 
between  Russia  and  the  British  Empire  betrays  in 
itself  the  impossibiHty  of  British  aspirations.  So 
self-contained  is  Russia  that  ninety -seven  and 
one-half  per  cent,  of  her  exports  are  food-stuff's 
and  raw  material.  Russian  imports  consist  almost 
entirely  of  merchandise  and  manufactured  articles, 
and  of  these  imports  fifty -seven  per  cent,  are 
supplied  by  Germany.  On  the  other  hand,  Eng- 
lish imports  consist  almost  entirely  of  food-stuffs 
and  raw  material,  their  exports  consisting  in 
the  same  degree  of  manufactured  articles.  Rus- 
sian exports  to  the  United  Kingdom  are  food-stuffs 
and  raw  material;  England's  exports  to  Russia 
manufactured  goods  of  the  same  class  as  those  im- 
ported from  Germany.  For  England,  even  if  it  were 
possible,  to  stop  the  oceanic  trade  of  Russia,  the 
result  would  be  exactly  opposite  to  that  antici- 
pated: it  would  close  one  source  from  which  the 
United  Kingdom  derives  its  food  and  raw  materials. 
It  would  destroy  British  export  trade  to  Russia, 

197 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

and  would  increase  that  of  Germany  to  Russia  fifty 
per  cent.,  since  Great  Britain  does  not  supply  Russia 
with  a  single  article  that  is  not  at  the  present  time 
supplied  by  Germany. 

In  a  strategic  sense  we  witness  the  inutility  of 
the  British  navy  to  hinder  or  retard  the  Russian 
conquest  of  Asia,  and  in  its  economic  phase  we  wit- 
ness in  this  same  war  this  strange  paradox,  that 
the  utilization  of  the  naval  power  of  Great  Britain 
to  destroy  the  economic  trade  of  Russia  results 
disastrously  only  to  the  British  Empire,  while  Russia 
remains  economically  as  immune  as  though  the 
British  flag  were  not  upon  the  seas. 

The  defense  of  India  and  those  regions  dependent 
upon  it  belongs  wholly  to  the  land  forces  of  the 
Empire,  Yet  such  is  the  strategic  situation  govern- 
ing the  attack  and  defense  of  India — the  relative 
positions  of  the  Russian  and  Saxon,  as  they  cling 
to  the  northern  and  southern  slopes  of  the  Hindu- 
Kusch,  together  with  their  respective  lines  and 
bases — that  the  British  army,  as  it  now  exists,  could 
do  no  more  than  retard  for  a  moment  of  time  the 
progression  of  Russian  conquest. 

We  have  heretofore  shown  that  there  exists  in  the 
world  certain  places  that  have  for  mankind  a  strange 
and  fatal  significance,  in  that  they  give  direction 
to  his  conquests.  In  these  places  victories  are  de- 
cisive, and  defeats  mark  the  consummation  of  na- 
tional ruin.  These  places  are  the  doorways  through 
which  nations  come  and  go;    sometimes  arches  of 

198 


SAXON    STRUGGLE    FOR    SURVIVAL 

triumph;  sometimes  those  narrow  exits  through 
which  nations,  Hke  men,  pass  to  return  no  more. 
Herat  is  one  of  these  places;  Kabul  another.  In  all 
the  world  there  are  no  two  like  them.  Nowhere 
have  highways  resounded  with  the  burden  of  greater 
armies  or  echoed  with  the  triumph  of  greater  con- 
querors. More  than  two  thousand  years  ago  it 
was  said  that  he  who  possesses  the  key  to  Herat  can 
unlock  the  door  to  India,  and  now,  though  these  many 
centuries  have  passed,  it  remains  as  true  as  then. 

The  British  lines  are  four  hundred  and  sixty  miles 
south  of  this  city,  while  a  Russian  railroad  station 
is  eighty  miles  to  the  north.  While  only  now  and 
then  a  Saxon  gazes  furtively  down  upon  its  walls, 
there  is  never  a  time  when  watchers  on  its  towers 
cannot  discern  to  the  northward,  eastward,  and 
westward  the  camp-fires  of  Cossack  posts. 

Russian  advance  upon  India  is  by  two  ways:  on 
the  left  flank  by  Afghanistan,  and  on  the  right  flank 
by  Persia. 

The  primary  base  of  the  Russian  left  advance  is 
the  Turkestan  sphere.^  This  base  of  less  than  ten 
millions  of  people  contains  a  Russian  peace  army  of 
135,000  men;  its  center  at  Samarkand  is  less  dis- 
tant from  Herat  than  is  Chicago  from  New  York, 
while  the  primary  base  of  the  Russian  right  advance 
through  Persia  is  the  Caucasus  sphere  with  a  popu- 
lation of  eleven  million  and  a  peace  army  of  125,000 
men. 

1  Chart  III. 
199 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

The  secondary  bases  of  these  two  spheres  are  the 
Saratof .  sphere  on  the  left,  with  a  population  of 
sixteen  million  and  a  peace  army  of  170,000  men, 
and  the  Kharakof  sphere,  with  a  population  of 
forty-four  million  and  a  peace  army  of  450,000  men. 
These  secondary  spheres  are  common  to  both  the 
right  and  left  flanks,  and  are  no  greater  distance 
from  Herat  than  is  New  Orleans  from  New  York. 

From  these  four  spheres  ^  Russia  is  able  to  place 
in  the  field  880,000  men  without  affecting  the  mili- 
tary integrity  of  either  her  European  or  east  Asian 
frontiers  and  under  conditions  entirely  different 
from  those  controlling  the  Russo-Japanese  conflict, 
where  the  theater  of  war  was  more  than  six  thousand 
miles  distant  from  these  same  spheres.  Yet  Russia 
was  able  to  place  in  the  field  more  than  one  million 
inhabitants. 

The  theater  of  war  within  which  is  determined 
the  conquest  of  India  is  no  longer  vast,  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  governed  by  military  distances  such 
as  affect  the  march  of  armies  less  great  and  less 
difficult  than  those  that  mark  the  conquests  and 
triumphs  of  Napoleon.  This  theater  of  war  is  cir- 
cumscribed within  an  area  no  greater  than  was  the 
American  Civil  War.  During  the  campaigns  of 
that  struggle  the  food  and  munitions  of  the  Union 
armies  were  in  many  instances  carried  over  a  third 
greater  distance  than  now  intervenes  between 
Russia  and  the  strategic  center  of  Indian  conquest. 

1  Chart  III. 
200 


SAXON    STRUGGLE    FOR    SURVIVAL 

The  defense  of  India  is  governed  by  the  applica- 
tion of  two  laws.  Both  are  the  product  of  condi- 
tions over  which  the  Saxon  has  no  control. 

1.  The  defeat  of  Russia  upon  any  of  her  frontiers 
other  than  that  of  India  or  Persia  not  only  does  not 
retard  her  advance  upon  India,  but  accelerates  it. 

2.  The  defense  of  the  Indian  frontiers  is  deter- 
mined, not  by  British  advice,  but  by  the  capacity 
and  progression  of  Russian  offense. 

It  must  be  a  reaction  instant  in  its  application, 
proportionate  in  its  intensity,  and  as  continuous  as 
the  causes  that  gave  to  it  its  initial  impulse. 


V 


SAXON    STRUGGLE    FOR   SURVIVAL — GERMANY 

Military  Relationship  of  Germany  and  England. — Source  and  Cause 
of  German  Expansion. — Specific  Preparation  for  War. — Results 
of  Naval  Engagements. — Theaters  of  War  in  Relation  to  Base. — 
Belgium,  Holland,  and  Denmark. — British  Policy  toward  Europe. 
— Principles  Governing. 

NATIONS  are  more  often  than  otherwise  given 
over  to  self-deception;  but  in  no  instance  is 
the  falsity  of  their  deductions  more  pronounced  than 
in  their  ideas  concerning  the  mechanical  means  of 
war  and  the  undue  pre-eminence  they  give  to  them. 
Only  when  these  means  are  restricted  to  one  com- 
batant do  they  affect  the  outcome  of  war.  Inven- 
tions are  generally  regarded  only  in  the  wonder  of 
their  own  mechanism,  and  not  in  their  exact  appli- 
cation to  war.  There  is  no  differentiation  made 
between  their  destructiveness  and  the  possibility 
of  using  them  at  a  time  and  place  where  they  will 
affect,  to  the  desired  degree,  the  combative  or  re- 
sistant power  of  the  enemy.  In  a  sense,  mechanical 
means  of  warfare  are  primarily  the  instruments  of 
the  offensive — man,  the  earth,  and  all  natural  forces 
constituting  the  defensive. 
The  making  and  invention  of  military  appliances, 

202 


SAXON  STRUGGLE  FOR  SURVIVAL 

from  the  time  when  man  in  his  old  vast  solitudes 
whittled  out  his  first  club  until  the  creation  of  the 
last  battle-ship,  has  been  one  long  ceaseless  labor  to 
secure  through  artificial  means  the  dominion  of  the 
offensive  over  the  defensive;  a  struggle  to  give  to 
the  inanimate  supremacy  over  the  living  forces  of 
nature.  This  can  never  be.  All  weapons  are 
limited  in  their  application,  and  are  designed  to 
overcome  not  general  but  specific  conditions.  Man 
and  nature  alone  constitute  the  universal  and  con- 
stant factors  of  war. 

With  every  new  military  invention  man  is  in- 
spired with  the  belief  that  war  is  at  an  end.  Yet 
each  succeeding  decade  betrays  the  illusion  of  such 
futile  hopes — the  inutility  of  mechanics  to  end  war 
or  to  exercise  over  it  any  effect  beyond  a  limited 
and  specific  sphere. 

It  has  been  due  to  this  abnormal  belief  that  the 
British  nation  has  exaggerated  the  power  of  its 
navy  in  extending  its  spheres  of  operations  to  regions 
it  cannot  reach,  and  the  doing  of  deeds  unknown  in 
war.  It  has  given  to  it  a  universality  it  does 
not  possess.  Its  command  over  great  nations  has 
decreased  with  each  successive  decade,  not  so  much 
through  the  application  by  other  states  of  greater 
instruments  of  war  as  by  means  that  have  first  to 
do  with  the  affairs  of  peace. 

Only  when  expansion  of  other  nations  con- 
verges upon  and  threatens  the  integrity  of  the 
British  Empire  by  sea  can  its  navy  prevent  the 
14  203 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

curtailment  of  its  sovereignty  or  the  dissolution  of 
the  Empire.  When  the  destructive  convergence  of 
other  nations  is  by  land,  as  has  just  been  shown  in 
the  expansion  of  Russia  toward  India,  Persia,  and 
eastern  Asia,  then  the  navy  must  give  way  to  those 
means  of  war  that  belong  to  land. 

The  military  relationship  of  Germany  to  the 
British  Empire  possesses  a  twofold  significance. 
While  the  Saxon  can  deal  with  Russia  only  on  land, 
or  Japan  only  by  sea,  the  conduct  of  a  war  with 
Germany  includes  both  land  and  sea.  The  severity 
of  this  struggle  will  be  equal  to  the  means  and  forces 
employed:  twice  as  great  as  against  a  continental 
state  strategically  placed,  as  Russia,  or  an  insular 
power,  as  Japan. 

Only  in  a  war  with  an  insular  nation  is  the  navy 
pre-eminent.  In  a  war  against  Russia  it  has  no 
place.  In  an  offensive  conflict  with  Germany  it  is 
of  secondary  importance.  The  "  British  navy  has 
one  duty  —  to  remain  supreme  in  its  sphere,  the 
sea.  From  the  beginning  to  the  end  it  is  restricted 
to  the  defensive.  The  army  alone  possesses  the 
power  capable  of  deciding  the  war  and  insuring  such 
peace  as  will  prolong  the  existence  of  the  Empire. 

As  it  is  essential  to  the  future  greatness  of  Ger- 
many to  destroy  Saxon  sovereignty  and  grow  great 
upon  its  ruins,  so  it  is  the  first  duty  of  the  British 
nation  to  arrest  or  destroy  German  power. 

The  failure  of  the  British  people  to  understand  the 
principles  that  impel  German  aggression  is  only  a 

204 


SAXON  STRUGGLE  FOR  SURVIVAL 

repetition  of  that  old  error  which  nations  make 
whenever  they  deal  with  conditions  that  involve 
themselves.  When  they  attempt  to  differentiate 
between  the  immaterial  and  the  immutable,  the 
transient  and  the  eternal,  all  that  w^hich  is  trivial 
and  fleeting  invariably  takes  precedence  and  controls 
their  activities. 

The  British  nation  does  not  understand  that  Ger- 
man expansion  is  governed,  not  by  the  passions  of 
her  people,  that  var^^  from  dawn  to  dusk;  nor  the 
ambitions  of  her  ministers,  that  ebb  and  flow  with 
the  rise  and  decHne  of  their  parties;  but  by  prin- 
ciples that  have  their  origin  in  natural  forces,  and, 
in  their  impulse  and  propulsion,  are  not  cognizant 
of  time  nor  place,  nor  the  hopes  and  fears,  nor  the 
valor  or  evasion,  of  mankind. 

When  the  convergence  of  two  races  reaches  the 
degree  of  acuteness  now  existing  between  the  Saxon 
and  the  Teuton,  it  invariably  results  in  war.  There 
is  no  instance  in  history  where  the  poHtical  relation- 
ship of  two  races,  approximating  that  which  now 
exists  between  the  British  and  German  Empires — 
where  one  exerts  its  utmost  to  prepare  for  war  and 
the  other,  by  evasion  and  subterfuge,  seeks  its  post- 
ponement— did  not  result  in  one  of  those  decisive 
wars  which  mark  with  fatal  invariability  the  end  of 
the  unmartial  race. 

In  the  national  misconception  of  war  and  the 
means  that  govern  its  conduct  under  varying  con- 
ditions, the  tendency  of  a  nation  is  to  throw  itself 

205 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

upon  the  protection  of  the  strongest  means  at  its 
disposal,  regardless  of  their  utility  or  actual  power, 
regardless  of  the  conditions  that  direct  and  deter- 
mine the  combat,  its  purposes,  or  theater  of  war. 
So  as  races  have  done  heretofore,  under  Hke  condi- 
tions the  British  nation  stakes  its  perpetuation  upon 
its  naval  forces. 

The  British  people  conceal  from  themselves  the 
true  source  and  cause  of  German  expansion.  They 
regard  it  in  the  same  hght  as  they  do  their  internal 
affairs.  To  them  it  is  as  transient  as  their  passions, 
as  mutable  as  their  ideals.  To  them  this  coming 
together  of  the  Teuton  and  the  Saxon  is  political 
instead  of  racial. 

It  is  in  consequence  of  these  two  errors — the  mis- 
taken conception  of  the  origin  of  the  approaching 
struggle,  its  causes  and  effects,  and  the  choice  of  the 
means  with  which  to  conduct  war — that  results  in 
a  third  and  determinate  error  assiuing  the  defeat 
and  dismemberment  of  the  Saxon  race.  This  error 
lies  in  the  choice  of  the  theater  of  war,  and,  though 
voluntarily  chosen  by  the  British  people,  it  consti- 
tutes the  last  place  where  war  should  be  waged  or 
battles  fought. 

The  purpose  of  an  Anglo-Teutonic  war  is  two- 
fold: that  of  Germany  to  destroy  British  sover- 
eignty and  create  a  Germanic  world  empire  upon 
its  ruins;  that  of  England  to  defend  its  possessions, 
to  arrest  the  miHtant  expansion  of  the  German  race 
and  limit  its  suzerainty  over  Europe.     The  task  of 

206 


SAXON  STRUGGLE  FOR  SURVIVAL 

Germany  is  simple ;  that  of  England  difficult.  With 
the  destruction  of  the  British  fleet,  British  capacity 
to  wage  war  is  at  an  end.  England  is  invaded. 
This  invasion  is  starvation.  Before  har\^est  there 
is  only  enough  food  in  the  United  Kingdom  to  last 
for  a  few  weeks;  after  the  gathering  of  the  crops 
only  enough  to  last  a  few  months.^  But  long  before 
physical  stan,'ation  sets  in  moral  starvation  ^ill 
have  accomplished  its  work. 

The  courage  of  a  populace  is  at  the  best  of  times 
anemic.  It  ever  has  and  ever  will  hover  near  the 
border-line  of  cowardice.  So  constant  is  it  in  cause 
and  effect  that  we  know  with  exactitude  the  manner 
and  degree  of  its  appUcation. 

The  ease  of  German  conquest  over  the  British 
people  is  due  to  three  factors: 

1.  The  insular  character  of  the  Empire,  which,  in 
modern  times,  is  the  most  precarious  of  all  national 
existence. 

2.  The  specific  character  of  German  preparation 
for  war  in  a  known  and  determinate  theater,  which 
gives  a  maximum  of  power  to  a  minimum  of  effort 
and  expense. 

3.  The  decHne  of  Saxon  militancy;  the  abandon- 
ment of  natural  frontiers;  the  supremacy  of  indi- 
\'idual  wants  over  aft'airs  of  state ;  the  disintegration 
of  racial  unit}^  and  the  evasion  by  the  masses  of 
their  obligations  to  the  Empire. 

Owing  to  these  conditions  the  task  of  Germany  in 

1  Report  of  Royal  Commission. 
207 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

bringing  about  the  dissolution  of  the  British  nation 
is  relatively  an  easy  one;  that  of  the  Saxon  pro- 
portionately difficult,  not  only  because  of  the  rea- 
sons given,  but  due  to  military  restrictions  which 
should  but  do  not  control  their  preparation  for  war. 
We  have  said  that  if  Germany  gains  control  of  the 
sea  the  war  is  brought  to  a  close  by  this  single  act,  and 
ends  in  the  downfall  of  the  Empire.  On  the  other 
hand,  should  the  British  navy  destroy  that  of  Ger- 
many, the  only  result  is  that  conditions  remain  the 
same  as  they  were  before  the  war,  with  this  excep- 
tion, that  the  United  Kingdom  is  exempt  from  im- 
mediate disaster.  But  this  victory  brings  England 
no  nearer  the  destruction  of  German  power  and 
its  potentialities  for  world  expansion  than  prior  to 
the  war.  Nothing  except  the  ruin  of  the  British 
navy  increases  German  sovereignty  in  Europe  more 
surely  than  the  defeat  of  her  own  fleets. 

The  British,  as  well  as  the  German,  Empire  pos- 
sesses a  definite  purpose  in  this  war  so  vital  that  its 
preparation  should  be  carried  on  with  the  same 
vigor,  the  same  intentness,  that  now  characterizes 
the  German.  Unless  the  British  Empire  is  able  to 
take  those  military  measures  that  will  result  in  the 
destruction  of  German  capacity  to  wage  war,  then 
its  naval  victories  are  useless. 

To  procrastinate  against  the  inevitable  is  the  cul- 
mination of  human  folly. 

The  degree  of  British  military  preparation,  its 
character  and  objective,  is  simple,  and  requires  no 

208 


SAXON  STRUGGLE  FOR  SURVIVAL 

discussion,  debate,  nor  hesitancy.  The  degree  and 
purpose  of  German  miHtary  power  alone  determine 
British  miHtary  preparation.  This  is  a  state  of 
preparedness  that  will  not  only  assure  victory  over 
German  armies,  but  control  over  the  means  out 
of  which  they  are  made  and  the  potentiaHties  that 
call  them  into  being. 

British  miHtary  deHnquency  is  not  alone  due  to 
these  factors  just  stated,  but  also  arises  from  a  mis- 
conception of  a  principle  that  governs  the  progress 
and  consummation  of  war — the  failure  to  differentiate 
between  a  theater  of  war  and  the  base,  to  under- 
stand that  what  constitutes  a  decisive  theater  for 
one  combatant  is  dangerous  in  a  like  degree  to  the 
other. 

In  this  approaching  struggle,  as  in  all  other  wars, 
both  nations  have  their  choice  of  the  theater  of 
war,  and  it  invariably  follows  that  the  selection  of 
one  is  the  danger  of  the  other.  It  can  be  considered 
as  a  military  maxim,  true  throughout  all  time  and 
under  all  conditions,  that,  to  the  nation  capable 
of  determining  the  theater  of  war  and  maintaining 
it,  the  chances  of  success,  as  determined  by  his- 
torical precedent,  stand  in  proportion  of  seven  to 
three. 

There  is  no  single  element  that  determines  event- 
ual victory  or  defeat  with  greater  certainty  than 
the  relationship  the  theater  of  war  bears  to  the 
combatants.  Great  victories  gained  in  a  wrongly 
chosen  theater  have  little  or  no  effect  upon  the  final 

209 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

result,  while  minor  victories  gained  at  strategic 
points  in  the  true  theater  of  war  possess  the  most 
definite  character. 

We  have  shown  the  relative  value  of  a  sea  victory 
to  Germany  and  to  the  British  Empire — decisive 
on  the  part  of  Germany;  without  effect  on  the  part 
of  England.  Because  of  this  the  true  theater  of 
war,  from  a  German  standpoint,  is  the  sea;  while  the 
only  decisive  victories  obtainable  by  the  Saxon  are 
from  land  battles  fought  on  or  adjacent  to  German 
soil.  This  is  a  cruel  truism,  but  one  that  must 
remain  so  long  as  the  hopes  of  the  Empire  are  based 
alone  upon  its  naval  forces. 

The  elemental  principles  of  warfare  remain  con- 
stant in  their  application,  though  the  means  of 
waging  war  vary  with  every  age,  every  alteration  of 
human  association  and  advances  made  in  science. 
Likewise  the  relative  value  of  a  base  to  the  theater 
of  war  remains  constant,  their  interdependability 
being  still  governed  by  the  same  principles  as  in 
former  times.  While  the  complexity  of  modem 
civilization  has  increased  the  value  and  vulnerability 
of  a  base  it  has  also  given  equal  importance  to  the 
theater  of  war  through  the  increased  decisiveness 
of  a  single  battle.  The  result,  therefore,  of  modern 
civilization  has  been  the  proportionate  increase  of 
the  vulnerable  character  of  the  base  and  the  de- 
cisive character  of  the  theater  of  war.  This  equable 
development  makes  necessary  a  greater  security 
and  increased  preparation  for  the  defense  of  a  base, 

2IO 


SAXON    STRUGGLE    FOR    SURVIVAL 

and  a  corresponding  ability  to  determine  the  theater 
of  war. 

The  belief  that  the  nearer  the  theater  of  war  is 
to  a  base  the  greater  its  advantage  must  now  be 
put  aside,  since  it  is  true  only  so  long  as  the  means  of 
transportation  are  Hmited.  In  war  distance  means, 
not  miles,  but  time  and  capacity.  Under  modem 
conditions  the  greater  the  geographical  distance  the 
main  base  or  nation  is  from  the  theater  of  war,  the 
longer  and  wath  least  hardship  can  it  conduct  the 
struggle,  provided  that  the  ratio  of  the  maximum 
distance  remains  constant  with  a  minimum  capacity 
and  rapidity  of  transportation  as  determined  by  the 
conditions  of  war. 

Every  advance  in  science  increases  the  proximity 
of  all  bases  and  theaters;  hence  a  corresponding  in- 
crease in  the  geographical  distance  between  a  theater 
of  war  and  base  augments  the  endurance  and  de- 
fensive capacity  of  the  nation,  while  the  offensive 
abihty  is  in  no  way  restricted  as  long  as  its  trans- 
portation facilities  are  provided  for  in  accordance 
with  the  law  just  given. 

Military  operations  can  have  only  one  true  ob- 
jective— the  destruction  of  the  enemy's  capacity  to 
wage  war  by  seizing  or  destroying  his  armies,  gov- 
ernment, or  resources.  Hence,  when  the  theater 
of  war  revolves  around  the  main  base,  which  is 
within  the  nation  itself,  the  chances  of  defeat,  all 
other  mihtary  conditions  being  equal,  are  three 
and  one-half  times  greater  than  when  the  theater 

211 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

of  war  is  at  a  distance  or  in  the  enemy's  terri- 
tory. 

In  great  and  widely  extended  nations,  as  that  of 
the  British,  there  are  many  bases  main  to  their 
specific  spheres,  but  secondary  as  regards  the  empire. 
The  United  Kingdom  differs  from  these  secondary 
bases  in  that  it  is  not  only  the  base  from  which 
must  be  directed  a  European  war,  but  is  also  the 
main  base  of  the  Empire. 

Whenever  the  English  nation  is  involved  in  war 
with  a  European  power  the  interests  of  the  entire 
Empire  are  affected.  But  when  the  United  King- 
dom is  itself  considered  by  the  British  people  as  the 
true  theater  of  war  in  a  conflict  with  a  European 
state,  and  preparation  for  war  made  upon  this  prin- 
ciple, then  the  day  of  the  Saxon  is  soon  over  and  his 
Empire  gone. 

In  a  European  war  the  surrounding  seas,  as  well 
as  the  United  Kingdom,  constitute  the  Saxon  base;  ^ 
since,  as  we  have  shown,  the  boundaries  of  an  insu- 
lar nation  are  not  its  own  coasts,  but  the  exterior 
shores  of  the  sea  in  which  it  is  situated.  The  seas 
surrounding  the  British  Islands  are  just  as  much  a 
part  of  the  British  base  as  the  Islands  themselves. 
To  prepare  to  carry  on  a  European  war  in  the 
United  Kingdom  or  upon  its  seas  is  to  commit  as 
great  an  error  as  is  to  be  found  in  military  history. 
The  British  base  reaches  to  the  shores  of  Europe. 
The  British  theater  of  war  only  begins  on  those 

» Chart  IV. 
212 


SAXON    STRUGGLE    FOR   SURVIVAL 

coasts  and  extends  eastward  to  that  vital  center 
which,  if  seized  or  destroyed,  ends  the  war. 

The  relative  position  of  the  German  base  and 
choice  of  the  theater  of  war  is  the  reverse  of  the 
above.  Were  it  not  for  the  interposition  of  Belgium, 
the  Netherlands,  and  Denmark,  the  coast-line  of  the 
North  Sea  would  constitute  a  line  of  demarcation; 
eastward  of  which  would  be  the  German  base  and 
the  Saxon  theater  of  war;  westward  the  English 
base  and  German  theater.^  The  intervention  of 
Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  and  Denmark  along  the 
line  that  limits  these  respective  bases  and  theaters 
of  war  affects  Germany  and  England  only  in  the 
time  of  peace,  when  warfare  is  viewed  in  all  that 
complexity  which  circumscribes  the  peaceful  associa- 
tion of  nations  and  belongs  in  no  way  to  the  brutal 
simplicity  of  war.  The  neutrality  of  these  three 
states,  whose  boundaries  are  coincident  with  those 
lines  of  military  demarcation  that  separate  the  Ger- 
man and  Saxon  races,  results  only  in  widening  that 
line  to  the  exact  width  of  their  territories.^  I 

The  neutraHty  of  a  minor  state,  once  it  is  included 
in  the  theater  of  war  waged  between  greater  nations, 
becomes  an  anomaly.  A  kingdom  in  such  a  posi- 
tion invariably  constitutes  an  area  over  which  war 
is  waged  until  one  or  the  other  combatant  is  capable 
of  incorporating  it  within  his  base  and  forcing  the 
conflict  into  the  territories  of  the  enemy.  The 
neutralization  of  these  three  countries  has  increased, 

»  Chapter  x,  book  i.  ^  Chart  IV. 

213 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

and  not  diminished,  the  probabiHties  of  war.  Only 
when  they  have  been  strategically  incorporated 
within  the  base  of  the  British  Empire,  their  eastern 
and  southern  boundaries  constituting  its  military 
frontiers  in  Europe,  will  it  be  possible  for  them  or 
the  Empire  to  endure. 

British  policy  toward  Europe  is  governed  by  three 
principles,  the  simplicity  of  which  permits  no  er- 
roneous deductions  and  their  directness  no  eva- 
sion: 

1.  Whenever  a  European  nation  acquires,  through 
war  or  material  development,  that  degree  of  poten- 
tial strength  and  actual  military  force  that  it  con- 
trols the  power  of  Europe,  it  will  in  due  time  direct 
the  totahty  of  this  power  toward  the  destruction  of 
the  British  Empire. 

2.  Whenever  it  becomes  apparent  that  one  Euro- 
pean state  or  racial  coalition  is  seeking  the  over- 
lordship  of  Europe  in  the  manner  above  stated,  it 
at  once  becomes  imperative  upon  the  British  nation 
to  destroy  this  power  and  the  means  that  make  it 
possible. 

3.  The  British  Empire  can  only  subject  Europe 
to  her  will  by  the  control  of  two  strategic  spheres: 

(a)  The  mastery  of  the  Mediterranean,  with- 
in which  as  affecting  the  British  Empire  is  in- 
cluded part  of  Russia,  the  Turkish  Empire, 
Austria-Hungary,  Italy,  and  a  part  of  France 
and  Spain.  This  theater  of  war  belongs  to  the 
British  navy,  the  strength  of  its  fleets  being 
214 


SAXON  STRUGGLE  FOR  SURVIVAL 

determined  by  the  maximum  strength  of  any 
coaHtion  that  may  be  brought  against  it. 

(b)  The  northern   strategic   sphere   includes 
miHtary   control   over   Denmark,   the   Nether- 
lands,  and  Belgium.     British  military  occupa- 
tion of  Denmark,  in  the  event  of  war,  restricts 
Russia  to  the  land,  and   forbids  her    the   sea, 
limiting  that  great  power  to  only  one  avenue 
of  attack  upon  the  Empire — that  of  the  Indian 
frontier.     This  position,  moreover,  annuls  the 
strategic  value  of  the  Kiel  Canal  by  making 
the  Baltic  an  inland  sea.     With  the  military 
occupation  of  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  Ger- 
man aggression  by  sea  is  restricted  to  the  mouth 
of  the  Elbe,  a  strategic  circumscription  which 
makes  impossible  Teutonic  expansion  seaward. 
German  naval  supremacy  must  first  be  based 
on  the  command  of  the  North  Sea,  which  alone 
is  determined  by  the  military  control  of  Den- 
mark, and  only  in  a  secondary  degree  by  the 
command  of  the  mouths  of  the  Rhine  and  the 
Scheldt. 
4.  Political  policies  not  directed  toward  the  de- 
fense of  these  two  strategic  spheres  are  erroneous, 
and   military   preparation   governed   by   any   other 
principle  than  that  based  upon  actual  military  con- 
trol will  prove  useless. 


VI 


PREPARATION   AND   CONFLICT 

Military  Preparation  and  National  Survival. — No  Line  of  Demarca- 
tion Between  Peace  and  War. — Insecurity  of  British  Empire  in 
Relation  to  Germany. — Necessary  to  Assume  Offensive. — Neu- 
trality of  Small  Nations. — Principles  Governing  Wars  Involving 
Neutral  States. 

IN  modem  times,  when  war  ensues  between  nations 
whose  mihtary  preparedness  approaches  the 
maximum  of  their  capacity  and  states  whose  mih- 
tary preparation  is  reduced  to  a  minimum,  the  prog- 
ress and  consummation  of  war  is  ascertainable  be- 
fore armies  take  the  field.  Subsequent  conflicts 
have  little  or  no  place  in  its  determination;  they 
no  more  than  mark  with  their  tragic  milestones 
I  the  old  red  way  along  which  neglectful  nations 
I  hasten  to  their  end. 

The  degree  of  continuity  and  the  character  of 
preparation  for  war  constitute  the  determinate  prin- 
ciple in  its  progression  toward  victory  or  defeat. 
Only  between  nations  whose  preparations  during 
peace  are  relatively  equal  does  the  subsequent  period 
of  conflict  constitute  a  decisive  factor.  It  is  no 
longer  possible  to  trust  to  the  fortunes  of  war,  for 
these,    like   its   gods,    have    abandoned    mankind. 

216 


PREPARATION    AND    CONFLICT 

Even  genius  falters  in  this  new  mechanic  age,  and 
valor  and  pride,  for  no  longer  can  these  things, 
noble  and  heroic  as  they  are,  be  substituted  for  a 
lack  of  preparation  in  one  state  nor  overcome  it  in 
another.  'I 

Military  provision  in  modern  times  has  come  to 
bear  so  intimate  a  relationship  to  national  survival 
that  it  forms  the  principle  upon  which  must  be  based 
such  laws  as  direct  its  progress  and  prolong  its  ^ 
existence.  Preparation  for  war  is  no  longer  an 
orderless  gathering  together  of  tribes  or  levies  or 
militia  or  volunteers;  neither  the  building  of  ar- 
senals nor  the  cramming  of  them  with  the  utensils 
of  combat.  These  old  ideals  have  no  more  than  a 
subordinate  place  in  that  general  adjustment  made 
necessary  by  this  age,  and  upon  the  completeness  of 
which  depends  the  duration  of  national  life.  ^ 

The  error  of  Saxon  preparation  for  war  originates  ' 
in  Saxon  misconception  of  peace.  Peace  and  war 
are  but  relative  terms  descriptive  of  human  strug- 
gle as  divided  into  two  phases.  Absolute  peace 
between  nations  only  exists  prior  to  the  time  their 
association  begins.  When  the  intercourse  between 
individuals  of  one  nation  and  those  of  another  in- 
creases to  the  point  that  their  trade  becomes  com- 
petitive, it  involves  the  interests  that  control  the 
policies  of  state.  The  transition  from  the  material 
conflict  of  individual  acquisitiveness  to  the  combat- 
ive struggle  of  national  wants  is  as  imperceptible 
in  its  progression  as  is  that  growth  which  marks  the 

217 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

gradual  transition  from  individual  greed  to  national 
necessity. 

I~  There  is  no  line  of  demarcation  between  peace 
and  war.  In  all  the  struggles  of  the  human  race 
we  are  unable  to  determine  with  exactitude  the  be- 
ginning of  a  single  war.  The  difference  between 
war  and  peace  is  not  that  which  distinguishes  iquie- 
tude  from  conflict.  It  is  a  difference  only  in  manner 
and  degree.     It  is  but  the  temporary  ascendancy 

(^     of  composite  struggle  over  individual  strife. 

[~  International  war  has  no  beginning  and  no  end, 
so  long  as  mankind  brings  himself  together  in  poHti- 
cal  and  individual  contention.  Whether  it  is  for 
good  or  for  evil,  this  everlasting  struggle  forms  the 
necessary  motif  of  human  aspiration.  Between  a 
spider  slipping  his  web  from  twig  to  leaf  and  a  man 
threading  his  nets  from  threshold  to  threshold, 
between  a  nest  of  ants  by  the  roadside  and  a  tribe 
L_  of  men  upon  a  greater  way,  there  is  no  difference. 
Individual  strife  is  the  epitome  of  selfishness; 
war  a  gigantic  altruism. 

p  Nations  as  individuals  exist  always  in  a  state  of 
potential  combat.  The  degree  of  combative  po- 
tentiality merges  unperceived  from  the  passive, 
which  we  call  peace,  to  the  active,  which  is  known 
as  war.  War  exists  long  before  the  public  conscious- 
ness is  aware  of  it,  since  nations,  especially  those  in 
a  low  state  of  militancy,  conceal  from  themselves  as 
long  as  possible  this  transition.  The  dead  may  be 
upon  the  field  before  they  acknowledge  it,  yet  they 

218 


PREPARATION    AND    CONFLICT 

have  in  reality  been  at  war  for  an  indefinite  period 
of  time. 

A  battle  is  not  entirely  fought  on  the  day  it  is 
fought,  nor  the  ensuing  victory  or  defeat  wholly 
due  to  the  efforts  of  that  day.  A  war  with  its  cam- 
paigns and  battles  bears  the  same  relation  to  the 
preceding  peace  that  a  battle  does  to  the  period  of 
war  that  preceded  it.  A  battle  is  a  part  of  war; 
war  a  part  of  peace.  We  cannot  determine  where 
one  ends  and  the  other  begins.  A  battle  is  but  a 
moment  of  violent  human  activity,  and  is  the  result 
of  innumerable  other  conditions  and  activities  that 
have  preceded  it  in  regular  sequence.  So  a  war  is 
only  a  battle  prolonged  in  time  and  space.  A  battle  ' 
in  its  relationship  to  war  is  analogous  to  war  in  its 
relationship  to  peace.  In  a  battle,  those  factors  that 
determine  the  success  or  failure  belong  to  the  combat 
only  in  a  Hmited  sense.  Months  of  war  may  precede 
the  battle,  yet  toward  and  for  that  battle  the  nations 
have  been  constantly  preparing  for  every  contin- 
gency. This  attitude  of  a  nation  toward  prepara- 
tion for  a  battle  during  the  months  of  war  that  pre- 
cede it  must,  in  a  greater  sense,  be  the  same  toward 
war  during  the  years  of  peace  that  go  before  it.  To 
deny  preparation  for  war  during  peace  is  a  greater 
folly  than  to  refuse  to  prepare  for  battle  after  war 
has  begun. 

Formerly    preparation    for    war    was    not    only 
Hmited  to  a  small  portion  of  the  population,  but, 
being  simple  in  character  and  applied  to  a  people 
15  219 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

more  or  less  inured  to  conflict,  it  neither  reqmred 
a  long  period  of  time  nor  great  effort  on  the  part  of 
the  nation.  In  modem  times,  however,  preparation 
for  war  and  war  itself  affect  the  entire  state.  E very- 
part  of  society,  every  business,  ever}'-  profession  now 
has  a  definite  place  in  relation  to  war. 

Before  a  state  can  be  drilled  to  arms  its  spirit 
must  be  militant;  if  not,  it  must  undergo  such  a 
transfiguration.  Militancy  is  different  from-  other 
virtues  in  that  it  cannot  be  preserved  by  the  indi- 
vidual. It  is  collective,  and  not  personal ;  hence  the 
first  duty  devolving  upon  a  state  is  to  take  means 
of  preserving  from  deterioration  this  excellence 
I  upon  which  depends  its  existence.  Modem  life  has 
a  definite  effect  upon  the  militant  decadence  of  a 
race,  in  that  it  diminishes  in  proportion  as  the  com- 
plexity of  civilization  is  increased.  So  positive  is 
the  result  of  this  deterioration  that  those  nations 
not  having  compulsory  training  are  incapable  of 
j  entering  into  war  with  a  power  whose  preparation 
I  is  inclusive  of  enforced  miUtary  service. 

It  has  been  shown  that  those  factors  upon  which 
the  security  of  the  British  nation  depends,  and  the 
theaters  of  war  where  battles  must  be  fought,  are 
without  the  confines  of  the  Empire.  Once  these 
frontiers  are  forced  the  defense  of  the  Empire  is  at 
an  end.  Because  of  this,  British  military  prepara- 
tion, the  organization  and  character  of  its  forces, 
can  never  be  governed  by  the  principle  of  defending 
the  Empire  within  its  own  segregated  territories. 

220 


PREPARATION    AND    CONFLICT 

In  an  empire  so  constituted  as  that  of  the  British, 
an  army  of  home  defense  becomes  an  army  of  im- 
perial destruction. 

A  foreign  army  on  Enghsh  soil  and  England  be- 
comes the  sepulcher  of  the  Saxon  race. 

British  military  preparation  and  the  organization 
of  every  unit  constituting  its  military  force,  whether 
in  the  United  Kingdom,  Australia,  Canada,  South 
Africa,  or  its  colonies,  must  be  subject  to  and  gov- 
erned by  those  principles  that  determine  the  character 
of  an  expeditionary  force. 

As  the  defense  of  Australia  belongs  primarily  to 
the  defense  of  the  Indian  frontiers,  so  Australia  con- 
stitutes a  base  from  which,  to  the  Indian  theater  of 
war,  forces  must  be  sent.  Canada,  South  Africa, 
and  the  colonies  depend  upon  the  hegemony  of  the 
United  Kingdom.  Its  survival  is  in  turn  dependent 
upon  the  defense  of  the  frontiers  of  Belgium,  the 
Netherlands,  and  Denmark.  In  the  European 
theater  of  war  the  United  Kingdom  forms  the  main 
base,  while  the  dependent  dominions  and  colonies 
constitute  secondary  bases  from  which  to  the  com- 
mon theater  of  war  troops  must  be  despatched. 

British  military  preparation  necessitates  not  only 
harmony  of  action,  but  cohesiveness  of  effort  and 
a  singleness  of  purpose  as  wide  as  the  world  itself. 
It  necessitates  not  alone  vast  means  of  transportation, 
but  a  constant  increase  in  their  efficiency,  so  that 
their  rapidity  and  capacity  shall  maintain  the  pre- 
liminary theater  of  war  at  no  greater  distance  from 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

British  bases  than  from  those  of  the  enemy.  The 
most  complete  miHtary  preparedness  is  useless  if  it 
cannot  be  utilized  at  a  crucial  time  or  in  the  true 
theater  of  war. 

These  salient  needs  are  ordinarily  controlled  by 
civil  authorities  who  are  not  conscious  of  what  makes 
military  strength.  They  invariably  neglect  moments 
of  greatest  military  value,  and  are  seldom  cognizant 
of  the  true  theater  of  war.  This  ignorance  increases 
as  military  control  over  the  departments  of  state 
diminishes.  This  reconstruction  of  governmental 
ideals  constitutes  the  basis  of  all  future  preparation 
for  war  as  it  affects  the  diiration  and  futurity  of  the 
Saxon  race. 

The  growth  of  the  Saxon  Empire  and  the  develop- 
ment of  its  power  have  not  been  due  so  much  to  Saxon 
statesmanship  as  to  the  lack  of  it  in  those  states 
whose  territories  now  form  its  domains.  Whenever 
the  intelligence  and  activity  of  Saxon  statesmen  be- 
comes less  than  that  exercised  by  its  strongest  op- 
ponent, or,  remaining  stationary  in  international 
progression,  is  superceded,  then  it  must  share  the 
fate  of  those  nations  whose  sovereignty  it  destroyed 
to  secure  the  power  now  so  vast  in  potentiahty  and 
so  useless  in  its  own  preservation. 

Nations,  like  individuals,  seldom  profit  when  they 
succeed  through  the  ignorance  of  others  and  take 
no  measures  to  prevent  the  success  of  others  through 
their  own  ignorance. 

Saxon  power,  potential  and  actual,  is  in  a  state 

222 


PREPARATION    AND    CONFLICT 

of  erosion — a  condition  due  not  so  much  to  the 
superior  intelHgence  of  those  nations  whose  forces 
and  persistence  now  grind  and  wear  away  its  sides, 
as  to  its  own  failure  to  reaHze  that  for  a  nation  to 
stand  still  in  universal  progression  is  identical,  in 
its  results,  with  retrocession — a  reversion  on  the  part 
of  a  state  to  an  earlier  phase  of  international  relation- 
ship, the  value  of  which  has  passed  away  forever. 

Power  and  progress  are  no  more  than  relative 
terms.  The  increasing  inequality  of  German  and 
British  power  is  due  not  so  much  to  the  superiority 
of  German  progress  as  to  the  stationary  character 
of  British  development,  not  so  much  to  German  in- 
telligence as  to  Saxon  indifference.  That  which 
constitutes  the  basic  element  of  German  military 
power,  as  exercised  against  the  British  Empire, 
results  from  British  ignorance,  instead  of  German 
wisdom,  in  all  matters  appertaining  to  warfare,  and 
a  consequent  violation  on  part  of  British  statesmen 
of  three  principles  of  war: 

1.  Permitting  the  continuance  of  false  military 
ideals  and  preparation  no  longer  suitable  to  modem 
conditions  of  war. 

2.  Selecting  a  false  theater  of  war  and  including 
the  base  of  the  Empire  within  this  theater. 

3.  By  the  sum  of  these  errors  restricting  the  in- 
itiation of  war  to  the  enemy. 

So  long,  therefore,  as  statesmen  violate  these  prin- 
ciples with  the  sanction  and  applause  of  the  popu- 
lace, all  other  military  preparation  is  useless.  Armies 

223 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

and  navies,  heroism  and  suffering,  are  of  no  avail  in 
this  old  immolation  of  the  nation  by  the  ignorance 
of  its  people — in  this  old  hecatomb  of  its  vanity,  in 
this  last  feeble  sacrifice  of  its  valor. 
r"  Whenever  it  is  determined,  as  it  can  be  with 
exactitude,  that  the  convergence  of  international 
interests  is  acute,  general  preparation  for  war  must 
,/  become  specific.     When  the  rate  of  speed  by  which 

nations  move  to  the  point  of  contact  has  been  ascer- 
tained, it  devolves  upon  the  ministers  of  state  to 
anticipate  any  overt  act  on  the  part  of  the  enemy 
I     and  initiate  the  war. 

When  a  state  does  not  initiate  war  it  commits  its 
first  error  against  the  principle  of  military  science. 
When  it  waits  to  make  ready  for  war  after  hostili- 
ties have  been  declared,  it  only  prepares  to  destroy 
itself. 

So  essential  is  this  principle  of  initiation  to  success 
in  warfare  that  within  the  last  two  hundred  years 
there  is  no  instance  where  sufficient  warning  has 
been  given  that  permitted  the  enemy  to  undertake 
military  preparation.  The  necessity  of  a  declara- 
tion of  war  is  only  a  modern  illusion.  During  the 
last  two  centuries  we  have  less  than  ten  cases  where 
declarations  have  been  issued  prior  to  the  regular 
commencement  of  hostilities,  though  in  one  form 
or  another  war  already  existed.  During  this  same 
period  of  time  we  have  one  hundred  and  eleven 
cases  where  war  was  begun  without  any  notifica- 
tion. 

224 


PREPARATION    AND    CONFLICT 

No  nation  has  followed  more  persistently  than  the 
English  this  principle  of  making  war  without  prior 
declaration.  They  have  done  so,  as  have  others, 
because  the  initiation  of  a  conflict  constitutes  the 
most  essential  principle  of  warfare. 

Formerly  armies  reached  the  theater  of  war  by 
degrees,  owing  to  the  great  distance  that  separated 
states  and  the  poverty  of  means  of  communication. 
A  march  of  armies  from  one  state  to  another  was 
slow,  cumbersome,  and  incapable  of  surprise.  It 
was  in  itself  a  notification  of  war  made  in  sufficient 
time  for  nations,  in  their  primitive  fashion,  to  pre- 
pare; hence  a  formal  notification  influenced  neither 
in  one  way  nor  the  other  the  activities  of  war.  In 
modem  times,  however,  means  of  transportation 
and  communication  have  been  so  developed  by 
science  that  the  old  natural  barriers  have  been 
broken  down.  In  the  future  it  can  be  considered 
as  an  established  principle  that  nations  will  more 
and  more  make  war  without  previous  notification, 
since  modem  facilities  increase  their  ability  to  take 
their  opponents  by  surprise  and  to  strike  the  first 
blow  as  nearly  as  possible  to  their  main  base.  That  \ 
this  is  true  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  ntmiber  ^ 
of  wars  undertaken  without  any  prior  declaration 
of  hostilities  in  the  nineteenth  century  is  greater 
than  in  the  eighteenth.  During  the  former  century 
there  are  recorded  forty-seven  wars  begim  without 
any  prior  declaration,  while  in  the  nineteenth  eighty  \ 
wars  were  begim  without  any  prior  declaration.     So  j 

225 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

correct  is  this  principle  governing  the  initiation  of 
future  wars  that  Saxon  preparation  for  war  must 
be  based  upon  it.  Whenever  the  inevitabiUty  of  a 
conflict  is  recognized,  as  is  the  case  with  both  Ger- 
many and  Russia,  where  the  theaters  of  war  are  re- 
mote from  their  bases,  they  should  proceed  to  specific 
preparation  for  the  conflict,  and,  when  they  reach 
the  maximum  of  preparation,  initiate  the  war  by 
the  occupation  of  those  frontiers  upon  which  de- 
pends the  destiny  of  the  Empire, 

The  occupation  of  the  Persian  and  Afghanistan 
frontiers  prior  to  war  with  Russia,  or  the  European 
frontiers  in  a  conflict  with  Germany,  arouses  in  the 
British  nation  the  appearance  of  great  opposition 
to  the  violation  of  neutral  territory.  This  is  false, 
for  the  Empire  is  not  moved  by  the  sanctity  of 
neutrality.  It  is  only  a  means  of  evading  responsi- 
bility and  shifting  it  upon  these  nations,  deluding 
themselves  with  the  belief  that  such  declarations 
are  inviolable;  whereas,  no  nation  has  violated 
neutral  territory  and  denied  their  obligations  more 
\  frequently  than  the  Saxon.  But,  now  that  Saxon 
sovereignty  depends  upon  the  defense  of  these 
frontiers,  we  see  the  British  race  laying  itself  open 
to  destruction  under  the  delusion  that  that  which 
has  no  real  existence  will  defend  them. 

The  occupation  by  the  Saxon  of  these  frontiers 
is  a  territorial  and  not  a  moral  violation,  while  their 
occupation  by  Russia,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Ger- 
many, on  the  other,  only  precedes  the  final  passage 

226 


PREPARATION    AND    CONFLICT 

of  their  identity,  that  tragic  end  under  the  swirl 
and  spawning  of  these  two  races. 

Neutrality  of  states  under  the  conditions  just 
mentioned  has  never  heretofore  nor  will  in  future 
have  any  place  in  international  association  in  time 
of  war.  Such  neutrality  is  a  modern  delusion. 
It  is  an  excrescence. 

In  the  year  1801  the  island  of  Madeira  was  taken 
possession  of  by  the  British,  without  any  previous 
communication  to  the  Court  of  Lisbon,  in  order 
that  it  should  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  French, 
observing  in  this  action  the  true  principle  governing 
such  activities  in  war. 

In  1807  the  British  fleet,  without  any  notification, 
with  no  intimation  given  of  hostile  intentions,  no 
complaint  of  misconduct  on  the  part  of  Denmark, 
entered   the    Baltic,   seized    the    Danish   fleet,   and 
blockaded  the  island  of  Zealand,  on  which  is  situated 
the  city  of  Copenhagen.     At  this  time  both  nations 
had  their  ambassadors  residing  in  their  respective  1 
capitals  and  were  in  perfect  harmony.      The  pur-' 
pose  of  this  attack  was  to  anticipate  the  occupation 
of  Denmark  and  the  use  of  her  fleets  by  France. 
So  correct  is  the  principle  of  this  initiation  that  it  ; 
stands  out  with  remarkable  brilliancy  in  the  dark-  j 
ness  of  innumerable  military  errors  made  by  the! 
Saxon  race. 

If  England  were,  therefore,  justified  in  seizing 
Denmark  in  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury for  no  other  reason  than  to  prevent  the  employ- 

227 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

ment  of  the  Danish  fleet  by  the  French,  how  much 
more  is  she  justified  during  peace  in  the  twentieth 
century  in  the  occupation  of  its  southern  frontiers 
for  the  protection  of  both  nations  against  German 
aggression. 

That  this  principle  was  appUcable  in  the  beginning 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  but  is  not  so  under  the 
civilization  of  the  twentieth,  is  an  erroneous  con- 
ception of  the  principles  that  direct  the  conflict  of 
nations.  While  England  and  other  nations  violated 
both  peace  and  neutrality  in  the  beginning  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  we  find  Russia  and  Japan  doing 
the  same  thing  in  China  and  Korea  in  the  beginning 
of  the  twentieth. 

These  old  laws  are  not  cognizant  of  man  nor  those 
ordinances  by  which  he  would  rope  dowTi  the  im- 
mutable w4th  the  gauzy  threads  he  spins  in  that 
moment  of  sunlight  that  marks  his  wisdom  and  his 
flight. 

Wars  involving  neutral  states  are  governed  by 
three  principles: 

1 .  Whenever  a  minor  state  rests  between  the  bases 
of  two  combatants  and  constitutes  a  portion  of  the 
subsequent  theater  of  war,  it  is  essential  to  seize 
that  state  prior  to  or  at  the  beginning  of  a  war, 
either  for  one's  owti  advantage  or  to  prevent  it  from 
falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

2.  When  the  neutrahty  of  a  minor  state  consti- 
tutes an  element  of  weakness  to  a  great  power,  those 
frontiers  from  which  arise  the  weakness  should  al- 

228 


PREPARATION    AND    CONFLICT, 

ways  be   subject   to   the   control   of   the   miUtary 

power. 

3.  When  the  continental  neutrality  or  indepen- 
dence of  a  minor  state  threatens  the  existence  of  a 
great  power,  as  Korea  threatened  Japan,  it  should 
be  deprived  of  its  independence  and  absorbed  by 
the  greater  power. 


> 


VII 


UNITY    OF    FORCES 

Principles  Governing  the  Unity  of  Empire. — Political  and  Military 
Power  Must  Remain  in  Hands  of  a  Racial  Unit. — Sectional  Dis- 
tinctions Must  be  Destroyed. — Confederacy  of  Independent 
States  the  Weakest  Form  of  Government. — Military  Consolida- 
tion Necessary  to  Preservation  of  Empire. 

WE  now  pass  to  the  end  of  our  work.  There 
has  been  much  that  is  bitter  in  what  we  have 
written  and  the  inevitabiHty  of  our  conclusions.  It 
could  not  be  otherwise.  We  have  shunned  hope  and 
its  illusions,  theory  and  its  pitfalls,  evasion  and  its 
'■  massacres.<;^We  have  been  guided,  not  by  those 
transient  ideals  that  ordinarily  direct  human  aspira- 
tion, but  by  that  truth  that  is  found  in  the  orderly 
sequence  of  natural  laws,  in  their  immutability  and 
the  finality  of  their  application/^ 

Whatever,  if  any,  superiority  exists  in  the  Saxon 
race  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  prolongation  of 
national  life,  unless  its  superior  intelligence  acts  in 
accordance  with  these  laws  and  is  cognizant  at  all 
times  of  the  ephemeral  character  of  national  and 
racial  existence  in  contrast  to  the  inexorability  of 
those  eternal  forces  that  control  the  progression 
and  dissolution  of  political  entities. 

230 


UNITY    OF    FORCES 

The  survival  of  the  British  Empire  depends  upon 
a  differentiation  between  national  greatness  and 
national  power.  When  the  government  of  an  em- 
pire is  the  product  of  sectional  policies  that  endure 
no  longer  than  the  men  who  make  them  and  rise 
no  higher  than  the  mediocrity  of  public  impulse, 
they  are  not  the  synthesis  of  national  intelligence, 
but  that  stronger  synthesis  of  individual  ignorance 
and  selfishness  as  expressed  in  the  wild,  mad  laws  of 
mob  caprice. 

The  perpetuation  of  the  British  Empire  depends, 
first,  upon  its  military  unity,  and,  secondly,  upon  its 
political  unification.  SectionaHsm  in  time  and  place 
must  give  way  to  laws  so  universal  in  their  applica- 
tion that  they  differentiate  in  no  way  between  the 
inhabitants  of  the  oversea  dominions  and  the  United 
Kingdom. 

The  unity  of  the  Empire  cannot  be  a  sentimental 
union  of  its  component  parts,  neither  can  it  be  a 
confederac}-  of  independent  political  units.  The 
first  is  a  negative  cause  of  disintegration,  the  second 
a  positive  one.  This  unification  is  governed  by 
four  principles: 

1.  The  Empire  must  be  miHtarily  a  imit. 

2.  It  must  be  politically  as  cohesive  as  a  single 
state. 

3.  The  militar}^  and  political  supremacy  of  the 
Saxon  in  its  constituent  parts. 

4.  The  complete  subordination  of  the  Empire  to 
the  imity  of  the  whole. 

231 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

As  an  individual  does  not  understand  the  true 
relation  existing  between  himself  and  the  state, 
exaggerating  the  immaterial  and  denying  the  es- 
sential, so  do  segregated  portions  of  a  nation  fail 
to  view  in  their  true  light  the  universal  activities 
of  national  existence,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  seek 
to  circumvent  national  power  by  the  intrusion  of 
their  own  desires.  When  this  is  true  in  an  empire 
scattered  over  the  world  as  that  of  the  Saxon,  it 
involves  such  a  nation  in  constantly  increasing  dan- 
gers, for  the  liability  of  war  is  almost  invariably  in 
proportion  to  the  number  of  parts  into  which  mari- 
time nations  are  divided  and  possess  a  potential 
value  to  others. 

As  the  Empire  has  added  to  its  possessions  it  has 
augmented  the  number  of  its  enemies.  There  is 
now  no  political  sphere  in  the  world  where  the  in- 
terests of  one  or  more  nations  are  not  directed  against 
those  of  the  Saxon  and  are  convergent  to  the  degree 
that  the  end  in  each  instance  is  war. 

While  the  Saxon  Empire  has  increased  in  greatness, 
it  has  lost  in  power  through  three  reasons: 

1.  Failure  to  add  to  its  power  in  constant  ratio 
to  its  increase  in  greatness. 

2.  Failure  to  augment  its  power  relative  to  the 
increase  of  power  among  those  nations  whose  in- 
terests have  or  will  become  convergent. 

3.  Failure  to  realize  the  change  modem  means  of 
transportation  and  communication  have  brought 
about  in    international    association,   shrinking   the 

232 


UNITY    OF    FORCES 

world,  jamming  nations  one  against  the  other, 
increasing  contention,  and  turning  the  whole  vast 
world  with  all  its  once  sequestered  places  into  a 
single  theater  of  war. 

National  exertion  for  defense  must  be  made  in 
proportion  to  the  probabiHties  of  war.  Who  then 
is  there  that  can  Hmit  the  labors  of  the  Saxon  Em- 
pire, from  whose  dominions  even  the  sun  cannot 
escape,  and  because  of  whose  sovereignty  no  nation 
can  move?  Yet  the  Saxon  race  has  never  grasped 
the  conception  involved  in  the  majesty  of  an  endless 
Empire  and  in  the  solemn  grandeur  of  its  perpetua- 
tion. 

The  tendency  of  human  society  is  not,  as  is  gen- 
erally beheved,  toward  unity,  but  is  actuated  by 
disintegrating  influences  which  are  the  result  of 
the  magnification  of  their  own  personahties  or 
localities.  Mankind  through  past  ages  has  con- 
tinued to  assemble  together  in  larger  and  larger 
units  due  to  the  necessity  of  self -protection.  When- 
ever there  occurs  a  lull  in  international  progression 
so  that  mutual  protection  among  racial  or  geo- 
graphical constituencies  is  no  longer  a  necessity, 
there  results  that  sectional  and  racial  ascendancy 
which  ends  in  dissolution.  ^^    , 

National  disintegration  originates  in  peace,   and    ^^ 
is  the  result  of  the  dissolution  of  political  and  racial       \ 
tmity. 

When  a  nation   made   up   of  autonomous  parts 
possesses  no  restrictive  unifying  elements,  it  is  lack- 

233 


/'. 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

ing  in  solidarity  to  the  degree  that  the  autonomy 
of  its  component  parts  is  complete. 

Some  nations  are  politically  homogeneous  and 
racially  heterogeneous.  The  unity  of  such  a  state 
is  greater  than  if  the  reverse  of  these  conditions  were 
true.  A  nation  politically  and  racially  homogeneous 
constitutes  a  unified  state  in  its  strongest  and  most 
natural  form.  A  nation  that  is  not  only  politically 
heterogeneous  and  racially  heterogeneous,  but  also 
geographically  devoid  of  any  unity,  constitutes  the 
weakest  form  of  empire,  and  necessitates  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  greatest  wisdom,  of  national  fortitude 
and  constancy,  to  counteract  these  natural  elements 
of  disintegration  and  dissolution. 

The  British  Empire  is  a  nation  of  this  latter 
kind. 

The  British  nation,  thrown  indifferently  over  the 
world,  includes  one-third  of  the  human  race,  and 
of  these  less  than  one-seventh  are  Saxon.  Upon 
this  minority  is  fixed  the  responsibility  of  rule.  For 
this  privilege  of  dominion  the  Saxon  must  assume 
the  full  responsibility  of  Imperial  defense.  In  a 
racially  heterogeneous  state  the  military  and  politi- 
cal power  must  remain  in  the  hands  of  a  single  and 
homogeneous  race.  Whenever  the  dominant  race 
shares  his  political  and  military  power,  the  de- 
cadence of  Imperial  unity  and  durability  begins. 

So  long  as  the  political  and  military  power  remains 
in  the  hands  of  a  single  racial  element  the  Empire 
will  endure,  provided  that  their  power  is  superior 

234 


UNITY    OF    FOI^CES 

to  conditions  of  internal  disintegration  and  the 
external  erosive  forces  of  convergent  nations.  But 
if  the  nation  is  a  confederation  of  political  units 
autonomous  to  the  degree  of  the  British  dominions 
and,, like  them,  geographically  separate,  the  nation 
is  exposed  to  the  quickest  and  surest  elements  of 
political  decadence  and  the  absorption  of  its  com- 
ponent parts  when  any  one  or  more  nations  become 
stronger  than  its  strongest  units. 

The  effect  of  political  autonomy  upon  the  people 
of  segregated  portions  of  a  state  is  distinct  in  char- 
acter, though  relative  in  the  degree  of  influence  it 
exercises  over  conditions  that  tend  toward  dis- 
integration. Patriotism  as  ordinarily  understood  is 
not  handed  down  from  the  heavens,  but  is,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  product  of  earth.  It  is  an  attach- 
ment that  mankind  gathers  only  from  the  soil  he 
tills.  Yet  it  is  this  patriotism  of  environment,  this 
old  fealty  of  man  for  his  tent-pegs  and  herds,  that 
is  in  this  age  not  only  without  utility,  but  becomes 
the  foci  of  political   disintegration. 

Primitive  patriotism  is  local,  and  to  be  of  use  in 
this  age  must,  like  the  evolution  of  a  race,  pass 
through  a  corresponding  transmutation.  The  small 
patriotism  of  environment  must  now  be  put  aside 
forever.  This  is  not  a  crucifixion  of  old  ideals;  it 
is  a  transfiguration.  It  is  the  merging  of  locaHties 
into  universality.  It  is  turning  the  eyes  of  an  empire 
from  the  hopeless,  stunted  herbage  at  their  feet  to 
the  constellations  overhead,  where  once  not  many 
16  235 


THE    HAY    •?    THE    SAXtN 

centuries  ago  some  shepherds  raised  their  narrowed 
eyes  and  found  a  universe. 

The  creation  of  an  empire  in  a  permanent  sense  is 
possible  only  subsequent  to  the  destruction  of  all 
sectional  distinctions.  Whenever  political  autonomy 
exists  to  the  degree  that  it  makes  possible  sectional 
distinctions  and  gives  to  these  localities  political 
precedence  over  Imperial  policies,  unity  is  at  an  end 
and  political  disintegration  begins. 

In  proportion  as  political  autonomy  is  increased 
in  a  distant  and  segregated  portion  of  the  Empire, 
there  is  increased  the  localization  of  patriotism  and 
all  the  evils  that  ensue  from  it.  Whenever  political 
autonomy  is  augmented  to  the  degree  that  it  clashes 
with  Imj^erial  ordinances,  sectional  rights  invariably 
take  precedence.  This  results  in  another  form  of 
political  dissolution.  The  first  effect  will  be  a  lack 
of  political  unity  and  a  diffusion  of  patriotism 
throughout  the  Empire.  This  will  sputter  and  go 
off  like  scattered  grains  of  powder,  giving  forth  pos- 
sibly much  smoke  and  some  noise,  but  does  no  more 
than  increase  the  probabilities  of  Imperial  de- 
struction. 

The  decrease  of  Imperial  patriotism  in  segregated 
portions  of  the  Empire  is  determinable  by  time. 
The  fealty  of  a  colony  to  the  mother-country  de- 
creases in  inverse  ratio  as  is  increased  its  self- 
government.  Each  generation  leaves  behind  it 
local  traditions ;  succeeding  generations  become  more 
and  more  fixed  to  the  soil  that  nourishes  them. 

236 


UNITY    OF    FORCES 

Abstract  ideals  involving  Imperial  patriotism  give 
way  to  that  which  is  material  and  local.  So  strong 
is  the  supremacy  of  locality  and  its  diurnal  tasks 
over  man,  that  conditions  which  are  distant  in  time 
and  space  or  ideals  that  are  abstract  have  very 
little  effect  upon  him.  Nothing  is  more  difficult 
than  to  raise  the  eyeHds  of  man.  He  loves  his  own 
dirt,  and  glories  in  the  fact  that  God  made  him  out 
of  it. 

The  preservation  of  Saxon  racial  integrity,   to-   ' 
gether  with  their  possessions  and  aspirations,   de-       '4 
pends  primarily  on  a  delocalization  of  their  patriot-  -^  ~^\^ 
ism,  the  replacing  of  it  by  that  other  racial  fealty     /T,     % 
which  knows  no  geographical  distinctions,  and  one 
that,  instead  of  creeping  along  with  the  nose  to  the 
narrow  spoor  of  old  hates,  is  cognizant  only  of  the 
race  and  Empire  as  a  whole. 

The  demand  for  political  autonomy  is  only  justi- 
fiable when  local  independence  does  not  interfere 
with  the  unity  and  solidarity  of  the  Empire.  When- 
ever the  relationship  between  the  different  portions 
of  the  Empire  takes  the  form  of  a  confederacy  in 
which  the  dominions  or  colonies  assume  such  a 
degree  of  independence  that  they  take  upon  them- 
selves the  prerogatives  of  their  own  defense  and  the 
right  of  determining  whether  or  not  they  will  assist 
in  the  defense  of  the  other  parts,  then  they  destroy 
not  alone  themselves,  but  the  Empire. 

The  ratio  of  population  growth  in  these  dominions 
is  comparative  to  a  like  growth  of  the  nations  within 

237 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

whose  sphere  of  expansion  they  happen  to  be.  In 
consequence  of  this  their  military  potentiality  must 
remain,  in  its  growth,  at  a  relative  fixed  degree  of 
inferiority.  The  economic  growth  of  European 
and  Asiatic  nations,  together  with  their  demands 
for  the  unexploited  resources  of  these  dominions, 
increases  in  geometrical  ratio,  while  the  defensive 
capacity  of  the  dominions,  relative  to  these  nations, 
either  remains  constant  or  depreciates.  An  inde- 
pendent Australia,  regardless  of  its  own  efforts,  can 
never  withstand  Japan,  since  the  disproportion  of 
their  initial  power  is  so  great  that  in  time  Australia 
will  become  relatively  weaker  and  Japan  stronger. 
This  is  true  of  India  in  relation  to  Russia,  Canada 
to  the  United  States,  Africa  to  Europe,  and  the 
United  Kingdom  to  the  Teutonic  race. 

Military  unity  constitutes  the  basis  of  national 
survival  in  an  empire  composed  of  politically  au- 
tonomous states.  A  confederation  of  states  in  the 
form  of  an  empire  is  significant  of  political  instability. 
The  error  of  British  Imperial  policy  is  this  tendency 
toward  a  confederated  form  of  government,  giving 
to  the  constituent  units  not  alone  self-government, 
but  military  segregation. 

Whenever  the  power  of  the  self-governing  colonies 
becomes  inclusive  of  the  military  and  naval  preroga- 
tives and  constitutional  rights  for  determining  their 
use,  such  a  nation  will  prove  to  be  no  more  than  a 
shell  of  mended  pieces. 

When  a  nation  is  composed  of  self-governing 
238 


UNITY   OF   FORCES 

states,  each  incapable  of  self-defense,  their  protec- 
tion is  to  be  found  only  in  the  unification  of  their 
military  potentiality  and  its  complete  centralization. 
Military  function  adheres  to  a  government  only  in  its 
most  unified  form,  so  that  to  give  to  any  portion 
of  a  state  mihtary  independence,  though  it  is  politi- 
cally autonomous,  is  to  expose  the  entire  Empire 
to  destruction  from  external  forces  or  dissolution 
through  internal  dissension. 

Saxon  greatness  is  only  within  itself,  and  con- 
stitutes no  more  than  a  single  link  in  that  endless 
chain  of  races  that  has  wrapped  itself  around  this 
world  from  a  time  that  has  for  us  no  beginning  to  a 
time  that  likewise  has  no  end. 

If  the  Saxon  race  is  to  survive,  it  can  do  so  only 
as  a  whole  ( i )  through  the  military  and  naval  unifica- 
tion of  the  Empire;  (2)  the  complete  separation  of 
the  military  and  naval  systems  from  the  civil  gov- 
ernment of  the  dominions  and  colonies;  (3)  the  in- 
troduction of  universal  and  compulsory  military 
service  among  the  Saxons  throughout  the  Empire; 
(4)  all  armies  to  be  organized  on  the  basis  of  ex- 
peditionary forces;  (5)  the  size  and  distribution  of 
the  Imperial  armies  to  be  determined  by  the  size 
and  distribution  of  its  probable  adversaries;  (6)  the 
militancy  of  the  Saxon  race,  and  the  actual  military 
power  of  the  Empire  increased  with  every  military 
increment  made  by  nations  whose  natural  lines  of 
expansion  are  toward  territories  and  peoples  now 
under  British  dominion;  (7)  the  military  and  polit- 

239 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 

ical  unity  of  the  Empire  must  progress  toward 
greater  centralization  as  the  population  of  its  com- 
ponent parts  is  increased. 

In  the  contact  of  war,  either  offensive  or  defen- 
sive, a  confederated  form  of  government  is  the 
weakest.  While  the  Saxon  is  more  capable  of  seh- 
govemment  than  many  other  races  holding  sover- 
eignty over  themselves  or  imposing  it  upon  others, 
their  capacity  has  not  reached  such  a  height  that 
they  are  able  to  deny  those  elemental  forces  that 
take  no  cognizance  of  their  Hmited  superiority. 

The  Saxon  has  tried  a  confederacy  of  states, 
mihtarily  as  well  as  poUtically  autonomous,  and  has 
found  it  to  be  wanting.  In  the  formation  of  the 
American  Republic,  in  the  struggles  and  \'icissi- 
tudes  that  have  marked  its  progress  from  the  be- 
ginning until  the  present  time,  is  betrayed  the  in- 
herent weakness  of  such  a  form  of  government  and 
the  impossibihty  of  its  sur\-ival.  Had  the  American 
Republic,  in  the  beginning  of  its  independence,  been 
subject  to  the  same  dangers  to  which  every  nation 
is  now  exposed  through  the  intimacy  of  their  inter- 
course and  the  shortness  of  the  distance  that  inter- 
venes between  them,  the  Republic  would  not  have 
surv-ived  a  single  generation.  Yet,  as  we  examine 
the  progress  which  marks  the  evolution  of  its  politi- 
cal system,  we  find  that  almost  in  exact  proportion 
as  science  has  brought  it  into  closer  contact  with 
the  rest  of  the  world,  augmenting  its  responsibiH- 
ties  and  dangers,  it  has  altered  its  poHtical  system, 

240 


UNITY    OF    FORCES 

taking  away  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  states;  now 
silently,  now  with  turmoil  and  noise,  sometimes  in 
cx)nvention  halls,  and  sometimes  upon  fields  of  battle, 
the  struggle  to  sundve  forced  the  American  RepubUc 
to  abandon  a  confederated  form  of  government. 

A  confederacy  is  an  old  ignorance.  It  is  a  falsi- 
fication of  poHtical  independence,  and  has  no  more 
a  place  in  a  modem  state  than  have  those  other 
blind  errors  nations  have  put  away  forever. 


INDEX 


Adelaide,  78-79. 

Aden,  64. 

Afghan,   109. 

Afghanistan,  46,  199,  226. 

Africa,  62,  67,  120,  182,  194,  238. 

Alexander  the  Great,  42,  102. 

America,  unpreparedness  for  war, 
7;  relation  to  British  Empire, 
28-30;  emigration  to  Canada, 
31-33;  racial  expansion  in,  39- 
40;  possibility  of  war  with 
Japan,  92;  Civil  War  of,  200, 
240-241. 

Amur,  109. 

Anglo- Japanese  aUiance,  87-91, 
96. 

Anglo-Saxon  race,  8-9,  35-36. 

Arabia,  63. 

Arbela,  battle  of,  103,  171. 

Asia,  16,  28,  47,  68,  70-71,  74, 
87-88,  91-92,  97,  99,  104-105, 
120-122,  126-127,  144,  157- 
158,  175,  182,  194-195,  204. 

Asia  Minor,  57,  63 — 64,  67,  115, 
120,  146,  151,  190,  195. 

Atlantic  Ocean,  40,  90-91,  126, 
175-176. 

Austerlitz,  battle  of,  112,  121. 

Australasia,  immigration  to,  35; 
defense  of,  is  defense  of  India, 
69;  relation  to  Asian  races, 
70-7 1 ;  home  defense  inade- 
quate, 72-76;  permanent  de- 
fense naval,  77;  strategic 
spheres  of,  79;  nature  of  de- 
fense, 81;  value  to  Empire, 
83;  mutual  obligations  of 
Australia     and     Empire,     84; 


failure  in  duty  to  Imperial 
unity,  89;  possible  conquest 
by  Japan,  93;  defense  can 
only  be  accomplished  by  Em- 
pire, 95;  as  effected  by  a  Ger- 
man expansion  in  Pacific,  144. 

Australia,  56;  position  in  rela- 
tion to  India,  64,  67;  blind  to 
changing  international  condi- 
tions, 69;  military  spheres  of, 
78;  restriction  of  population 
to  sea-coasts,  79-80;  defense 
divisible  into  two  parts,  81; 
dependence  upon  Imperial  sol- 
idarity, 82;  relation  to  Indian 
defense,  221;  could  not  resist 
Japan  unaided,  238. 

Austria,  75,  115,  123-124,  137, 
140,  141,  146,  214. 

Balkans,  46,  115,  117,  122. 
Baltic,  107-108,  no,  215,  227. 
Batoum,   109. 
Belgium,  46,  137,  i6o-i6i,  213, 

215,  221. 
Berlin,  135. 
Bessarabia,   109. 

Bismarck,  Prince,  132,  133,  135. 
Black  Sea,  107-110,  120. 
Blue  Mountains,  Australia,  80. 
Boors,  81. 
Bosphorus,    112,    114,    115,    118, 

146. 
Bredo,  Peace  of,  11. 
Brisbane,  78,  80. 
British  Empire,   2;    dangers  to, 

3-5;    unpreparedness  for  war, 

7;    military  system  too  fixed, 


243 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 


9-10;  formation  of,  11-12; 
laws  governing  future  hostili- 
ties of,  13;  dangers  in  its  geo- 
graphical distribution,  15-17; 
militant  spirit  weakened,  17- 
18;  principles  determining 
future  wars  against,  20-24; 
angles  of  convergence  with 
other  powers,  28;  relationship 
toward  America,  30;  relations 
with  Canada,  33-34;  relation- 
ship with  Western  hemisphere, 
36-39;  security  in  Western 
hemisphere  dependent  on  Euro- 
pean equiUbrium,  41 ;  vast- 
ness  of,  no  guarantee  of  dura- 
tion, 42;  spread  of,  due  to 
strategic  position  of  British 
Isles,  46;  interposes  between 
Europe  and  Asia,  47;  impor- 
tance of  India  to,  48,  66-67; 
development  of  India  by,  49- 
51 ;  duty  to  provide  for  India's 
expansion,  56;  defense  of 
frontiers,  60--62;  relation  to 
Pacific  dominions,  68-69;  ab- 
sorption of  Transvaal,  73; 
relation  to  Australasia,  74,  83- 
84;  continental  attributes  of, 
76;  results  of  alliance  with 
Japan,  87^0,  93;  duty  to  re- 
store equilibrium  in  Pacific, 
94;  alliance  with  China  more 
advantageous  than  with  Japan, 
95-98;  threatened  in  Asia  by 
Russian  advance,  105;  igno- 
rant of  India's  value  to  Empire, 
113;  Dreibund  negative  men- 
ace to,  123-124;  expansion  of 
other  powers  directed  against 
dominions  of,  125-128;  law 
of  expansion  of,  131;  relation 
to  German  expansion,  132-139; 
duration  dependent  upon  bal- 
ance of  European  power,  140- 
142;  navy  compared  with  Ger- 
many's, 145;  VLilnerable  as  are 
all  empires,  149-152;  zenith 
of  power  after  Waterloo,  153- 


155;  retrocession  of  power  in 
Asia,  157;  end  of  political 
dominion  over  Europe,  158; 
preservation  of  Belgium,  Hol- 
land, and  Denmark  necessary 
to,  160-161;  causes  of  its 
dangers,  162-163;  destruction 
of  fleet  means  downfall  of,  1 72 ; 
suzerainty  of  diminished,  173- 
175;  naval  force  inadequate, 
176-177;  threatened  b}'^  growth 
of  other  sea  powers,  180;  de- 
struction of  supremacy  begins 
during  peace,  183-185;  failure 
to  stop  extension  of  converg- 
ent states,  187-191;  national 
mind  not  militant,  192-193; 
na\'y  powerless  to  prevent 
Russia's  Asian  expansion,  194; 
sea  power  powerless  to  destroy 
Russian  trade,  195-198;  dis- 
tance of  frontiers  from  Herat 
compared  with  those  of  Russia, 
199;  laws  governing  defense 
of  India,  201 ;  exaggeration  of 
nav'y's  value,  203;  military 
relationship  with  Germany, 
204-206;  result  of  destruction 
of  fleet,  207-208;  importance 
in  choice  of  theater  of  war, 
209-212;  principles  governing 
policy  toward  Europe,  214- 
215;  factors  on  which  security 
depends,  420 ;  necessity  of  of- 
fensive policy,  221;  govern- 
mental ideals  should  be  recon- 
structed, 222;  violation  by 
statesmen  of  principles  of  war, 
223;  wars  begun  without  pre- 
vious declaration,  225;  opposi- 
tion to  violation  of  neutral 
territory,  226;  blockade  of 
Denmark,  227-228;  principles 
governing  unity  of,  23 1 ;  rea- 
sons for  loss  of  power,  232-235 ; 
sectional  distinctiveness  must 
be  destroyed,  236-237;  weak- 
ness of  confederated  govern- 
ment from  military  standpoint, 


244 


INDEX 


238 ;      military     consolidation 

necessary,  239-240. 
British    Islands,  32-33,  35,  46- 

47.  63,  143,  174.  212. 
British  statesmen,  19,  29,  34,  223. 
Bug,  108. 
Burma,  57,  67,  120. 

C^SAR,  Julius,  26. 

Canada,  nationalism  of,  30; 
population,  31-34;  immigra- 
tion to,  35,  40;  Indian  sub- 
jects prohibited  from  domicile 
in,  56;  less  important  to  Em- 
pire than  India,  69;  American 
expansion  against  unsuccessful, 
130;  depends  on  hegemony  of 
United  Kingdom,  221 ;  relation 
to  United  States,  238. 

Cape  Town,  64,  77. 

Caribbean  Sea,  145. 

Carthage,  180. 

Caspian  Sea,  107,  109. 

Caucasus,  107,  109,  120,  199. 

China,  rniKtary  unpreparedness 
of,  7;  Great  Wall  of,  16-17; 
decline  of,  46;  as  continental 
state,  75;  vastness  of  ob- 
scured growth  of  Japan,  85; 
Russian  advance  in,  89,  91; 
interests  in  common  \vith  In- 
dia, 95;  expansion  antagonis- 
tic to  Russia,  96-99 ;  neu- 
trality violated  by  Russia, 
228. 

China- Japanese  War,   116. 

Copenhagen,  227. 

Crimea,   108. 

Cyprus,  67. 

Danube,  109. 

Denmark,  dangerous  position  of, 
46;  strategic  importance  to 
Germany,  137,  141-146;  fail- 
ure of  England  to  preserve 
integrity  of,  158;  loss  of  prov- 
inces, 160-161;  limits  British 
and  German  bases  of  war,  213; 
necessity  of  military  control  of 


to  England,  215;  occupation 
of  by  England,  227. 

Diego  Garcia,  64. 

Disintegration,  national,  2. 

Dniester,  108. 

Dretbund,  interpoUtical  relation- 
ship of  Russia,  Japan,  and  Ger- 
many, 122-128. 

Duration  of  empires,  principle 
of,  42. 

Dutch,  possessions  in  America, 
145-146;  possessions  in  East 
Indies,  decline  of,   174. 

Egypt,  46,  67. 

Elbe,  215. 

England,  growth  as  maritime 
nation,  11-12;  guarantees  in- 
dependence of  American  na- 
tions, 40,  47;  invasion  of 
preferable  to  loss  of  India,  48 
ignorance  of  India's  value,  60 
insular  position  of,  75;  result 
of  concentration  against  France 
and  Russia,  85;  position  as 
effected  by  Japan's  rise  to 
power,  88;  relation  to  Europe, 
91-92;  not  naturally  ally  of 
Japan,  97;  possible  invasion 
by  Germany,  105;  results  of 
failure  to  prevent  German 
unity,  139-140;  proximity  to 
Holland,  143;  supreme  at 
close  of  Napoleonic  wars,  153; 
danger  to  from  lack  of  mih- 
tary  expansion,  158;  failure 
to  realize  Denmark's  position, 
1 60-161;  strategic  position  of, 
174;  trade  of,  197;  results  of 
an  invasion  of,  206-208,  221; 
bases  in  war,  213;  violations 
of  neutraUty  by,  227-228. 

Euphrates,  115. 

Eurasia,   119. 

Europe,  28;  emigration  from, 
32-33,  35;  interests  in  Ameri- 
ca, 38-40;  overflow  to  other 
continents,  47;  difference  be- 
tween Europe  and  India,  50; 


245 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 


aggression  against  India,  64- 
65;  size  compared  with  Aus- 
tralasia's, 70;  interests  in  Asia, 
87-88,  105;  wars  of,  103; 
Russian  aggression  in,  1 12,  1 17- 
118,  120;  Napoleon  and,  135; 
balance  of  power  in,  140;  Den- 
mark's position  in,  142;  rela- 
tion to  Monroe  Doctrine,  146; 
expansion  as  influenced  by 
modem  science,  151;  amalga- 
mation of  minor  states  in,  158; 
racial  consolidation  of,  159; 
in  sixteenth  century,  173-174; 
relation  to  British  sea  power, 
175-177;  intercommunication 
by  land,  182;  German  power 
in,  188;  movement  on  other 
continents,  194;  Russian  fron- 
tiers in,  200;  British  policy 
toward,  212,  215. 
Expansion  of  races,  56-65. 

Finland,   108. 

Five  Seas,  15. 

Formosa,  93. 

France,  1 1 ;  decline  of  maritime 
power,  12;  insular  character- 
istics of,  75;  English  concen- 
tration against,  85;  unaffected 
by  Asia's  awakening,  105; 
Napoleon's  influence  on  ex- 
pansion of,  132;  relation  to 
Germany,  136;  native  popu- 
lation of,  144;  condition  at 
close  of  Napoleonic  wars,  153; 
decline  of,  174;  in  Mediter- 
ranean, 214;  designs  on  Den- 
mark, 227. 

Franco- Prussian  War,  141. 

French   population    in    Canada, 

31- 
French  Revolution,  12. 
Friedland,   112. 

Genghis  Khan,  42-43,  102. 
Genoa,   1 1 . 

Germany,  size  and  population 
compared    with     India's,     48; 


territorial    expansion    in    rela- 
tion to  India,  59-60;    eastern 
advance  should  be  limited  by 
England,  65;    problems  of  de- 
fense, 75;    menace   to  British 
Empire,    85;     comparison    of 
military'   forces   with  Japan's, 
90;    conquest  feared  by  Brit- 
ish,   105;    rise  and  ambitions 
of,    112;    relations  to  Russia, 
115,  118,  121;  natural  ally  of 
Russia     and     Japan     against 
England,     122-124;      results 
from   possible   wars,    125-126; 
dangers  to  British  Empire  in 
expansion  of,    127-128;    basic 
impulse  of  expansion,  131;  in- 
fluence of  Bismarck,  132;  de- 
velopment   of    power    not    a 
recent    one,     133;     zenith    of 
militancy,   134;    struggle  with 
British  Empire  inevitable,  135- 
137.     138-140;     strategic    im- 
portance of  Denmark  to,  141- 
143,215;  laws  governing  naval 
expansion    of,     144-145;     ex- 
pansion    over    Austria,     146; 
Waterloo  beginning  of  military 
greatness   of,    153;    expansion 
as  it  affects  Great  Britain,  159- 
170;    result  of  destruction  of 
fleet,  172;  extension  unaffected 
by    British    navy,     188-189; 
results  of  naval  victor>%   191; 
trade    with    Russia,    197-198; 
military   relationship  to   Brit- 
ish   Isles,    204;     cause   of   ex- 
pansion,   205-206;     character 
of  war  preparation,   207-208; 
scene  of  war  with  Britain,  210, 
213;    causes  of  inequality  be- 
tween    British     Empire    and, 
223;     occupation    of    neutral 
frontiers  of,   226-227. 
Gibraltar,  142. 

Hawaii,  92. 
Herat,  199-200. 
Hindu-Kusch,  198. 

46 


INDEX 


Hoangti,   17. 
Holland,  11-12. 
Hongkong,  67,  93,  117. 

Imperial  solidarity,  82-S4. 

India,  frontiers,  3;  conquest  of 
ancient  empires,  46;  close 
association  with  continuance 
of  British  Empire,  48;  prin- 
ciples on  which  tenure  of  de- 
pend, 49-51;  relationship  of 
population  to  landed  area,  54- 
55;  natural  expansion  of,  56- 
62 ;  strategic  position  of,  63- 
65;  importance  to  British 
Empire,  66-69,  73;  vulner- 
ability of  frontiers,  91;  in- 
terests in  common  with  China, 
95.  97~99;  Japanese  alliance 
no  protection  against  Russia, 
96;  Russian  expansion  toward, 
108-109,  112,  113-115,  117- 
118,  121,  126-127,  157,  182, 
189,  191,  194,  199,  215;  rela- 
tion to  British  sea  power  in 
East,  175;  laws  governing  de- 
fense of,  198,  199,  201,  204; 
weaker  than  Russia,  238. 

Indian  Ocean,  72,  175. 

International  alliance,  86-87. 

Italy,  123-124,  136,  140,  214. 

Japan,  military  superiority  of, 
41;  unaffected  by  wealth  of 
United  States,  42;  territorial 
expansion  convergent  upon 
India,  59-60;  strategic  posi- 
tion of,  63,  75-76;  growth  un- 
suspected by  Russia,  85;  al- 
liance with  Great  Britain,  87, 
96;  potentialities  of  in  Pacific, 
88-91;  danger  to  America,  92 ; 
essentials  of  national  power 
in,  93-94;  relation  to  equilib- 
rium of  Pacific,  95;  natural 
ally  of  Russia,  97-98;  sig- 
nificance of  Japanese  victory 
to  Russian  expansion,  112, 
116-H7,     121-122;     interests 


not  antagonistic  to  Germany's, 
124-125;  results  to,  from 
British  defeat,  126;  aggression 
against  British  Empire  com- 
pared to  Germany's,  127; 
sovereignty  over  Pacific  neces- 
sity to,  156-157;  unimpor- 
tance at  beginning  of  nineteenth 
century,  153;  absorption  of 
Korea,  141,  160;  in  Russian 
war,  168,  170,  172,  191; 
national  mind  militant,  192- 
193;  contest  with  Britain 
must  be  naval,  204;  violation 
of  Korea's  neutrality,  228- 
229;  stronger  than  Australia, 
238. 

Jena,  battle  of,  171. 

John  III.,  King  of  Portugal,  li. 

Kabul,  65,  199. 
Kamchatka,    109. 
Kars,    109. 
Keang-tung,   no. 
Kharakof,   200. 
Khiva,  log, 
Kiel  Canal,  215. 

Korea,  46,  76,  93,  141,  160,  228, 
229. 

Law  of  national  environment, 

45- 
Leipsic,  battle  of,  171. 
Lisbon,  227. 
Louis  XIV.,  85. 

Macedonian  Empire,  41. 

Madeira,  227. 

Malay  Peninsula,  57,  64. 

Malta,  67. 

Manchu  Empire,  41. 

Manchuria,  76,  iii. 

Mauritius,  64,  67. 

Mediterranean,  the,  67,  126,  143, 

146,  175,  176,  214. 
Melbourne,  78-79. 
Mesopotamia,  115. 
Mexico,  46. 
Military  preparedness,  216-224. 


247 


THE    DAY    OF    THE    SAXON 


Mohammed,  42. 

Mongol  Empire,  41. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  40,  47,  146. 

Moscow,  112,  116. 

Moslem  Empire,  41. 

Mukden,  103,  112. 

Napoleon,  42,  85,  106,  132,  135, 

140,  153- 

Narva,    112,   120. 

Netherlands,  the,  1 1 ;  danger- 
ous position  of,  46,  137; 
strategic  importance  to  Ger- 
many, 141-146,  160-1 61 ;  limits 
British  and  German  base  of 
war,  213;  importance  to  Brit- 
ish Empire,  215. 

New  S<juth  Wales,  79. 

New  Zealand,  64,  67,  69,  72-74, 
78. 

North  Sea,  145,  215. 

Orange  Free  State,  73. 

Pacific  Ocean,  63,  67-69,  72- 
73,  85,  88-89,  1(^-109,  112- 
113,  116- 118,   120,  120-127, 

i5^>-'57.  175.  194-195- 

Palestine,  45. 

Pamir,  95. 

Paris,   112,   135. 

Peace,  natural  laws  determining, 
22-24. 

Persia,  dangerous  position  of,  46; 
as  afFecte<l  by  Indian  cxj)an- 
sion,  57,  65;  wars  with  Russia, 
109;  Russia's  expansion  tow- 
ard, 112,  114-116,  118,  120- 
122,  127,  157,  201,  204;  pos- 
sible area  of  Russian-British 
war,   191.   194-195,   199,  226. 

Persian  Gulf,  1 14. 

Perth,  Australia,  78-79. 

Peru,  46. 

PhiUppines,  92-93. 

Poland,  45,  107-108. 

Poltava,   112. 

Port  Arthur,  93. 

Port  Said,  65,  115. 


Portugal,  11-12,  174. 
Prussia,   141,  160. 
Punic  Wars,  90. 

Queensland,  80. 

Red  Sea,  120. 

Rliine,  215. 

Roman   Empire,  41. 

Russia,  15;  emigration  to  United 
States,  35;  wealth  compared 
to  India's,  48;  territorial  ex- 
pansion in  relation  to  India, 
59-60,  65;  continental  state, 
75-76,  167;  onward  move- 
ment of,  85,  105-122,  201; 
conditions  resulting  from  de- 
feat by  Japanese,  88-8g;  fron- 
tiers contiguous  with  China's, 
95;  China's  expansion  not 
antagonistic  to,  96;  natural 
ally  of  Japan,  97-98;  not 
antagonistic  to  Germany,  124- 
125;  result  to  from  British 
defeat,  126;  aggression  against 
British  Empire,  127-128;  law 
of  expansion,  130-132;  ix>si- 
tion  after  Waterloo,  153;  de- 
velopment in  Asia,  157;  ad- 
vance on  India,  182,  200;  un- 
aiTectetl  by  British  navy,  189, 
191,  194-195,  204;  economic 
relations  with  British  Empire, 
196-198;  advance  in  Turkes- 
tan sphere,  199;  in  Me<litcr- 
ranean,  214;  in  relation  to 
Denmark,  215;  occupation  of 
neutral  frontiers,  226;  viola- 
tion of  neutrality  by,  228; 
relation  to  India,  238. 

St.  Petersburg,  116. 

Samarkand,    199. 

Saratof,  200. 

Saxon,  and  Empire,  1-5;  and 
war,  6-24;  and  America,  25- 
43;  and  India,  44-65:  and 
Pacific,  66-81;  and  Eastern 
Asia,  82-99;   and  the  Russian, 


24S 


INDEX 


loo-i  1 8, 186-201 ;  and  Europe, 
1 19-128;  and  the  Germans, 
129-146,  202-215;  recession 
of,  149-163;  sea  power  of, 
173-185;  necessity  of  offen- 
sive policy  to,  220-227;  mili- 
tary consolidation  necessary 
to,  230-241. 

Scheldt,  215. 

Schleswig-Holstein,  141. 

Sea  power,  156. 

Sedan,  battle  of,  171. 

Seven  Years'  War,  12, 

Seychelles,  64,  67. 

Siberia,    116. 

Sinclair,  Sir  J.  G.  T.,  preface, 

Singapore,  64,  93,  117. 

Slav,  41. 

South  Africa,  35. 

South  America,  145-146. 

Spain,  11-12,  41,  136,  174,  214. 

Straits  Settlements,  64,  67. 

Suez,  67. 

Sviatosloff,  107. 

Sweden,  107-108,  112,  121. 

Sydney,  78-80. 

Teheran,  65,  115. 

Texas,  136. 

Tibet,  46. 

Tilsit,  treaty  of,  113,  140. 

Transvaal,  73. 

Tsar  Alexander,  114. 

Tsar  Alexei-Michaelovitch,  107. 

Tsar  Boris  Godunoff,  108. 

Tsar  John  III.,  107. 

Tsar  John  IV.,  107. 

Tsar  Peter  the  Great,  114,  132. 

Tsar  Theodore-Ivanovitch,  108. 


Tsu  Shima,  straits  of,  77. 

Turkestan,  199. 

Turkey,  75,   107-109,   113,  214. 

United  States,  emigration  to 
Canada,  32-33;  relation  to 
British  Empire,  34-36;  quality 
of  population,  40;  wealth  of, 
42;  military  relationship  to 
Europe  and  Asia,  68;  blind 
to  changing  military  condi- 
tions, 69;  possesses  certain 
characteristics  of  an  insular 
power,  75;  indifference  to 
Japanese  development,  92;  ex- 
pansion against  Canada  un- 
successful, 130,  238;  revenue 
of,  136;  relation  to  German 
expansion,  137;  unimportance 
at  opening  of  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, 153;  land  transportation 
of,  194;  gradual  abandonment 
of  confederated  government, 
241. 

Ussure,  109. 

Valor  of  Ignorance,  The,  preface, 

14,  91-92,  127,  144,  152. 
Venice,   11. 

Vicksburg,  battle  of,  171. 
Victoria,  Australia,  79. 

Wagram,  battle  of,  171. 
Watedoo,  battle  of,  153,  154. 
Wei-Hai-Wei,  93. 
Wu  Tai  Mountains,   16. 

Zealand,  227. 


THE   END 


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